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PART A: RESEARCH QUESTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Germany, the shortage of skilled labor is currently one of the most important topics of 
conversation in both politics and the corporate sector (Brenke 2010). Both enterprises 
and employers’ associations caution against the increasing long-term lack of highly 
skilled workforce. The anticipated shortage will mainly be caused by the demographic 
change as well as the increasing emigration of highly educated citizens (Zimmermann 
2010). Although empirical studies conducted by e.g. the DIW (‘Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung’) and the Federal Employment Agency (Brenke 2010; 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011) do not confirm an immediate short-term shortage, the 
Federal Government tries to counteract this trend as early as possible. By setting the 
right incentives, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) tries to 
increase the number of well-trained citizens in Germany. One possibility to generate a 
more highly skilled workforce is to encourage young citizens to upgrade their education 
by attending a university. In order to convince more (promising) high school graduates to 
enroll in tertiary education, the BMBF has increased public spending on merit-based 
scholarships, i.e. scholarships that are allocated on the basis of individual achievement. 
In 2009, 132.3 million € were available for merit-based student scholarships (BMBF 
2009). In comparison to 2005, this corresponds to a 64% increase in financial means 
dedicated to merit-based stipends. 
Albeit, only very little is known about the selection criteria applied in merit-based 
scholarship. Who among all German students is awarded a scholarship and why? The 
BMBF usually only claims to select the ‘best and most promising’ students based on 
elaborated selection processes, but virtually nothing is known about the selection criteria 
employed in this process. The BMBF (2009) merely states to select on the basis of 
subject-specific achievement, personality as well as extracurricular activities. How 
applicants are able to signal their ability and how evaluators screen potential 
scholarship holders is basically unknown. In order to be able to assess the effectiveness 
of these measures, however, one needs to gain in-depth knowledge of the selection 
process and its outcome. Only then, it is possible to evaluate whether or not merit-based 
financial aid is indeed capable of acting as a remedy for the imminent shortage of skilled 
labor by supporting promising young executives and elite members.  
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The only previous attempt to shed some light on the characteristics of German merit-
based scholarship holders has been conducted by Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla 
(2009). Using survey data collected from current stipend awardees they identified how 
the ‘average’ German scholarship holder looks like. Although they were able to get in-
depth insight into the characteristics of those scholarship holders that answered to their 
request (approximately 50% of all contacted subjects), they were not able to separate 
self-selection (supply-side) from screening (demand-side) effects. In order to be able to 
differentiate between supply- and demand-side effects, the present research adopts a 
different approach and analyzes empirically how stipend awarding in one single 
scholarship granting organization is conducted. Being aware of the distinct selection 
criteria used in stipend awarding, the reader will then have a detailed idea about the 
pool of stipend awardees which — according to the BMBF’s vision — represents the group 
of future executives and elite members.  
In order to be able to answer the prevalent research question, this thesis is structured as 
follows: In Part A (Research Questions and Relevant Literature; Chapters 1-3), the 
reader will not only become aquainted with the main research questions as well as the 
institutional background of stipend awarding decisions, but also relevant literature will 
be presented. Part B (The Determinants of Successful Scholarship Applications: 
Theoretical Considerations; Chapters 4 and 5) subsequently provides a theoretical basis 
for an understanding of the drivers behind stipend awarding decisions. Finally, the 
hypotheses derived from Part B will be tested empirically in Part C (Empirical Evidence 
on the Determinants of Successful Scholarship Applications; Chapters 6-8). In more 
detail, Chapter 2 provides a basis for understanding stipend selection processes by 
defining the different types of financial aid available to German students. Chapter 3 
then summarizes the available previous literature. Here, not only previous research on 
stipend awarding decisions will be presented, but also success factors of other types of 
selection processes will be discussed. Subsequently, the theoretical background of the 
investigated selection decision will be presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the 
decision of whom to award a stipend will be discussed both from a sociological and an 
economic perspective. Based on what has been addressed in Chapter 3 and 4, a 
conceptual model reflecting the current selection situation will be developed and a 
number of testable hypotheses will be derived in Chapter 5. The empirical part (Part C) 
begins with the presentation of the data set which has been specifically compiled for this 
research project (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 then addresses the actual empirical analysis of 
stipend awarding success whereas Chapter 8 concludes by providing a brief summary of 
the main results as well as addressing limitations and future research possibilities. 
2 Fundamentals of Student Stipend Awarding  
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2 FUNDAMENTALS OF STUDENT STIPEND AWARDING 
Before analyzing distinct success factors of scholarship selection processes, the reader 
needs to become acquainted with the concept of higher education stipends.1 
Consequently, the present chapter addresses the essentials of student scholarships by 
first providing a definition as well as discussing several types of financial aid. 
Subsequently, some peculiarities of stipend awarding in Germany will be presented. 
2.1 DEFINITIONS AND TYPES OF STUDENT STIPENDS 
Whenever an individual desires to visit a tertiary education institution, he or she needs 
to ensure sufficient funding for several years. Students — or in most cases their parents — 
typically do not only need to pay tuition and general fees, but also have to cover their 
day-to-day expenses for a period of three to five years. Several possibilities of financing 
higher education exist: Working either full- or part-time alongside their studies or 
raising a loan are only two of the opportunities students have. On the other hand, 
student stipends have also been increasingly offered by several institutions and private 
organizations. A stipend in general can be defined as a “source of funds that is provided 
to an individual, […] which allows the individual to pursue a particular interest” 
(Business Dictionary 2012). In the present case, the ‘particular interest’ would be to 
study or more precisely to earn a higher educational degree by graduating from 
university. Another (more functional) definition describes a stipend as a “predetermined 
amount of money that is provided periodically to help offset expenses” 
(Investopedia 2012). Depending on the scholarship provider, college scholarship 
programs can either be state-funded or privately-organized, but only state-based 
financial aid programs will be discussed here.2  
The policy goal of each publicly funded scholarship program is usually to enable more 
high school graduates to study at a higher education institution, i.e. “to make the 
opportunity for a college enrollment more accessible” (Duffourc 2006, 236). Hence, an 
increase in college enrollment is usually aspired. Several distinct types of stipends have 
emerged from this initial objective: By reference to the basis on which scholarships are 
awarded one needs to differentiate between need-based and merit-based scholarships.  
                                                
1  In the course of this thesis, the terms ‘stipend’, ‘scholarship’, ‘sponsorship’, ‘grant’ and ‘award’ 
will be used interchangeably although slightly different definitions exist in the literature.  
2  As selection in privately funded programs might be bound to and hence awarded on the basis 
of the idiosyncratic ideas of the stipend provider, selection and retention criteria are very 
likely to be biased by the private organization’s vision. 
2 Fundamentals of Student Stipend Awarding  
4 
 
Need-based — also called means-tested scholarships — are allocated on the basis of 
somebody’s individual financial neediness (Duffourc 2006; Federal Student Aid). Based 
on the student’s — or in most cases his or her parents’ — discretionary income, need-based 
financial aid is provided as a grant for low-income students only. Consequently, the 
student’s ability to pay determines the amount of financial assistance (Monks 2009). 
Apparently, the objective of these programs is to facilitate university or college 
attendance for otherwise under-privileged high school graduates (Duffourc 2006; Monks 
2009). Merit-based scholarships in contrast are awarded on the basis of individual 
(previous) achievement such as academic, artistic, athletic or other abilities. More 
specifically, these programs can be understood as a “form of financial assistance that 
does not require repayment or employment and which is usually offered to students who 
show potential for distinction, or who possess certain characteristics important to the 
scholarship provider (such as religious beliefs, hobbies, ethnicity, etc.)” (Peterson 20083). 
Selection for (state-funded) merit-based programs in the US is mainly executed on the 
basis of standardized academic qualifications such as GPA or SAT scores (Duffourc 
2006). It becomes obvious that merit-based financial aid does not pursue the objective of 
simply raising college enrollment per se, but to attract “worthy high school graduates” 
(Duffourc 2006, 235), i.e. “the most academically desirable applicants” (Monks 2009, 99). 
The policy goal of each federal state therefore is to keep the best, i.e. the “academically 
proficient students” (Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2006, 761), in state.  
Both types of state-based financial aid usually compete for the same funds and are 
consequently permanently criticized by the respective opponents. Means-tested 
programs are entirely oriented toward needy families. As a result, children whose 
parents’ income is (slightly) above the threshold level are excluded by definition. Due to 
the positive correlation between socio-economic status and high school grades, merit-
based scholarships however are criticized for disproportionally supporting “already-
advantaged students” (Duffourc 2006, 244). As a result of the prevailing need-merit 
debate, most countries opt for a combination of both types of student financial aid. In 
addition to the need-merit distinction, scholarships can also be classified as e.g. student-, 
career- or college-specific according to the person, institution or purpose they are bound 
to. In contrast to the United States, German higher education is mainly taxpayer-funded 
and little, if any tuition is charged at public institutions. Nevertheless, both need- and 
merit-based student scholarship programs exist which will be briefly presented in the 
following section.  
                                                
3  http://www.fastweb.com/financial-aid/articles/815-financial-aid-glossary?page=5. 
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2.2 STIPEND AWARDING IN GERMANY — FACTS AND FIGURES 
Owing to the vision that higher education should be accessible to everybody, most 
publicly-funded German universities do not charge tuition fees, but are funded with the 
help of public means only, i.e. they are indirectly financed by each taxpayer.4 Still, 
students are in need of funds in order to be able to pay their everyday expenses.  
In order to enable as many high school graduates as possible to enroll in tertiary 
education, a nation-wide means-tested program has been established. Each student 
whose parents’ income and/or financial assets are below a certain threshold is entitled to 
benefit from the student grant and will be allocated the grant upon application (BMBF 
2010). The program is regulated by a law named ‘Bundesausbildungsförderungs-Gesetz’ 
(BAföG) and this acronym is also used in order to address the financial aid per se. The 
German legislation has decided upon certain amounts the ‘typical’ German student 
needs in order to cover living as well as study-related expenses. This amount is adapted 
on a regular basis. At present, the maximum rate for students who do not live with their 
parents adds up to 670€ per month (www.bafoeg.bmbf.de). Dependent on the individual 
financial background, each student’s financing gap is calculated by subtracting this 
student’s disposable income from the maximum rate. 50% of the financial aid provided 
by the BAföG is designed as a grant, i.e. this part is not repayable by the student (BMBF 
2010). The other half of the financial aid is designed as an interest-free loan. This loan 
needs to be repaid after graduation, but only up to the maximum amount of 10,000€ 
(every amount which has been disbursed over and above these 10,000€ is transformed 
into a non-repayable grant). Redemption is not possible until five years after graduation 
and might be paid by installments of at least 105€ per month (BMBF 2010). Students 
however whose financial assets exceed the threshold level are not entitled to be 
sponsored by the BAföG. Hence, only ‘under-privileged’ students benefit from the aid 
regulated by the BAföG. In 2007, almost 500,000 students were sponsored by the BAföG 
program (Schmidt 2009). This corresponds to 25.5% of all students enrolled at any type 
of higher education institution in Germany (Destatis 2008; Schmidt 2009). 
In order to additionally support particularly talented students regardless of their socio-
economic background, several state-funded organizations also award merit-based 
scholarships to German students. In particular, twelve organizations who provide 
scholarships for outstanding students (‘Begabtenförderungswerke’) allocate merit-based 
stipends with funds provided by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
                                                
4   In some federal states tuition fees are charged. Albeit, they do not exceed 500€ per semester. 
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Each of these twelve organizations5 puts emphasis on different applicant characteristics 
(BMBF 2009, 2011) and pursues slightly different goals (reflecting the pluralistic concept 
of German merit-based sponsorship). The ‘Cusanuswerk’ as well as the ‘Evangelische 
Studienwerk e.V. Villigst’ for instance are church-related institutions and consequently 
aim at sponsoring catholic (or protestant) students. Other organizations, e.g. the 
‘Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’, are rather affiliated to distinct political parties and desire to 
support prospective political leaders (BMBF 2009, 2011).  
In order to further increase the number of stipend awardees, the BMBF started an 
additional stipend program in 2011 called ‘Deutschlandstipendium’. This type of merit-
based stipend is especially directed at elementary students promising to perform 
excellently at university and during their professional career. Each of these scholarship 
holders receives 300€ jointly funded by public and private means (BMBF 2012a). 
As the majority of German universities do not charge tuition fees from their students, 
merit-based stipends in Germany are rather aimed at identifying future top performers 
at a very early stage of their career (BMBF 2009, 2011). In addition to direct financial 
sponsorships, German merit-based scholarships also support their stipend awardees in 
non-material ways by granting them access to e.g. networks and elite positions (BMBF 
2009). At the moment however, merit-based aid does not rate as high as need-based 
student aid in Germany. Only approximately 1% of all German students, i.e. 24,000 
individuals, is sponsored by any of the above-mentioned organizations (BMBF 2009, 
2012b; Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla 2009). Federal funds provided for this 
purpose however have increased substantially from 80.5 million € in 2005 to 132.3 
million € in 2009 (BMBF 2009) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
aspires to increase this amount substantially in the coming years (BMBF 2011). 
                                                
5  These 12 organizations are: ‘Cusanuswerk’, ‘Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Studienwerk’, 
‘Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. Villigst’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’, ‘Friedrich-Naumann-
Stiftung’, ‘Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung’, ‘Hans-Böckler-Stiftung’, ‘Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung’, ‘Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’, ‘Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung’, ‘Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft’ as well as 
the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’. For more detailed information on each of these 
organizations see e.g. www.begabtenfoerderungswerke.de or BMBF (2009).  
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3 RELATED LITERATURE 
In order to relate the investigation of who is awarded a scholarship to previous research 
activities, the following section gives an overview of the related literature. To the best of 
my knowledge, only very few researchers have previously explicitly investigated who 
succeeds in a stipend selection process. The only two investigations addressing an at 
least similar research question have been conducted by Freeman (2005) and 
Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009).  
Freeman (2005) empirically investigated the determinants of stipend awardees for 
graduate students using panel data of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate 
Fellowship Research Program. With the purpose of giving policy advice of how to raise 
the number of US natives choosing science and engineering careers, he empirically 
tested how several factors affected the probability of being awarded a stipend over a 
period of 22 years (1976 to 1998). Freeman (2005) finds scholastic achievements such as 
Grade Point Averages (GPA), Graduate Records Examination (GRE) scores and the 
quality of reference letters to be most important for the probability of receiving a 
stipend. Furthermore, controlling for demographic determinants revealed that — in line 
with the diversity criterion — women and minority group members c.p. have better 
chances of receiving the award than majority men. Investigating more than 100,000 
award decisions over a period of more than 20 years, Freeman (2005) is able to explain a 
high proportion of variation in both award offers and panel ratings. Although originally 
aiming at a different purpose — giving policy recommendations of how to increase the 
number of native Science and Engineering (S & E) graduate students by increasing the 
number of stipends awarded — Freeman’s (2005) paper gives a first insight into the 
determinants of stipend awarding. It was the first investigation of the criteria evaluators 
in a stipend selection process apply. 
Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) conducted the only study about stipend 
granting behavior in Germany, but went into a slightly different direction than Freeman 
(2005). With the help of a survey conducted in October 2008 among all 19,958 actual 
scholarship recipients of eleven German institutions who provide scholarships for 
outstanding students6 they tried to find out how the social profile of an average student 
                                                
6  ‘Begabtenförderungswerke’ in German. Note that of all 12 institutions presented in Chapter 2, 
the ‘Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Studienwerk‘ was not considered in the Middendorff, Isserstedt and 
Kandulla (2009) study. 
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scholarship recipient looks like. 7 In order to be able to classify and evaluate the findings 
of their investigation, Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) consulted data from 
another survey based on a representative German student sample (‘18. Sozialerhebung 
des Deutschen Studentenwerks’, see Isserstedt et al. 2007 for details). Having analyzed 
the questionnaires of all stipend awardees who voluntarily took part (48% of all current 
scholarship holders), Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) inter alia found 
evidence for some kind of social imbalance: The major part (51% resp. 21%) of 
scholarship holders comes from the upper (middle) class and children from less educated 
backgrounds are highly underrepresented (less than 10% have a working class 
background). The classification to these ‘social groups of origin’ is based on a 
combination of both the parents’ educational background and current occupation. 8  
 
Figure 3-1  Social Origin of Stipend Awardees (left column) and All Students in Germany (right column)  
(Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla 2009, 28). 
Compared to all students in Germany, the fraction of those being classified as having an 
upper class background is significantly higher among sponsored students (51% vs. 37%), 
whereas students from the upper middle class (21% vs. 24%), the middle class (19% vs. 
25%) and the working class (9% vs. 14%) are underrepresented in comparison to the 
                                                
7  Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) divide their study into two sections: 
(undergraduate) student and doctoral stipends. Here, only the results concerning 
(undergraduate) student profiles are presented, as this is the population of interest in the 
present research. Students also represent the majority of all stipend awardees: approximately 
85% of all 19,958 scholarship recipients in October 2008 were students (16,935 vs. 2,949 
doctoral students, s.p. 14). 
8  For a detailed explanation, see Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009), p. 28-30 and 
Appendix, Picture A.1. 
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entire student body in Germany (see figure 3-1). In consequence, the authors postulate 
that a social injustice in scholarship provisions exists. These kinds of scholarships rather 
seem to be granted to those who have access to a good education anyways (even without 
the scholarship) and — following their assessment — fail to support those really in need of 
such a fellowship. Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) also compare the fraction 
of students with a migrational background among sponsored and ‘regular’ students, but 
do not find any substantial differences between both stipend awardees and all students. 
They do find some further differences in the demographic profile: stipend awardees are 
for instance slightly younger and more frequently live outside of their parental home. 
Additionally, some academic, scholastic and professional characteristics also differ 
between the two groups (e.g. the fraction of students having completed an apprenticeship 
prior to their studies is significantly lower among stipend awardees and the percentage 
of those having already studied or lived abroad is significantly higher among sponsored 
students). Stipend awardees also work part-time less frequently and if they do, they 
rather do it for career instead of monetary reasons (as ‘regular’ students mostly declare). 
Nevertheless, the disparity in social backgrounds of stipend awardees and all students 
remains the most obvious result Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) found in 
their study.  
Even though this study is an important step towards understanding scholarship 
granting behavior, it lacks some important steps in order to be able to make inferences 
about how selection procedures in this context work. One major shortcoming of this 
investigation is that it addresses only those who have been granted the scholarship. 
Although getting in-depth information about the background of those who are financially 
supported by one of these institutions, we have no information about those who were 
rejected. We are therefore not able to find out whether e.g. the apparent uneven social 
distribution among scholarship recipients is due to self-selection processes (i.e. because 
only those having an upper class background applied for the scholarship) or whether 
evaluators discriminate against applicants with a working class background. This deficit 
can only be eliminated by investigating the entire selection process as opposed to only 
asking the successful applicants some questions about their social background. 
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Apart from the above mentioned studies, no (empirical) research has been published 
dealing with the determinants of stipend awards.9 Only in laboratory experiments, a 
fictitious setting of the selection of scholarship applicants has been used to demonstrate 
and explain physical attractiveness and similarity-attraction phenomena (Agthe, Spörrle 
and Maner 2010).10  
Due to the lack of further literature on (merit-based) scholarship awarding decisions, 
literature dealing with related fields needs to be used as a reference for hypotheses 
development. First, the scope of related literature will be extended to include empirical 
elite research in general and upward mobility in particular in Chapter 3.1. 
Understanding a) who is considered to be an elite member and b) who is actually able to 
move up to elite status in Germany is crucial for getting an impression of how elites are 
built in Germany. Only then it is possible to anticipate which characteristics and 
attributes might influence the evaluator’s decision in stipend awarding decisions.  
Subsequently, the focus of the literature review turns to success factors in other types of 
selection processes. First, some papers investigating determinants of success in an 
educational selection process need to be discussed (Chapter 3.2). Finally, most important 
findings for the type of selection process that has been studied most frequently so far — 
the personnel selection process — will be presented in Chapter 3.3, arranged according to 
the respective influence factor(s) that have been studied in these papers.  
                                                
9  All other studies on scholarship programs that have been published so far rather deal with the 
optimal financial design of scholarship programs in order to maximize either the number of 
students going abroad (Lien 2007) or their post-program ability (Lien Liu 2010; Lien Wang 
2010) and not with the question of who is actually selected. Additionally, some empirical 
research on the impact of merit-based financial assistance on college enrollment has been 
conducted (Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2006; Monks 2009; Stanley and French 2009). 
Furthermore, self-selection into, i.e. application for, a (means-tested) scholarship program in 
the United States has been empirically tested by Singell (2002) and Figlio, Hart and Metzger 
(2010). Mead (1965) gives a descriptive overview of a union scholarship program and Opheim 
(2006) examines policy-induced changes in the number and composition of (means-tested) 
student support in Norway. But as outlined in Chapter 2, merit-based and means-tested 
scholarships serve completely different purposes and therefore, totally different admission 
criteria will be applied by the evaluators for each type of scholarship program.  
10  A more detailed presentation of the results of this study is provided in Chapter 3.3.2. 
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3.1 WHO IS ABLE TO BECOME AN ELITE MEMBER IN GERMANY? 
First and foremost, it is not my intention to give a comprehensive (historical) literature 
review on German empirical elite research.11 In this section, only a few selected 
empirical investigations dealing with the question of who belongs to the German elite 
will be presented, particularly focusing on the question which of an individual’s 
attributes are decisive for elite recruitment.  
In elite research, there is a lack of unity in the understanding of elite formation. 
According to Kaina (2006, 2009), there is still no general consensus about who belongs to 
the elite(s) of a particular society and why. Empirical research on elite formation mainly 
relies on characteristics of those who are currently understood as being elite members.12 
With the help of detailed surveys and interviews, elite researchers inter alia try to find 
out which attributes are of importance in elite recruitment. The most important 
empirical studies in Germany trying to find answers to this question are three surveys 
known as ‘Mannheimer Elitestudien’ which were conducted in West Germany in 1968, 
1972 and 1981 respectively as well as a follow-up study called ‘Potsdamer Elitestudie’ in 
1995 in which executives from the reunified Federal Republic of Germany were 
interviewed. Another important analysis has been conducted by Hartmann (2002) who 
tracked and analyzed both the origin and the career progression of four cohorts of PhD 
graduates in Engineering, Law and Economics. The results of the two most recent elite 
studies (1981 and 1995) will be presented briefly and compared to what Hartmann 
(2002) found in his investigation in the following sections. 
  
                                                
11  Readers interested in a general overview: see e.g. Hoffmann-Lange (1992; 2001), Hartmann 
(2002) and Kaina (2009). 
12  Who is to be interviewed in these surveys, i.e. who is considered to be an elite member, can be 
elaborated following three different approaches (reputational approach, decisional approach, 
positional approach). For a detailed explanation of these three elite member identification 
approaches, see e.g. Putnam (1976), Felber (1986), Hoffmann-Lange (1987, 2007) or Kaina 
(2009). 
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Procedure of the Elite Studies in 1981 and 1995 
All of the four main German elite studies strived for a census of all current occupants of 
leadership positions in Germany (Machatzke 1997). In order to be able to conduct 
comparisons between all elite studies, maximal consistency in terms of both content and 
selection of respondents was intended. Respondents in all four studies were selected 
following the positional approach which is the most frequently used approach in the 
social sciences: This approach is the simplest (and therefore fastest) of all approaches 
and is based on the assumption that power in industrialized societies is linked to formal 
positions of leadership (Wildenmann et al. 1982; Hoffmann-Lange 2007) rather than to 
individuals. According to this approach, several positional elites are determined 
following a multi-stage procedure: First, all relevant sectors of society are identified. 
Second, within each sector, influential organizations such as political parties or 
corporations are identified. Third, executive positions are determined and current 
occupants of these positions are contacted. Being the easiest and most reliable way of 
identifying the target group, the positional approach is the most frequently used method 
in the social sciences (Kaina 2009).  
Sectors of society that have been included in the Mannheim Elite Study in 198113 
(Wildenmann et al. 1982) were  
(1) Politics 
(2) Administration 
(3) Business (Commercial Enterprises) 
(4) Trade Associations 
(5) Unions 
(6) Mass Media 
(7) Science 
(8) Military 
(9) Culture 
(10) Other 
  
                                                
13  Due to the longitudinal design, basically the same sectors have been included in the remaining 
three elite studies. 
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In total, 3,580 positions had been identified in 1981 (Wildenmann et al. 1982). In 1995, 
the number of executive positions investigated totaled 4,569 (von Rosenblatt et al. 1995). 
Due to vacancies, job rotations during the observation period or accumulations of 
multiple positions, the number of actually contacted persons occupying these positions 
was reduced to 3,165 in 1981 and 3,941 in 1995. All of the identified subjects were 
informed in writing about the study and its purpose and were asked to participate in 
individual interviews.14 Table 3-1 illustrates the number of individuals contacted in each 
year, the response rates as well as the final number of participants in each sector. 
  1981 1995 
Sector  Contacted 
Subjects 
Response 
Rate 
Subjects 
Interviewed 
Contacted 
Subjects 
Response 
Rate 
Subjects 
Interviewed 
Politics  452  60,6% 274 898 55,6%  499
Administration  471  62,8% 296 646 73,4%  474
Business  688  41,4% 285 651 38,2%  249
Trade associations  296  58,8% 174 310 55,8%  173
Unions  155  56,1% 87 164 59,1%  97
Mass Media  354  62,7% 222 454 61,9%  281
Science  179  72,6% 130 202 81,2%  164
Military  172  25,0% 43 157 86,0%  135
Culture  180  57,8% 104 178 56,7%  101
Other  218  59,2% 129 281 69,8%  168
Total  3,165  55,1% 1,744 3,941 59,4%  2,341
Table 3-1  Number of Contacted Subjects and Response Rate in the Elite Studies of 1981 and 1995  
 Source: Wildenmann et al. (1982), 16-17 and von Rosenbladt et al. (1995), 33. 
The data analysis mainly remained descriptive: Proportions of several groups in both the 
elite and the entire population at this particular point of time were compared and 
(dis)proportionality indices in several sectors were determined. In order to find out 
whether or not access to elite positions is determined by social background or education 
or both, also logistic regression models were used to isolate these effects.  
  
                                                
14  Detailed information about all questions asked during the interviews can be obtained from the 
appendices of Wildenmann et al. (1982), Hoffmann-Lange (1992) and Bürklin et al. (1997). The 
original questionnaires of both studies can also be requested from the ‘GESIS - Leibniz 
Institute for the Social Sciences/Data Archive for the Social Sciences (DAS) Germany’ 
(http://www.gesis.org/en/services/research/data-catalogue/) under the heading ‘ZA1139’ for the 
1981 Mannheim Elite Study and ‘ZA2881’ for the 1995 Potsdam Elite Study. 
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Procedure of the Hartmann study 
Hartmann (2002) chose a different approach. Believing that the doctorate is the highest 
(general) educational qualification, Hartmann (2002) assumes that one will find the 
highest social selectivity among PhD graduates. He also denotes that a PhD in the fields 
of Engineering, Law and Economics is disproportionately common among elite members, 
and therefore examines only career paths of four cohorts of PhD graduates in these 
fields. Hartmann (2002) chose to track the careers of 6,500 individuals who graduated in 
either 1955, 1965, 1975 or 1985. In order to be able to analyze both origin and career 
development of these individuals, he extracted important variables of the graduates’ 
CV.15 Additionally, Hartmann consulted relevant compendia (e.g. the ‘Hoppenstedt-
Handbuch’ for business careers) approximately ten years after each graduation in order 
to add occupational information to the data set. Apart from only including PhD 
graduates, the main difference to the traditional elite studies is that Hartmann does not 
interview his subjects, but tries to consult more objective data from official sources. 
Hartmann (2002) also mainly illustrates his findings descriptively using separate 
proportions for e.g. different social classes, but additionally applies more sophisticated 
multivariate procedures such as Event History Analysis to find answers to how access to 
and success in elite positions is determined. 
Results 
The fact that access to elites mainly depends on the social background of an individual 
has been widely acknowledged by all researchers using the data of the above mentioned 
four studies (Hoffmann-Lange 1992; Schnapp 1997; Hartmann 2002, 2004, 2007): 
Children from upper (middle) classes have relatively better opportunities to reach an 
elite position than individuals possessing ‘only’ a middle class background. But this 
social imbalance does not hold true for all elite sectors: Whereas access to business, 
public administration and military elites is mainly granted to upper class members, elite 
positions in law, science, union and political fields are filled with individuals from all 
social classes. Being aware of this (partial) social imbalance in elite recruitment and 
making use of the quasi-longitudinal data basis, also changes in elite composition over 
time can be examined: Has the relative influence of social origin decreased over time? As 
functional elite theory predicts,16 have meritocratic, i.e. performance-related, selection 
                                                
15  Age, gender, degree-granting university, field of studies, beginning & length of study, number 
and location of universities attended, full/part-time employment before, during & after the 
studies as well as the social origin (3 categories) count among the variables Hartmann (2002) 
was able to extract from most of the CVs attached to the PhD thesis. For a more detailed 
description of his research design, see Hartmann (2002), 31-43 & Hartmann (2001), Chapter 2. 
16   For a detailed discussion of functional elite theory, see Chapter 4.1.2 of this thesis. 
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criteria gained in importance over the last decades? Schnapp (1997), Rebenstorf (1997) 
and Hartmann (2002) draw quite controversial conclusions when addressing this issue: 
Whereas Hartmann (2002) even denotes tendencies for more severe social imbalances in 
the recent past in his study, both Schnapp (1997) and Rebenstorf (1997) provide support 
for a (slightly) facilitated, i.e. broader, access to elite positions compared to the results 
from the earlier ‘Mannheimer Elitestudien’. These differences might occur due to the 
different methodological strategies applied. Whereas Hartmann (2002) only considers 
official information about the careers of PhD graduates, the traditional elite studies 
follow the positional approach and interview persons in elite positions regardless of their 
education. Both strategies have inherent advantages and disadvantages, but as a result 
of the differing sample they can lead to different results. Secondly, the classification of 
the social background also varies among the studies. The elite study uses Goldthorpe’s 
(1982) concept of the service class, while Hartmann (2002) originally built eleven 
categories and combined these to three social classes which are not necessarily 
congruent with the service class classification.17  
The question remains whether the social background has a direct or only an indirect 
effect (or even both) on elite access opportunities. Schnapp (1997) illustrates all possible 
relations between the three variables ‘Social Background’, ‘Education’ and ‘Elite Status’ 
in four different models (see figure 3-2). 
 
Figure 3-2  Models Reflecting the Relation between Social Background, Education and Elite Status 
(according to Schnapp 1997, 84). 
                                                
17  For a more detailed explanation of how both authors classified the social background, 
see Hartmann (2002), 33-34 and Schnapp (1997), 72-73.  
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It is feasible that both meritocratic (education) and non-meritocratic (social background) 
attributes can have an influence on whether or not somebody belongs to an elite. 
Whenever each variable has a direct separate influence on elite status, but both effects 
are independent from each other, Model I would be supported. Modell II by contrast 
postulates only a direct effect of somebody’s background on his or her course of 
education. Having achieved a better education then in turn improves the chances of 
becoming an elite member, but no direct effects of somebody’s social background can be 
found. This would mean that the social background only indirectly affects elite access as 
it facilitates access to education which is a prerequisite for elite status. Following Model 
III, one would expect a direct effect of social background on both education possibilities 
and elite admission, whereas Model IV claims that social background has both a direct 
and an indirect effect (via education) on elite membership.  
As e.g. Schnapp (1997) concludes, higher educational achievement, i.e. a university 
degree, indeed leads to improved recruitment chances. But as the probability of 
achieving a university degree in Germany is significantly higher for upper class 
members,18 this might be the actual driver of unequal elite access opportunities (as 
Models II and IV predict). But both Hartmann (2002) and Schnapp (1997) further 
observe a direct influence of a person’s social background although controlling for given 
unequal chances to obtain a university degree. This leads to a ‘double privilege’ for upper 
class members which is reflected in Model IV and may be explained by the use of 
Bourdieu’s (1983) different kinds of capital. Due to cultural and economic capital, 
descendants from upper class families face better chances to obtain tertiary education 
and subsequently a university degree. Apart from that, they also possess higher social 
capital which basically means that they have access to social networks allowing them to 
inofficially gather information that might stimulate their career (Schnapp 1997). This 
lack of social capital can only be partly compensated for by acquiring a good tertiary 
education and individuals coming from lower social classes can thereby only partially 
improve their recruitment opportunities (Schnapp 1997). 
Apart from the social background of a person, other socio-demographic characteristics 
were also salient in the elite populations from 1981 and 1995 and differ significantly 
from the entire population (see table 3-2).  
  
                                                
18  See e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012). 
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  1981 1995 
Socio‐demographic Attributes  Elite Members  German 
Population  Elite Members 
German 
Population 
Age  53 38 52  40
Proportion of Females  3% 52% 13%  51%
University Degree  68% 4,7% 78%  7,6%
Thereof: 
PhD  49% n.a.19 47%  n.a.
Habilitation  8% n.a. 8%  n.a.
Total Subjects Considered  1,744 61,658,000 3,241  81,817,000
Table 3-2  Selected Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Elite Members in 1981 and 1995 
 Sources: Values for Elites 1981: own calculations based on the data set of the Mannheim Elite 
Study (ZA1139); Values for Elites 1995: Kaina 2009, 402. German population indices calculated 
from Destatis 2012a, 15-17; Destatis 2011a, 12. 
Overall, elite members are relatively old in all four studies: In 1995, they were on 
average 52 years old (Kaina 2009), but the average age varied significantly in different 
elite sectors. Whereas elite members in politics and mass media have always been the 
youngest, elite positions in business, administration and trade associations are 
constantly filled with the oldest of all elite members. This is directly related to the fact 
that career advancement is mainly driven by seniority: Especially in West Germany (in 
1995), most of the elite members had been working for this specific organization for more 
than a decade before advancing to the current elite position with an average age of 49. 
Consulting the findings of Opitz (2005) on the career progression of top managers in the 
US, France and Germany, it is not likely that this finding represents a peculiarity of the 
German elite. Transferring Opitzes (2005) results for high potentials on elites, German 
elite members are not expected to be significantly older than their international 
equivalents. Women are traditionally underrepresented in all elite positions (Kaina 
2009), although the overall percentage of female executives has constantly risen from 2% 
in 1968 to 13% in 1995. Especially, in business (1%), trade associations (2%), science 
(3%) and military elites (1%), women were extremely underrepresented in the 1995 
study whereas female elite members in politics account for more than a third of all 
executives (36%). To conclude, elite positions are still dominated by relatively old, male 
and highly educated individuals stemming from the upper classes. Nevertheless, the 
survey results from 1995 indicate a slight tendency towards broader access opportunities 
for lower class members as long as they take the opportunity to obtain the same tertiary 
education as their upper class ‘competitors’.  
                                                
19  Prior to 1998, the PhD was not separately recorded by the Federal Bureau of Statistics 
(‘Statistisches Bundesamt’) and was simply classified as ‘university degree’. Only data on all 
PhD graduations in a given year is available for these years (Destatis 2011b, 10). 
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3.2 WHO SUCCEEDS IN OTHER EDUCATIONAL SELECTION PROCESSES? 
In the absence of empirical findings (or better: publications) on scholarship awarding 
decisions, it might be helpful to look at other selection processes in educational settings. 
Although knowing that the purpose of these selection processes — and therefore also the 
‘ideal’ candidate - can be quite different from the current context, some success factors 
identified in other educational selection processes may also prevail in stipend granting 
behavior and may assist in hypotheses development for the current study.  
When it comes to selection processes in education, college admission decisions are one of 
the most frequently analyzed subjects: Who is admitted to a certain college and who is 
rejected? Which are the selection criteria colleges base their decision on? How do colleges 
screen prospective students? How do college applicants signal their aptitude for studying 
at the college/university they applied for? The most important findings of papers trying 
to find answers to these questions will be presented subsequently.20  
Facing an increasing supply-demand imbalance, colleges and universities all over the 
world need to establish fair, consistent, reliable and valid selection processes (Turner 
and Nicholson 2011) in order to minimize misjudgments. In Germany, university 
admission decisions are traditionally mainly based on the high school grade average21 
while the use of other criteria such as standardized aptitude tests is rather exceptional 
(Formazin et al. 2011). In the United States and the United Kingdom however, college 
admission is quite selective22 and the aptitude of applicants needs to be assessed in 
advance. As colleges and universities lack a uniform definition of aptitude and as 
academic achievements always have to be assessed in the educational context of an 
applicant (Stringer 2008), selection or rejection decisions are based on several 
meritocratic and non-meritocratic criteria. How these criteria look like has for instance 
been empirically tested in several studies in the UK, the Netherlands and in the US. 
Numerous studies on college admission have been conducted in medical or psychology 
school contexts which seem to be the most selective fields of study (in Europe) and 
consequently much attention is placed on the selection of medical students (Carr 2009). 
Aspiring to select future doctors in a more holistic way than solely looking at academic 
qualifications (Nicholson and Turner 2011), British medical schools select with the help 
of diverse criteria provided by students in their applications, especially in times of 
                                                
20  As being admitted to a higher education institution is a prerequisite for having the chance of 
being awarded a study-related scholarship, success factors of college applications may also be 
of importance to stipend awarding decisions. 
21  For students who do not meet the required numerus clausus at once, waiting periods improve 
the chances of being admitted to university (www.wartesemester.de).  
22  At least for colleges or universities of high quality (elite institutions). 
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decreasing academic variability. Formal aptitude testing has only recently been 
introduced in the UK as a new means of selecting prospective students and is still 
subject to controversial public discussion (McDonald et al. 2000). High school graduates 
wishing to attend medical school hand in their application form to a central body, the 
Universities and Colleges Admission Service (UCAS). Completed application forms 
include personal information about the candidates, details about their academic 
achievements, a letter of motivation for their wish to study medicine as well as at least 
one letter of reference. The statements provided in these forms are usually verified by 
several attached official documents and certificates (Nicholson and Turner 2011). 
Selectors at medical schools screen these forms and identify which candidates they want 
to reject at this early stage and which of the applicants they would like to invite to a 
personal interview.  
With the use of both a focus group design with 17 selectors of a London based medical 
school as well as a content analysis of selector marking forms, Nicholson and Turner 
(2011) identified criteria frequently used for both selection and rejection of a candidate. 
Most frequently, the provision and reflection of medically-related work experience led to 
the invitation of a candidate. Although there was only little consensus about the 
appropriate or minimum amount of work experience a candidate needs to show, all focus 
group participants agreed that a lack of any work experience in the medical field leads to 
the immediate rejection of a candidate. Furthermore, showing some commitment of any 
sort — extracurricular activities, sports or even a part-time job on weekends — revealed to 
be advantageous for an application to be considered. The same applies for personal 
statements that have to be judged quite subjectively: As long as the candidate is able to 
show any interest outside the academic field and conveys his or her ability to work in a 
team, personal statements rather lead to the selection of candidates. Negative teacher 
references are seen as alert signals and often lead to a rejection of a candidate. (Overly) 
positive letters of recommendation in turn do not necessarily lead to an invitation of the 
candidate, as selectors do not perceive these letters as being explicit enough as they have 
to ‘read between the lines’. This corresponds to the limited predictive power of teacher 
references that Ferguson et al. (2003) found when examining the relationship between 
personality, references and personal statements with performance in medical school. “In 
summary the ‘ideal’ candidate was selected for having undertaken and reflected upon an 
appropriate amount and type of medically-related work experience, having a supportive 
teacher reference, possessing positive attributes detailed in the candidate’s personal 
statement, and demonstrating commitment to the study of medicine” (Nicholson and 
Turner 2011, 305). 
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The advantageousness of such costly and time-consuming selection procedures in 
comparison to selection by lottery has been shown in the Netherlands by Urlings-Strop 
et al. (2009). In a controlled experiment they identified that assessing applicants’ 
cognitive and non-cognitive aptitude a priori leads to the selection of students whose 
dropout rate is significantly lower (2.6 times) than that of students who have been 
admitted by lottery. In terms of academic performance however, no significant 
differences have been found between these two groups. 
For the United States, different college admission criteria might apply. In contrast to 
most European countries, formal aptitude testing (SAT) has had a long tradition in the 
US. Nevertheless, at least for some high quality colleges and universities, some factors 
other than SAT scores play an important role in admission. For psychology graduate 
students, Rodolfa et al. (1999) have identified several exclusion and inclusion criteria in 
the predoctoral internship selection process which represents the last step for graduate 
students before earning their doctoral degree. Looking at graduate students’ selection 
success might be particularly beneficial for the study of scholarship success factors, as 
applicants for stipends are usually also advanced students. The factors that selectors 
indicated in the 1999 survey to be most important for selection are in descending order 
(1) applicant fit, (2) supervised clinical work experience, (3) completion of related 
doctoral coursework, (4) the interview, (5) the status/reputation of the attended doctoral 
program, (6) completion of written and oral examinations, (7) the professional demeanor 
displayed by the applicant and (8) the letter of recommendation provided by the 
applicant. Distinct exclusion criteria are the lack of accreditation of the doctoral program 
and the non-completion of exams. Ginkel, Davis and Michael (2010) replicated the 
survey after the introduction of a standardized application procedure and mainly found 
personal characteristics — as opposed to meritocratic attributes — to have increased in 
importance. They interpret the change as a way for selectors to differentiate between 
applicants of equal academic achievements. 
Apart from peculiarities of medical and psychological curricula, other American studies 
have tried to identify more general US college admission criteria for diverse disciplines. 
One of the most comprehensive investigations trying to identify how US institutions 
select undergraduate students has been conducted by the nonprofit College Board 
Association (Rigol 2003). With the help of interviews, site visits and examining both 
official and internal college materials, Rigol (2003) found that there does not seem to be 
a best practice of how college admission decisions are made in the United States. Various 
heterogeneous approaches to student selection exist and each college or university has 
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elaborated individual policies and practices. Depending on the institutional mission 
pursued and therefore the desired outcome for its students, colleges adopt different 
selection strategies. An approach which is commonly adopted by public colleges and 
universities is to admit all students meeting certain predetermined requirements such 
as grades or test scores above a certain threshold. These institutions are called 
entitlement or open access institutions. Other institutions rather want to maximize the 
success of admitted students and admission mainly depends on how these colleges or 
universities define success. These types of institutions look for a student body that 
optimally reflects the institution’s vision. This does not necessarily mean that each 
individual student needs to meet certain predefined criteria, but the best balance of 
student skills, talents, backgrounds and interests is sought after. Naturally, all selection 
approaches are subject to constant change according to supply and demand in a given 
selection year. In her report, Rigol (2003) offers an in-depth analysis of the different 
approaches higher education institutions in the US adopt and outlines seven different 
models that are frequently used to select undergraduate students. Although differing 
very much in their selection practices, most colleges and universities share the use of the 
following categories of factors considered (Rigol 2003, 19): 
a) Academic Achievement, Quality and Potential 
Direct Measures 
Caliber of High School 
Evaluative Measures 
b) Nonacademic Characteristics and Attributes 
Geographic 
Personal Background 
Extracurricular Activities, Service and Leadership 
Personal Attributes 
Extenuating Circumstances 
Other23 
As this list shows, admission criteria in the US are influenced both by meritocratic and 
non-meritocratic characteristics. 
  
                                                
23  A summary of application components is provided by Rigol (2003), 61-67 and a more detailed 
enumeration of all factors that may be used in selection can be found in Rigol (2003), 75-77. 
3 Related Literature  
22 
 
One of the largest and most frequently cited scientific US studies on college admission 
has been conducted by Manski and Wise (1983). In the course of empirically 
investigating individual economic higher education decisions and behavior of US 
citizens, Manski and Wise (1983) also examined the admission behavior of universities 
and colleges of different quality. By simultaneously looking at individual application and 
institutional admission decisions, Manski and Wise (1983) found that on average, the 
admission to a four-year college of a certain quality is mainly influenced by the 
individual decision to apply for it. This means, college admission is rather the result of 
applicant self-selection than a consequence of admission officers’ decisions. Using data 
from the National Longitudinal Study of the high school class of 1972, Manski and Wise 
(1983) conducted a multivariate analysis comparing the effects of four groups of 
variables measuring academic potential as well as nonacademic attributes on both 
application and admission to colleges of different qualities.24 Being able to use such a 
broad dataset encompassing all high school graduates, they do not only have information 
about actual college applicants, but also about those who decided not to go to college. 
The four groups of variables Manski and Wise (1983) tested included  
(1) academic and nonacademic high school performance, 
(2) an applicant’s socio-economic background, 
(3) local labor market conditions representing alternatives to studying and  
(4) indicators of sex and high school environment (urban vs. rural). 
The results show that the “most important determinant of both college choice and 
admission is scholastic preparation, as reflected in the SAT score and high school class 
rank measures” (Manski and Wise 1983, 84). For college admission, college quality 
represents the key factor: Colleges already hosting better performing students seem to 
be more selective than colleges requiring only lower academic aptitude and admitting 
freshmen with lower SAT scores. Therefore, SAT scores are an important determinant of 
selection outcomes of high quality colleges. Leadership positions as well as athletic 
achievements in high school only have a minor influence on college admission decisions, 
but do affect individual application decisions significantly. Concerning the socioeconomic 
background, parents’ education and income positively affects college application and 
college quality. As the returns to college education are generally higher for black high 
school graduates, they are c.p. more likely to apply to a college than Whites. For 
admission decisions however, the race of an applicant is irrelevant.  
                                                
24  School quality is measured as the average combined SAT score of freshmen entering the school 
to which a student applies (Manski and Wise 1983, 69). 
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Manski and Wise (1983) were able to show that measures of academic aptitude such as 
SAT scores are much more important for individual application decisions than for 
institutional admission results. This reflects a substantial influence of self-selection in 
higher education decisions: “Although people with low academic ability and poor past 
performance are very unlikely to apply to any four-year college, such people, if they were 
to apply to a college of average quality, would have a high probability of admission. The 
probability of admission is much higher than the probability of application” (Manski and 
Wise 1983, 89). 
In summary, the way in which signaling and screening in college admission decisions 
work does not only vary between countries or continents, but also within a country, very 
different selection criteria are applied. Depending on the status and the quality of an 
institution, totally different admission criteria emerge. But in order to ensure a selection 
process as transparent and fair as possible, most institutions mainly rely on ‘objective’ 
criteria such as test scores, high school performance, work experience and references.  
Applying these results to the present situation on the one hand assists in understanding 
how selection processes in educational settings work in general. But on the other hand, 
one needs to bear in mind that the rationale behind student selection and/or admission is 
quite different from stipend awarding decisions: Whereas colleges and universities try to 
maximize average student success — however this might be measured —, scholarship 
granting organizations aim at supporting future elite members in both material and non-
material ways (BMBF 2009). Due to this goal discrepancy, success factors in stipend 
awarding decisions might vary widely from college admission success factors.  
  
3 Related Literature  
24 
 
3.3 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCESSES? 
In the absence of further empirical investigations of related elite or educational selection 
criteria, it may be worthwhile looking at success factors of other applicant selection 
processes being characterized by a substantive supply-demand imbalance. The most 
extensively investigated applicant selection process in economics, psychology and social 
sciences is the personnel selection process. As choosing the wrong candidate can become 
very costly, a large interest in the drivers and determinants of personnel selection exists. 
Research questions commonly addressed are: Who among a job applicant pool gets the 
opportunity to present himself in an interview? Who in the end gets the job? Which are 
credible signals job candidates provide in their application? How do employers screen the 
ability of applicants? Are there any factors prevalent in the selection process that are of 
rather subjective nature and bias the evaluators’ decision? Numerous researchers 
focusing on the strand of research dealing with “explaining and predicting an 
individual’s success in job search” (Chia 2005, 75) have addressed these questions 
empirically so far. Studies trying to reveal the relative importance of various factors on 
somebody’s selection success can be classified into three major categories according to 
the method used in data collection. Researchers either  
(1) conducted a survey among (potential) employers asking them to indicate the 
relative importance of several criteria in selecting a new employee, 
(2) reviewed actual success rates of real applicants, or 
(3) performed experiments by manipulating two or more independent variables. 
Additionally, meta-analyses try to summarize the respective effects of a certain 
influencing factor found in numerous previous studies in diverse fields and occupations. 
All of the above mentioned methods do have several respective limitations that need to 
be mentioned. Data gathered from questionnaires sent to employers will always be 
subject to manipulation by those filling in the survey (stated preferences): This may 
result in subjective and sometimes even false evaluations of selection criteria that do not 
reflect reality as e.g. Behrenz (2001) and Cole et al. (2007) were able to show. Actual 
success criteria from real selection periods (revealed preferences) are hard to get as most 
employers usually do not publish the characteristics of either applicants or newly 
recruited employees. Experiments in turn only represent a very simplified model of 
reality in which the applicants only differ in two or three key characteristics/attributes. 
The most important findings from all these kinds of studies will be presented in the 
following sections.  
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Due to the abundance of empirical papers addressing personnel selection success factors, 
the results will be arranged in the order of the influence factors examined in the 
respective studies. Whenever the importance of a certain factor of influence varies 
according to the screening activity employed by the recruiter (e.g. pre-selection based on 
paper credentials vs. final selection after an interview), the respective effects will be 
discussed separately. Beginning with rather objective criteria that can be classified as 
signals (Chapter 3.3.1) according to Spence (1973)25, the review subsequently turns to 
the respective influence of factors that Posthuma, Morgeson and Campion (2002) label 
individual difference factors (Chapter 3.3.2) and situational factors (Chapter 3.3.3). 
 
Figure 3-3  Structure of Chapter 3.3 (Personnel Selection Literature)  
Source: Own Illustration 
  
                                                
25  For a more detailed explanation of Spences (1973) model, see Chapter 4.2.2. 
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3.3.1 The Influence of Ability Signals 
Efficient and fair personnel selection should be based on objective, i.e. merit-based or 
job-relevant qualifications. In Spence’s (1973) terminology, everything that can be 
classified as an objective measure of and credential for ability or future productivity is 
understood as a signal. In contrast to indices, signals are alterable by the individual 
applicant and therefore follow a function of the applicant’s investment or effort. 
Recruiters commonly extract these kinds of ability signals from biographical data — also 
referred to as biodata - applicants provide in their application. Biodata is defined by 
Brown and Campion (1994, 897) as “work experience, education, activities, and other life 
history information contained in resumes and applications”. With the help of this 
information, recruiters make inferences about a person’s ability when screening (Brown 
and Campion 1994) and follow the rationale that “nothing predicts future performance 
as well as past performance” (Harold, McFarland and Weekley 2006, 337). In the 
aggregate, biodata inventories count among the most effective predictors of job 
performance (Brown and Campion 1994; Becton et al. 2009) and therefore represent a 
relatively valid selection device (Harold, McFarland and Weekley 2006). 
Cole et al. (2007) were able to show that three résumé categories — academic 
qualifications, work experience and extracurricular activities (ECAs) — mainly predict 
recruiters’ perceptions of an applicant’s employability. Together with letters of 
recommendation (LORs) — which applicants can also indirectly improve via their effort 
and behavior — these signals should ideally have the greatest impact on employers’ 
hiring recommendations as they represent the most objective measures of applicant 
quality. 
3.3.1.1 Educational Attainment 
Education is assumed to have a substantial impact on employers’ evaluations of a job 
candidate. The influence of a person’s education on employer ratings can be empirically 
tested using various independent variables: Either the influence of somebody’s level of 
education — measured in terms of years of formal schooling or educational degrees 
obtained — or the respective absolute or relative performance in educational settings (e.g. 
high school grade average and class rank, university GPA and quartile rank in college 
graduating class, Dean’s list and other awards etc.) can be tested. 
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Several studies and meta-analyses have shown that the validity of educational 
attainment and/or grades for adult achievement remains comparably low (Schick and 
Kunnecke 1981; Reilly and Chao 1982; Cohen 1984; Roth et al. 1996). Although 
academics agree on the low predictive value of grades for future (job) performance, many 
employers believe grades to be useful predictors of an individual’s value to the firm 
(Reilly and Chao 1982; Roth et al. 1996). The main reason for the frequent use of grades 
and other educational achievement variables might be the immediate availability. 
Applicants usually hand in all the necessary information with their résumés and 
employers are able to use these criteria for (pre-) screening without additional costs. 
Although a direct ability measure such as cognitive ability testing would yield more valid 
predictions of future success (Berry, Gruys and Sackett 2006; Koedel and Tyhurst 2012), 
employers do use signals of educational performance very frequently. Believing that 
educational attainment is a proxy for cognitive ability (Berry, Gruys and Sackett 2006) 
and reflects desirable attributes such as intelligence and motivation (Roth and Bobko 
2000), they refrain from using costly cognitive ability testing and use the information 
readily available in the résumé. 
The most important findings resulting from surveys among actual recruiters (Lewis, 
Shimerda and Graham 1983; Behrenz 2001), reviews of actual success rates of real 
applicants with varying educational performance levels (Roth and Bobko 2000; 
Behrenz 2001; McKinney et al. 2003; Chia 2005; Berry, Gruys and Sackett 2006; Athey 
et al. 2007) and experiments having manipulated the level of academic qualification 
(Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette 1970; Dipboye, Fromkin and Wiback 1975; Dipboye, 
Arvey and Terpstra 1977; Zikmund, Hitt and Pickens 1978; Knouse 1994a; Cole et al. 
2007, Koedel and Tyhurst 2012) will be presented here. Additionally, selected results 
from meta-analyses (e.g. Cohen 1984; Olian, Schwab and Haberfeld 1988; Roth et al. 
1996) will be discussed, too. 
One major shortcoming of inferences made from experiments needs to be mentioned in 
this context: Very rarely, academic performance is the attribute of interest in 
experiments on personnel selection decisions. Educational attainment is rather used as a 
control variable reflecting applicant qualification while trying to reveal for instance 
discriminatory behavior of recruiters. In this function, academic achievement and work-
experience are often manipulated as a combined measure of applicant qualification (e.g. 
Dipboye, Arvey and Terpstra 1977; Watkins and Johnston 2000) and single effects of 
academic achievements are often difficult to disentangle from work experience effects 
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(Cole et al. 2007). This occasionally exacerbates the interpretation of meta-analyses 
summarizing the influence of what is considered as ‘qualification’. 
Most studies provide support for a substantial positive influence of educational 
attainment, at least in personnel pre-selection or prescreening decisions. Only McKinney 
et al. (2003) found that 42% of the investigated screening decisions made by college 
recruiters were not at all influenced by the applicant’s GPA. In comparison to the 
influence of several personal characteristics, objective qualification measures such as 
work experience and academic achievement are able to explain far more variation in 
selection decisions: Olian, Schwab and Haberfeld (1988) for example report that 
experience and education account for 35% of the variance in hiring recommendations, 
whereas individual difference factors such as gender are only able to explain single-digit 
percentages. Renwick and Tosi (1978) found that the undergraduate major and the 
graduate degree play a more influential role in selection decisions than personal 
characteristics. When comparing the relative influences of scholastic standing, work 
experience and extracurricular activities (ECAs), Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette (1970) 
found evidence for an overwhelming reliance among interviewers on information about 
scholastic standing of recent accounting graduates: scholastic standing accounted for 
approximately 47% of the total variance in suitability ratings whereas the influence of 
both business experience and interests of the applicant remained negligible. 
Both the duration of education and measures reflecting the performance in education 
positively influence the probability of being selected by recruiters. But the influence of 
grades varies widely according to the selection stage examined. Whereas measures of 
educational attainment are revealed to be a primary factor in initial screening decisions 
commonly leading to an invitation to an interview (Dipboye, Fromkin and Wiback 1975; 
Behrenz 2001; Chia 2005; Cole et al. 2007), their influence decreases or even disappears 
in later stages such as subsequent interviews or final job offers (Behrenz 2001; Chia 
2005). In interviews, professional demeanor and what is commonly referred to as ‘soft 
skills’ become much more important than grades. As Harvey et al. (1997, Chapter 4) 
formulate, “having a degree … [is] … a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, criterion 
for getting a job […]. For many senior managers getting the job depends on such things, 
such as motivation and ‘managerial potential’ ”. Nevertheless, Singer and Bruhns (1991) 
for example were able to show a substantial influence of higher levels of academic 
qualifications (MBA vs. Bachelor vs. high school certificate) in their experiment although 
videotaped interview material was provided to subjects. This effect was particularly 
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large when student raters participated in the study as opposed to professional recruiters 
who rather relied on related work experience of applicants. 
Moreover, the importance of grades differs according to the occupational area examined. 
Certainly, job applicants in academia (PhD graduates for instance) are mainly granted 
access to high-quality jobs based on their previous academic achievements (Athey et al. 
2007) whereas accounting graduates applying to the Big 5 accounting firms are 
evaluated on their GPA only in initial stages of the application process (Lewis, Shimerda 
and Graham 1983; Chia 2005). As a matter of fact, the relative importance of educational 
attainment depends on the requirements of the job (van Ours and Ridder 1991). Hence, a 
lack of appropriate education is one of the most frequently used immediate rejection 
criteria (Behrenz 2001). In addition, job-relevant education, i.e. a degree or major in the 
occupational field the candidate has applied for, leads to more favorable applicant 
ratings and hiring recommendations than educational credentials that are rather 
irrelevant for performing the job at stake (Knouse 1994a). McKinney et al. (2003) were 
also able to show that the use of GPA as a screening device depends on the individual 
preference of a recruiter: Some of the college recruiters in their sample seemed to rely 
extensively on GPA whereas others did not use grades for their selection decision at all.  
A major criticism that several studies investigating the influence of grades and other 
academic achievement measures on application success face is the prevalent use of 
applications from new college graduates (Rynes, Orlitzky and Bretz 1997). As both 
recent graduate data and/or student evaluators are readily available to most 
researchers, numerous studies address success rates for entry-level jobs. But as 
recruiting behavior varies significantly according to the applicants’ level of work 
experience (Rynes, Orlitzky and Bretz 1997; Cole et al. 2007), inferences from entry-level 
studies are likely to overestimate the power of academic qualifications. The importance 
of this particular kind of signal decreases over a person’s career and other signals such 
as work experience become more decisive for an application’s success (Rynes, Orlitzky 
and Bretz 1997; Thoms et al. 1999). 
In summary, grades and other measures of educational attainment are relatively 
important for a candidate’s application success and are one of the most important 
sections of a candidate’s résumé (Knouse 1994a). Especially in initial screening decisions 
of recent graduates, GPAs are a frequently used (Cole et al. 2007), but not always the 
most important predictor of screening decision outcomes (McKinney et al. 2003). An 
exclusive use of GPAs (McKinney et al. 2003), i.e. recruiters purely relying on grades as 
a screening device, was found in none of the above mentioned studies. 
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3.3.1.2 Work Experience 
A candidate’s previous work experience is — similar to educational credentials — one of 
the items recruiters rank as crucial for selection when being asked directly for the most 
important selection and/or rejection criteria (Feild and Holley 1976; Lewis, Shimerda 
and Graham 1983; Hutchinson 1984; Pibal 1985; Harcourt and Krizan 1989; Hutchinson 
and Brefka 1997; Behrenz 2001; Cole et al. 2007). In Behrenz’ (2001) survey for instance, 
a lack of appropriate experience was indicated as the most important rejection criterion. 
58% of all recruiters interviewed declared that work experience is the most important 
characteristic in pre-selecting appropriate candidates. In final selection decisions, 
recruiters in the Behrenz’ (2001) study do not directly mention work experience to be 
crucial for a positive selection outcome. Nevertheless, the attribute they consider to be 
decisive in interviews is something Behrenz (2001) calls professional competence which 
is of course increasing with job experience. Therefore, recruiters in these surveys concede 
the direct influential role of work experience in pre-selection and its indirect influence in 
employment interviews. 
The preference of recruiters to use job experience as a selection device is reasonable. In 
contrast to educational attainment, job experience does not solely act as a signal of 
someone’s ability or productivity, but also directly represents human capital 
endowments that can be of advantage in the future, i.e. for the recruiting employer. 
Whereas educational achievements do not directly increase an individual’s productivity, 
but rather act as a measure of (cognitive) ability, (relevant) job experience directly leads 
to an accumulation of job-related knowledge which in turn increases job performance 
and/or supervisory ratings (Schmidt, Hunter and Outerbridge 1986). This explains the 
relatively high validity of previous job experience in predicting future job performance. 
Validity measures between 0.18 and 0.21 are reported in several studies (Hunter and 
Hunter 1984; Schmidt, Hunter and Outerbridge 1986; McDaniel, Schmidt and 
Hunter 1988). The predictive value of job experience varies according to the mean level 
of experience in a given occupation as well as the complexity of the job at stake: Job 
experience is a better predictor for low-complexity jobs (McDaniel, Schmidt and Hunter 
1988) as in high-complexity jobs other factors such as educational attainment play an 
equally important role in predicting future performance. 
As opposed to recruiter surveys, other studies rather try to reveal the ‘real’ importance of 
work experience in selection decisions and deliver more compelling evidence for actual 
recruiter behavior. Researchers in these studies either look at actual success rates of 
candidates with differing levels of job experience (Behrenz 2001; Cole et al. 2007) or 
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actively manipulate résumés of (fictitious) candidates with varying job experience 
(Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette 1970; Dipboye, Arvey and Terpstra 1977; Stone and 
Sawatzki 1980; Fusilier and Hitt 1983; Singer and Bruhns 1991; Knouse 1994a). Job 
experience in these kinds of empirical studies is usually operationalized as either length 
of experience (measured in years), number and importance of previous jobs (e.g. 
assistant director of marketing), relevance of past job content (similar or dissimilar to 
actual job requirements) or good vs. poor employment history (length of unemployment 
spells, frequent quits and/or job changes etc.) 
When comparing recruiters’ statements to actual success rates, Behrenz (2001) and Cole 
et al. (2007) found that in reality, work experience does not exert as much influence on 
selection decisions as recruiters indicate: Behrenz (2001) found that inappropriate levels 
of work experience did not necessarily lead to direct elimination (in contrast to what was 
indicated in the survey). Comparably, Cole et al. (2007) found that work experience is 
not significantly related to measures of applicant employability, although the same 
recruiters ranked work experience as most important. Cole et al. (2007, 337) therefore 
conclude that “recruiters often espouse or endorse ordering of criteria as important or 
essential in the abstract but then utilize an alternative ordering when making actual 
judgments”. 
Nonetheless, job experience has been found to influence recruiter evaluations in several 
empirical investigations, especially when previous work experience is related to the job 
the candidate has applied for (Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette 1970; Wingrove, 
Glendinning and Herriot 1984; Knouse 1994a). However, the magnitude of the impact 
work experience has on selection decisions mainly depends on the career development of 
the applicants examined. Whereas e.g. Cole et al. (2007) and Lewis, Shimerda and 
Graham (1983) find non-significant or only minor effects of work experience on recent 
graduates’ selection success, Knouse (1994a) and Singer and Bruhns (1991) attest 
significant influences of previous work experience for applicants at more advanced 
stages of their career. Analogous to academic achievement, work experience has only 
been used as an independent variable in a few studies and if so, in many cases it was 
tested in combination with education. The only study that compared the effects of both 
work experience and education with each other was conducted by Singer and Bruhns 
(1991). They found that professional raters did not base their decision on academic 
qualifications at all and solely evaluated applicants based on their work experience. 
Student raters in this study however mainly selected applicants based on both education 
and experience. 
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Most experimental studies do not explicitly differentiate between full- or part-time work 
experience, but recent graduates typically possess only limited and/or irrelevant prior job 
experience (Nemanick and Clark 2002; Cole et al. 2007). Nevertheless, several studies 
report improved job-opportunities for actual graduates who have completed internships 
while in college (Taylor 1988; Knouse, Tanner and Harris 1999; Callanan and Benzig 
2004). One of the few studies that distinctly investigated the influence of student part-
time work experience in Germany was conducted by Sarcletti (2009, 2010). Investigating 
Bavarian graduates’ time until employment after graduation, he found that internships 
and part-time jobs while studying reduced the time to labor market entry after 
graduation. But according to Sarcletti (2009), the effect is driven by increased social 
capital such as established contacts to potential employers rather than accumulation of 
human capital through job experience. 
Although work experience is only seldomly studied explicitly in experiments and the 
investigation of actual applicant success rates, it is always among the items that 
recruiters rate as most important in (pre-) selection. Relevant work experience is 
considered less important in applications to entry-level positions, but — contrary to the 
influence of educational credentials — its importance increases with the career 
progression of applicants. 
3.3.1.3 Extracurricular Activities 
In addition to academic qualifications and job experience, the third major résumé 
content area is represented by extracurricular activities (ECAs). These activities are also 
commonly referred to as campus activities or simply titled applicant interests and 
include memberships in professional societies, college clubs, sports organizations, 
fraternities or sororities as well as being elected into a particular office or engaging in 
community activities (Cole et al. 2007). Engaging in extracurricular activities or, to be 
precise, mentioning these activities in an application form, is another way how 
candidates can differentiate from the rest of the applicant pool and signal superior 
abilities. As opposed to educational attainment and work experience which rather reflect 
cognitive abilities and/or human capital endowments, extracurricular activities may act 
as a signal for social competence and soft skills. Both the number and the extent of 
extracurricular activities may lead to a more positive employability rating, as “recruiters 
attribute leadership, interpersonal skill, and motivational qualities to applicants with 
numerous extracurricular activities” (Cole et al. 2007, 323). 
As Nemanick and Clark (2002) for instance remark, the provision of extracurricular 
activities in résumés is of particular importance to recent graduates. College graduates’ 
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prior work experience is typically limited or irrelevant and the academic qualifications of 
most applicants tend to be very similar. Therefore, providing evidence for engaging in 
extracurricular activities allows recruiters to differentiate among otherwise equal 
applicants. Lewis, Shimerda and Graham (1983) also point out that ECAs can 
compensate for an entry-level applicant’s lack of work experience.  
Only a handful of empirical studies exist that explicitly try to reveal how the provision of 
ECAs in résumés influences application success and affects hiring recommendations 
(Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette 1970; Campion 1978; Lewis, Shimerda and Graham 
1983; Nemanick and Clark 2002; Chia 2005; Cole et al. 2007). In survey studies, 
recruiters report at least some importance of ECAs in selection decisions (Lewis, 
Shimerda and Graham 1983; Cole et al. 2007), but the magnitude of this effect is not 
comparable to education and experience effects. In the Cole et al. (2007) survey, ECAs 
were ranked third and therefore last in importance, behind work experience and 
educational attainment. Lewis, Shimerda and Graham (1983) showed that in accounting 
settings, the importance of ECAs is dependent on the type of the employer: Whereas 
certified public accountants (CPA) perceive ECAs to be equally important as work 
experience, Fortune 500 corporations clearly prefer applicants with relevant work 
experience to those with extracurricular activities.  
In experimental or actual success rate studies, the existence of ECAs is either 
measured/manipulated as the number of ECAs, the responsibility level (via an indicator 
for holding leadership positions) or the relevance of a certain activity to the job aimed at. 
Although Campion (1978) found that membership in fraternities/sororities or 
professional societies in combination with a good undergraduate GPA leads to most 
favorable recruiter evaluations more than three decades ago, little experimental work 
has been done on the influence of ECAs on application success. To the present, the most 
comprehensive lab study in this context has been conducted by Nemanick and Clark 
(2002). Actively manipulating (a) the number of ECAs (b) the number of leadership 
positions and (c) the relevance of these activities to the individual’s professional career, 
they found various effects. They did not only report significant main effects of all three 
dimensions, but also showed an additional effect of number of activities and leadership 
positions. Raters evaluated applicants best when they showed leadership positions in 
many activities. Positions of leadership in a few activities or no leadership in many 
activities (representing a moderate level of activity) were rated second best. Holding no 
leadership positions in only a few activities was perceived worst. The influence of ECA-
relevance for the professional career mainly depends on how actively an applicant 
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appears to be involved in ECAs: Whenever an applicant in the Nemanick and Clark 
(2002) study held leadership positions in many activities, a mixture of relevant (i.e. 
marketing or accounting related societies) and irrelevant (i.e. social activities) was rated 
best. For moderately active applicants however, business related activities were 
perceived as more positive than either purely social or mixed activities. Cole et al. (2007) 
also found support for a substantial positive relation between extracurricular activities 
and employability ratings. According to Chia (2005), the positive effect of extracurricular 
activities is only prevalent in initial stages of the selection process, i.e. in paper-based 
pre-selection.26 
In Germany, only two major empirical studies investigating how ECAs might help 
applicants in the recruiting process exist. Although most job advertisements in Germany 
emphasize the importance of ECAs, Merker (2009) and Merker and Kühlmann (2010) 
failed to find any significant correlation between the level of ECA and (a) the number of 
job interview invitations, (b) time to labor market entry or (c) starting salaries of newly 
recruited Bavarian university graduates.27 Similarly, Gaugler, Martin and Schneider 
(1995) concluded from their survey among 364 German companies that ECAs are only of 
minor importance in personnel selection.  
All in all, recent graduates seem to be able to compensate for a lack of work experience 
by providing evidence for ECAs in their application (Lewis, Shimerda and Graham 
1983). Nevertheless, the effect of ECAs on suitability ratings is comparably small (Hakel, 
Dobmeyer and Dunnette 1970) and has been revealed to be non-significant for German 
graduates. As only studies for entry-level positions exist so far, there is no empirical 
evidence on how ECAs influence selection decisions in later stages of an individual’s 
career. Therefore, the distinctive role of ECAs needs to be studied in greater detail in the 
future. 
  
                                                
26  Although Chia (2005) explicitly addresses the possibility of indirect effects of ECA on interview 
success (via improved discussion and presentation skills for instance), ECAs in his study do 
not affect interview success. The reason might be that these ‘soft skills’ are already captured in 
the construct of Emotional Intelligence which was simultaneously tested in this study. 
27  In fact, multivariate analyses would have improved the validity of these findings. 
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3.3.1.4 Letters of Reference 
References are reported to be a widely used selection tool by organizations all over the 
world. Frequently, more than 80% of organizations indicate to use any form of reference 
requests during their selection process (Muchinsky 1979; Gatewood and Feild 1987; 
Schuler, Frier and Kaufmann 1993; Dany and Torchy 1994; Schuler and Höft 2004; 
SHRM 2005; Cook 2009). The popularity of this selection tool is based on the same 
principle as information about prior work experience is: Recruiters believe that the best 
way to predict somebody’s performance is to look at past performance. And they believe 
that the best way of finding out about applicants’ past performance is to ask somebody 
who knows them well (Cook 2009). In the recruiter’s belief, consulting references might 
deliver unique information about an applicant’s past behavior that is not available from 
other sources (Knouse 1994b). 
Typical types of references are telephone requests, standard recommendation forms or 
free-form letters (Cook 2009). Whereas telephone requests allow for a fast and direct 
communication between recommender and recruiter and are therefore very common in 
the US (SHRM 2004), (free-form) letters of recommendation (LORs) usually need to be 
interpreted by the reader alone. This type of reference is frequently used in Germany 
(Moser and Rhyssen 2001) and will therefore be presented in detail subsequently. 
Reference checks are utilized both in pre- and final selection (Moser and Cook 2009). 
Unexpectedly, little empirical research dealing with LORs has been conducted so far: 
The study of LORs remains one of the most under-researched areas in personnel 
selection (Cook 2009). The existing LOR research however usually addresses one of the 
following three areas: (1) Why are LORs so widely used in practice? (2) How can 
accuracy and validity of LORs be improved? (3) How can the value of LORs to 
organizational decision-makers be improved? 
Despite the frequent use of references in practice, academics doubt the usefulness of 
(free-form) reference checks as a selection tool. The average prognostic validity that 
LORs provide is reported to be as low as 0.13 (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 1993). Low 
validity measures have been reported by all studies investigating the predictive value of 
LORs for several success variables (e.g. Mosel and Goheen 1959; Reilly and Chao 1982; 
Hunter and Hunter 1984). Validity of LORs can be improved by using the keyword 
counting method introduced by Peres and Garcia (1962) rather than focusing on the 
positiveness of the letter (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 1993). But in the way LORs are 
frequently used in practice, they still count among the poorest predictors of future 
performance. Although most studies use anglo-american data, the same result has been 
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found in Germany as well. The only study investigating the validity of references in 
Germany up to now has been conducted by Moser and Rhyssen (2001). Looking at data 
from a German services start-up, they found the correlation between a telephone 
reference and the later supervisor rating to be as low as 0.20 (Moser and Rhyssen 2001). 
Thus, the relatively low validity has also been confirmed for the German market. 
Four major problems are associated with the use of LORs that may explain the low 
validity of this selection tool (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 1993). These problems are 
(1) a letter writer’s leniency, (2) limited knowledge of the applicant (and limited memory 
of the applicant’s behavior), (3) low inter-rater reliability and (4) the influence of 
extraneous factors. 
As illustrated in the LOR framework developed by Loher et al. (1997), applicants usually 
select the author of an LOR themselves. Naturally, applicants request only references 
from people of whom they know that they are well-disposed towards them. As a 
consequence, most LORs are very supportive. This is one reason for the observed 
leniency in LORs. Another explanation for overly positive recommendation letters are 
liability concerns by letter writers. Due to increased employee rights (in the US), 
recommendees are nowadays granted access to LORs (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 
1993; Knouse 1994b). This loss of the letter content’s confidentiality prevents letter 
writers from disclosing negative information. Guaranteed recommendee access to LORs 
even aggravates the leniency problem and leads to what Nicklin and Roch (2008) 
consider as letter inflation. 
The second shortcoming of LORs is the fact that the reader usually does not know how 
good the letter writer knows the recommended person. Professors are for instance 
commonly asked to write LORs for students they have only encountered in one 
introductory class (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 1993). Consequently, they do not know 
the applicant very well. Even if the relation between recommender and recommendee is 
close — such as an LOR from former employers — the recommender’s memory of the 
recommendee’s behavior might be limited and/or biased. Even direct supervisors do not 
observe all aspects of an employee’s conduct and even if they did, it is not certain that 
they remember all facets at the time when they are writing the LOR (Aamodt, Bryan 
and Whitcomb 1993).  
Low inter-rater reliability is another aspect that decreases LOR credibility and 
consequently validity. Baxter et al. (1981) were able to show that LOR content tells more 
about the writer than about the recommendee. Comparing three different patterns of 
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agreement between 80 LORs28, they found that two LORs written by the same 
recommender describing different targets (1-on-2 agreement) are more similar to each 
other than two LORs about the same recommendee written by different recommenders 
(2-on-1 agreement). They conclude that the “results are more directly a function of the 
writers’ idiosyncrasies than of the students’ qualities” (Baxter et al. 1981, 300). In a 
similar sense, also Judge and Higgins (1998) found that LOR content is largely driven by 
recommenders’ affective disposition. According to their study, “positively oriented letter 
writers do write more favorable letters” (Judge and Higgins 1998, 217), regardless of 
applicant quality or suitability. 
The influence of extraneous factors implies that the method used in writing an LOR 
seems to be more important than its content (Aamodt, Bryan and Whitcomb 1993). Also, 
salient factors such as recommender gender seem to have an influence on LOR content. 
Addressing the phenomenon of LOR writing from an evolutionary psychological 
perspective, Colarelli, Hechanova-Alampay and Canali (2002) were able to show that 
both the cooperative relationship between recommender and recommendee as well as 
mating interests of male recommenders positively influenced LOR favorability. 
Accordingly, male letter writers write more favorable letters for female applicants and 
LOR content is not entirely dependent on recommendee quality. 
Despite the shortcomings of LORs, some studies have empirically investigated the use 
and perception of LORs by the reader, i.e. the recruiter. In his survey study, Behrenz 
(2001) found that specific LOR content is not among the most important selection or 
rejection criteria. Nonetheless, references are indicated to be the most important source 
of information by 21.5% of all interviewed recruiters. This source of information ranked 
third behind information gained from the personal interview and personal contacts. 
By asking campus recruiters about the types of information they typically extract from 
LORs, Evuleocha, Ugbah and Law (2009) found that recruiters most frequently try to 
obtain information about somebody’s ability to work with others, their work ethic, 
response to pressure, decision-making skills and relationship to the reference. 
                                                
28  Pattern 1 (1-on-2 agreement) measures the extent to which one perceiver, i.e. the 
recommender, describes two targets similarly (extent of discrimination between 
recommendees), pattern 2 (2-on-1 agreement) measures the extent to which two perceivers 
describe one target similarly (degree of consensus between different recommenders) and 
pattern 3 (2-on-2 agreement) measures the similarity of two perceivers’ descriptions of two 
different targets (level of chance or stereotypic agreement). For more information on all three 
patterns, see Baxter et al. (1981), 296-297. 
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To the best of my knowledge, only few researchers (Knouse 1983; Tommasi, Williams 
and Nordstrom 1998; Nicklin and Roch 2008) have experimentally tested the perception 
of LOR content and structure. Based on his findings, Knouse (1983) advises LOR writers 
to give specific examples of recommendee performance as this significantly increased 
recruiter evaluations. The influence of negative, i.e. slightly unfavorable statements 
about the applicant however was not consistent and did not allow him to give advice on 
this aspect for LOR writers. Tommasi, Williams and Nordstrom (1998) found that most 
LOR readers weigh relevant LOR content, i.e. applicant qualification, more heavily than 
irrelevant information such as applicant and referent gender or referent status. But in 
line with the low inter-rater reliability problem on the writer side, they also found that 
there are differences in perception on the LOR reader side. That applicants benefit from 
inflated LORs — as opposed to non-inflated, i.e. not exaggeratedly positive, ones — was 
demonstrated by Nicklin and Roch (2008). Although letter readers recognize letter 
inflation and therefore doubt credibility of these LORs, they rate applicants having 
inflated LORs more positively on both hiring probability and assumed future success. 
To sum up, letters of reference are a selection device frequently used by practitioners 
although their predictive value has been shown to be rather low. Although LORs tend to 
be inflated and overly supportive, the few surveys and experimental studies conducted in 
this area show that LOR readers are influenced by both LOR content and structure. 
Unfortunately, no study has tested the relative importance of LOR content in 
comparison to other signals or résumé characteristics so far.  
3.3.1.5 Conclusion 
Recapitulating what has been presented in the previous four sections, signals of ability 
such as academic qualification, work experience, extracurricular activities and letters of 
reference all represent frequently used selection devices. Each of the aforementioned 
ability signals has been shown to have an impact on application success. The extent to 
which each of these signals is able to influence the selection decision varies depending on 
e.g. the selection stage (pre- or final selection), the applicant’s career progression and the 
occupational area examined.  
Several authors emphasize though that there is not one single characteristic or signal 
which is crucial for success, but it is rather a combination of several desirable 
characteristics that leads to a positive selection outcome. As Cole et al. (2007, 336) put it, 
especially when “an applicant is above average in all résumé categories, there is no one 
aspect of résumé content that distinguishes, or sets apart, this applicant”. The road to 
success in selection processes rather seems to be determined by a combination or 
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configuration of several of the above mentioned signals. However, only very few studies 
have empirically tested the simultaneous influence of multiple signals so far. Only 
Hakel, Dobmeyer and Dunnette (1970) and Cole et al. (2007) investigated the influence 
of all three résumé content dimensions simultaneously. Whereas Hakel, Dobmeyer and 
Dunnette (1970) reported main effects only, Cole et al. (2007) were able to show how all 
three dimensions also interact in the selection process. They conclude that “recruiters’ 
perceptions of applicant employability jointly depended on the content reported in all 
three résumé categories” (Cole et al. 2007, 334). Not surprisingly, applicants ranked high 
(low) in all three categories received the highest (lowest) ratings. But applicants being 
perceived as weaker in one category could compensate for this deficit by being perceived 
as extraordinarily high in other categories. Applicants showing a high level of 
extracurricular activities for instance could compensate for a low work experience or 
weak academic performance (Cole et al. 2007).  
The existence of a substitutive relationship between campus activities (i.e. ECAs) and 
work experience has also been assumed by Lewis, Shimerda and Graham (1983). On the 
other hand, van Ours and Ridder (1991) reject the hypothesis that education and 
experience are substitutes in the hiring process: “… education and work experience are 
not substituted, when hiring employees, i.e. an applicant that does not have the 
minimally required level of education, cannot compensate this by having more work 
experience (and the other way round)” (van Ours and Ridder, 1991, 218). Moser and 
Rhyssen (2001) conjecture that diverse signals are simultaneously utilized by recruiters. 
They for instance explain the popularity of LORs with their function as some kind of 
security which only serves to complement or confirm other application content such as 
work experience. 
Although widely used in all stages of the selection process, the aforementioned paper-
credentials seem to be most effective in pre-selection, i.e. in the decision to invite 
somebody to a personal interview. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that recruiters 
tend to use different types of information, i.e. different signals and indices, from those 
they endorse when being asked directly (stated versus revealed preferences). That is the 
reason why quasi-experimental studies lead to superior results in this context. 
Especially, when it comes to more sensitive questions such as discriminatory practices in 
hiring, results of experimental studies should be primarily presented and discussed, as 
will be done in the following sections.  
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3.3.2 The Influence of Individual Difference Factors 
A large amount of research focuses on how individual differences of all the persons 
involved in the selection process affect the recruitment outcome (see e.g. Posthuma, 
Morgeson and Campion 2002). Individual difference factors on the one hand represent 
applicant characteristics such as gender or race. On the other hand, some research also 
focuses on a variety of rater characteristics that may influence the selection outcome. 
The results of several empirical studies dealing with the influence of both applicant and 
rater characteristics during personnel selection will be presented separately. 
3.3.2.1 Applicant Characteristics  
In Spence’s (1973) terminology individual differences among applicants are referred to as 
indices. Indices are unalterable characteristics of the applicant, such as gender, age, race 
etc. In line with Spence’s (1973) theory29, signals are assumed to have a greater impact 
on the employer’s conditional probabilistic beliefs of the candidate’s suitability than 
indices. Whenever indices have a major influence on the recruiter’s decision although 
some convincing signals have been provided, this may be considered a sign of 
discrimination (in the workplace).30  
As discrimination in the workplace is on the one hand directly linked to economic 
inefficiencies and may on the other hand evoke a sense of inequity in societies (Bendick 
2007), it attracts wide interest in both the social sciences and economics. Legally, at least 
in industrialized countries discrimination is strictly prohibited. In the US, for instance, 
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 postulates equal employment opportunities for 
racial/ethnic minorities, persons of non-US birth or ancestry, persons of all religions, and 
women. This list has been extended to also include age and disabilities by the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990. In Europe, discrimination against all of the aforementioned characteristics plus 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity is regulated by several EU 
Directives31 which have been transposed into German Law, for instance, by the 
commencement of the ‘Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz’ (AGG) in 2006. 
                                                
29  See Chapter 4.2.2 for more information about Spences (1973) theory. 
30  The only exception to this is the influence of applicant personality which will be dealt with in 
section 3.3.2.1.5. Although representing both an individual difference factor and an index in 
Spence’s sense (as personality is usually unalterable), differential treatment of applicants 
showing varying personalities is commonly not understood as a sign of discrimination. 
31  These include the Council Directives 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000/78/EC establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation and 2002/73/EC 
implementing the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.  
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Evidence for discriminatory practices in hiring has already been found in several 
empirical studies dealing with diverse individual difference factors. Typically, the effect 
of individual difference factors is not measured in recruiter survey studies,32 but rather 
through the use of (laboratory or field) experiments or actual (published) success data. 
Especially, correspondence and audit studies have recently been used in order to detect 
discrimination of minority group members. These studies were introduced as a response 
to the inadequacy of earlier attempts to discover discriminatory practices such as the 
econometric approach, i.e. regression analyses of published data (e.g. Blinder 1973; 
Oaxaca 1973; Ward 2001; Hinks 2002).33 Correspondence and audit studies34 represent 
carefully controlled field experiments that are able to provide the most convincing 
evidence on discrimination (Neumark 2011), but are also subject to substantial ethical 
concerns (Riach and Rich 2004; Pager 2007). 
Both variants of situation testing try to reveal discrimination by using matched pairs of 
bogus applicants that are “identical in all relevant employment characteristics and differ 
only in one characteristic, such as sex, race, ethnicity or disability” (Riach and Rich 2002, 
F481). Audit studies are personal or in-person approaches where actual individuals — 
frequently professional actors — act as testers and are either sent to interviews or asked 
to apply on the phone. This technique enables the researcher to measure and compare 
the success of minority and majority applicants in both pre- and final selection, but has 
several shortcomings. First, coaching of testers is very costly. Second, according to critics 
of this approach (e.g. Heckman and Siegelman 1993), even with extensive coaching it 
remains impossible to control for personality differences of testers. Therefore, the fact 
that two applicants only differ in one characteristic and otherwise act the same cannot 
be guaranteed in audit studies. Third, the intransparent procedure of audit studies is 
criticized. The “inability to defend, or even fully enunciate, the criteria used to match 
                                                
32  Recruiters deliberately discriminating against certain minority groups usually would not 
reveal this behavior honestly and accurately in a survey (Riach and Rich 2002). One exception 
to this rule is certainly Behrenz (2001) who also asked recruiters whether or not they would 
reject (a) women (b) applicants over 45 years of age or (c) previously unemployed applicants. 
Surprisingly, 20.7% of all recruiters admitted to eliminate applicants who are 45 years or older 
in the first round. Still, the actual number could be substantially higher.  
33  Wage regression techniques analyze individual-level earnings of minority and majority group 
members and try to control for as many productivity-related factors as possible. The remaining 
unexplained variance is then deemed to be of discriminatory nature (Neumark 2011). As the 
results mainly depend on model specification, i.e. the choice of independent variables as 
proxies for productivity, these techniques have been heavily criticized (Riach and Rich 2002; 
Neumark 2011). Another inherent weakness of these techniques is that wage regression is not 
able to separate for instance discriminatory behavior of recruiters from ‘pre-market’ 
discrimination which is a consequence of unequal education opportunities (Bendick 2007). 
34  Outside the US, these techniques are also commonly referred to as situation testing (Bendick 
2007). Other commonly used terms are employment testing, employment auditing and paired-
comparison testing. All these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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audit pair members constitutes the Achilles heel of the audit pair methodology” 
(Heckman and Siegelman 1993, 191).  
As a remedy for most of the shortcomings of audit studies, correspondence (or résumé-
based) studies have been developed and used frequently in discrimination research. 
Unlike in audit studies, no ‘real’ person is sent to an interview, but the experiment is 
carried out with the help of  
“carefully-matched pairs of written applications in response to advertised vacancies, 
to test for discrimination in labour hiring at the initial stage of selection for 
interview. In order to avoid detection, the letters obviously cannot be identical, but 
in all essential characteristics such as qualifications and experience candidates are 
closely matched so that the only effective distinguishing characteristic is race, 
ethnicity, sex, age or disability” (Riach and Rich 2002, F484). 
As the researcher is truly able to control for any unintended bias through thorough 
matching and random assignment of variables such as letter type, this technique is less 
susceptible to criticism. Nevertheless, this method also has some shortcomings. First of 
all, the key differentiating characteristic needs to be signaled on paper (Pager 2007). 
While this might be conveyed easily for gender through the use of gender-specific first 
names, it becomes more difficult to do so with skin color for instance. Secondly, 
correspondence studies are only applicable to a limited range of occupations. While 
written applications are quite common for white-collar jobs, most blue-collar jobs (at 
least in the US) rather require in-person application procedures (Pager 2007). 
Regardless of the specific approach chosen, discrimination in these kinds of studies is 
usually defined as being existent “whenever two testers in a matched pair are treated 
differently in the aggregate or on average” (Heckman and Siegelman 1993, 198). The 
extent of discrimination is commonly calculated using the so called net discrimination 
rate “by deducting occasions of ‘minority-only offered job’ from occasions of ‘majority-only 
offered job’” (Riach and Rich 2002, F491).35  
                                                
35  Nevertheless, not all researchers interpret their findings with the use of this net 
discrimination rate definition: Several studies also interpret cases in which none of the 
applicants was invited (or offered the job) as equal treatment and not, as in the definition of 
net discrimination rates, as non-observation. How this interpretation affects inferences made 
from correspondence and audit studies, is discussed in Riach and Rich (2002). Whenever net 
discrimination rates will be mentioned throughout this thesis, they have been calculated by 
deducting the number of cases where only the minority candidate received a callback/job offer 
from the number of cases where only the majority candidate received a callback/job offer 
divided by all cases where at least one candidate received a callback/job offer.  
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3.3.2.1.1 Race and Ethnicity 
“Race/ethnicity/color/national origin is the personal characteristic most commonly 
examined” (Bendick 2007, 23) in correspondence and audit studies not only in the US, 
but also in Europe. Although discrimination against ethnic or racial minorities36 is 
prohibited by law in all of the investigated countries, numerous studies have found 
evidence for such discriminatory practices in hiring.37  
In the US, discrimination against African-American (e.g. Turner, Fix and Struyk 1991; 
Bendick, Jackson and Reinoso 1994; Pager 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; 
Pager and Western 2005; Pager, Western and Bonikowski 2009) and Hispanic applicants 
(see Cross et al. 1990; Bendick et al. 1991; Firestone, Yanoff and Montenegro 2002; 
Pager, Western and Bonikowski 2009 for instance) has been tested and found 
repeatedly.38 Discrimination does not only occur in jobs that mainly require ‘only’ 
completion of secondary school (Turner, Fix and Struyk 1991; Lodder, McFarland and 
White 2003), but also among university graduates (Bendick et al. 1991; Nunes and 
Seligman 1999).  
In Britain, several ethnic minorities such as Asian, (West) Indian, Pakistani, African or 
Australian immigrants have been reported to have significantly lower success rates than 
a British-born white applicant in both initial and final stages of personnel selection 
processes (see e.g. Daniel 1968; McIntosh and Smith 1974; Hubbuck and Carter 1980; 
Esmail and Everington 1993). These findings are not limited to certain occupations, but 
hold true for both white-collar (e.g. Jowell and Prescott-Clarke 1970; Firth 1981; Esmail 
and Everington 1993) and blue-collar or unskilled occupations (see McIntosh and Smith 
1974 for example). In addition, Riach and Rich (1991) were able to show that especially 
Vietnamese-, but also Greek-born immigrants are discriminated against in Australia. 
Similarly, discrimination against immigrants has been revealed by audit or 
correspondence studies in other European countries such as Belgium (Smeeters and 
Nayer 1998), Germany (Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke 1996), Greece (Drydakis and 
                                                
36  Racial and ethnic minorities in this thesis are understood in a broader sense and also include 
(first and second generation) immigrants. However, discrimination against religious minorities 
will not be discussed during this section. 
37  Moreover, numerous papers deal with discriminatory practices against several minorities on 
other markets such as housing or product markets (e.g. List 2004; Ahmed, Andersson and 
Hammarstedt 2009; Gneezy, List and Price 2012). However, all following sections are 
restricted to recruitment processes and discrimination in hiring. 
38  In all of the studies mentioned in this section, perceived race has been manipulated in 
correspondence studies by (a) typical and identifiable (white or minority) names or (b) 
indication of interests/extracurricular activities pointing to specific minority affiliation (e.g. 
NAACP strongly signals an African-American applicant (Pager 2007)). In-person audit studies 
on the other hand also made use of accents or physical appearance. 
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Vlassis 2010), the Netherlands (Bovenkerk et al. 1995) or Spain (de Prada et al. 1996). 
Here, the minority applicants were of Albanian (Drydakis and Vlassis 2010), Moroccan 
(Bovenkerk et al. 1995; de Prada et al. 1996; Smeeters and Nayer 1998), Turkish 
(Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke 1996) or Surinamese origin (Bovenkerk et al. 1995). As 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to give a comprehensive review of racial or ethnic 
discrimination worldwide, the discussion of more detailed test results will be limited to 
the most recent and relevant studies.39  
In one of the most frequently cited correspondence studies on racial discrimination, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) examined the effect of race-specific names on callback 
rates in the US. Designing résumés with either very white-sounding names (Emily 
Walsh and Greg Becker) or very African-American-sounding names (Lakisha 
Washington and Jamal Jones), they found evidence for substantial discrimination 
against applicants of African-American origin.40 In their experiment, African-American 
applicants faced a net discrimination rate of 29.5%.41 This racial gap remained uniform 
across all occupations and industries and did not vary statistically significantly with 
employer size. Surprisingly, even federal or equal opportunity employers did not 
discriminate less against African-American applicants. The only significant interaction 
effects Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) report are the effects of neighborhood and 
résumé quality. Applicants living in a better, i.e. more affluent or ‘whiter’ neighborhood42 
had better chances to be called back, but this positive effect was the same for both black 
and white applicants. Résumé quality was (slightly) manipulated through incremental 
changes e.g. in labor market experience, language skills or the declaration of an email-
address. In contrast to the expectations, résumé quality effects were greater for majority 
candidates than minority candidates, i.e. Whites benefited more from an improved 
résumé than black applicants did. This result prompted Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004) to reject the notion of statistical discrimination in their study as discrimination 
would have decreased with the use of additional ability signaling. Taste-based 
                                                
39  For a review of the most important racial discrimination studies in the US, see Bendick (2007). 
Riach and Rich (2002) in addition present and compare several European findings and Kolle 
(2012a) gives an overview of the most recent European and US studies. 
40  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) rejected the assumption that the name represents and 
conveys socio-economic background rather than racial differences by controlling for mother’s 
education of people with all the names used in the experiment.  
41  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) do not explicitly state the net discrimination rate, but it 
can be calculated from the values they provide in table 2, p. 999: Number of white-favored 
cases (111) minus number of black-favored cases (46)=65 divided by the number of cases with 
at least one callback (1,323-1,103=220)=29.5%. 
42  Neighborhood quality was communicated through the applicant address used in the résumé. 
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discrimination does also not seem to be the preferred explanation of the authors.43 
Therefore, they introduce another explanation for the type of discrimination found in 
their study: According to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), employers “may use quick 
heuristics in reading these résumés. One such heuristic could be to simply read no 
further when they see an African-American name” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, 
1011).44  
In a series of three correspondence tests, Swedish researchers showed that ethnic 
discrimination in hiring persists across all occupations, industries and skill levels in 
Sweden (Bursell 2007; Carlsson and Rooth 2007, 2008a; Carlsson 2010). Even more 
compelling, Carlsson (2010) revealed some of the factors driving discriminatory recruiter 
behavior (see also Carlsson and Rooth 2008a). In 2007, Carlsson and Rooth found that 
applicants with Middle-Eastern-sounding names such as Mohammed Ameer or Ali Said 
had substantially lower callback rates than applicants with a typically Swedish name 
(Erik Andersson for instance) in all of the occupations and skill levels they tested. 
According to their results, the net average discrimination rate against applicants with 
Middle-Eastern names was 28.9%,45 although all recruiters that were interviewed later 
on indicated to treat Middle-Eastern applicants equally.46 In addition, they were able to 
show that the callback gap was greater in lower-level, i.e. unskilled jobs which means 
that there has been less discrimination in highly skilled jobs. This result is somewhat 
surprising as low-level occupations are traditionally the ones with a higher share of 
immigrants in Sweden. On the other hand, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) assume that 
ability signals are more evident in high-skilled occupations which in turn reduces room 
for statistical discrimination. In a follow-up study, the researchers went one step further 
and did not only compare callback rates of natives with a Swedish name with natives 
with a Middle-Eastern name (also referred to as second generation immigrant), but also 
introduced a third fictitious applicant being a first generation immigrant with foreign 
qualifications. By doing so, they wanted to disentangle effects such as ethnicity, country 
of birth, foreign mother tongue and foreign qualifications (Carlsson 2010) and show 
whether it is the foreign name (indicator for preference-based discrimination) or the 
foreign qualification (indicator for statistical discrimination) that drives discrimination. 
                                                
43  For a more detailed discussion of the differences between statistical and taste-based 
discrimination, see Chapter 4.2.3.1. 
44  However, the simple notion of heuristics does not represent a viable alternative to the 
economic theories of discrimination. Although heuristics may be used by employers, these are 
certainly based on and have been put into practice either as a consequence of distaste or 
statistical uncertainties. 
45  Calculated from the data Carlsson and Rooth (2007) provide on page 721: (217-66)/522=0.289. 
46  Whenever at least one candidate was invited to an interview, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) 
addressed him or her with an interview request. 
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Surprisingly, they find that ethnicity per se is the main driver behind discriminatory 
practices of Swedish employers: Callback rates for both first and second generation 
immigrants are significantly lower than the ones for native applicants with a Swedish 
name, but are not statistically different from each other. Using an earlier version of the 
paper (Carlsson and Rooth 2008a), net discrimination rates can be calculated. They were 
38% for the second-generation immigrant versus the native Swedish applicant and 16% 
for the first generation applicant versus the second generation applicant. As a result, 
Carlsson and Rooth (2008a) report that 77% of the total callback gap could be explained 
by ethnicity per se and only 23% of the differential treatment could be attributed to the 
foreign qualification. 
Up to now, only three situation testing studies have been conducted in the German labor 
market all investigating discrimination against applicants with a Turkish migrational 
background (Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke 1996; Kaas and Manger 2012; Kolle 2012a). 
In the course of several studies initiated by the ILO, Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke 
(1996) conducted two studies on ethnic discrimination in Germany. The first study, a 
telephone audit study, revealed discrimination against second generation immigrants in 
semi-skilled occupations (cumulative net discrimination rate of 19%). Applicants with a 
Turkish-sounding name (Yilmaz Öztürk) were significantly less often invited to an 
interview than applicants with a typically German-sounding name (Stefan Niemeyer).47 
In a second study, Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke (1996) tested discrimination in higher-
quality occupations through a correspondence test. This time, nationality was 
manipulated and applicants did not only have a Turkish-sounding name, but were born 
in Turkey. However, this second study did not yield significant differences in callback 
rates of German or Turkish applicants. More recently, Kaas and Manger (2012) 
investigated discrimination against economics and management science students with a 
Turkish-sounding name applying for an internship. The only distinguishable 
characteristic in their correspondence study was the Turkish-sounding name of the 
applicant (Fatih Yilmaz or Serkan Sezer). In order to study discrimination against 
second- and third-generation immigrants regardless of language effects, Kaas and 
Manger (2012, 2) created applicants that “have German citizenship and […] were born 
and educated in Germany, and all of them specify ‘German’ as their mother tongue”. 
Nonetheless, Kaas and Manger (2012) revealed discriminatory behavior of German 
internship providers: With an average net discrimination rate of 10%, applicants with a 
Turkish-sounding name are invited to interviews less often than their counterpart with 
                                                
47  In this study, Turkish migrational background was solely conveyed through the distinct name. 
Testers in the telephone study were born and raised in Germany and did not have any dialect. 
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a typically German name. Especially in smaller companies, having a Turkish sounding 
name reduces the probability of a callback significantly. However, discrimination against 
candidates with a Turkish name disappears with the provision of letters of references 
which may be seen as an indicator for the presence of statistical, rather than taste-based 
discrimination. Similarly, Kolle (2012a) finds a net discrimination rate of 20.5% against 
applicants with a Turkish-sounding name when applying for apprenticeships in 
Germany, but discrimination disappears with the provision of internship certificates. 
To sum up, racial or ethnic discrimination persists in labor markets worldwide despite 
the implementation of equal opportunity rights. This discrimination is generally not 
limited to specific occupations or skill-levels. Net discrimination rates are overall very 
high, but remain generally lower in the US which might be associated with longer equal 
opportunity rights and greater fear of litigation for discriminatory behavior (Riach and 
Rich 2002). Some studies in addition have separated ‘foreignness’ from ‘skin color’ and 
report differential treatment according to skin color. In the US, discrimination against 
applicants of African-American origin seems to occur less frequently than against 
Hispanics. In the UK, by contrast, non-white immigrants are discriminated to a higher 
extent than white immigrants (Riach and Rich 2002). This emphasizes the importance of 
country-specific data. Racial or ethnic discrimination tends to be driven by stereotypes 
against certain minority groups per se rather than by fear of language problems or 
uncertainty about foreign qualifications. Even second and third generation immigrants 
born and raised in the specific country face lower callback rates. In Germany, 
discrimination rates in total remain comparably low which might be attributed to 
diverse ability signals traditionally provided in German applications. Nevertheless, 
ethnic discrimination also prevails in the German labor market.  
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3.3.2.1.2 Gender 
Gender discrimination is the second most frequently investigated field in the economic 
discrimination literature. Mostly, female applicants are expected to be discriminated 
against during recruitment. A handful of audit and correspondence studies (Levinson 
1975; Firth 1982; Riach and Rich 1987; Neumark et al. 1996; Nunes and Seligman 2000; 
Weichselbaumer 2004; Riach and Rich 2006a; Petit 2007; Carlsson and Rooth 2008b; 
Kolle 2012b) have been conducted both in the US and Europe for various occupations so 
far.48 The most important results of these studies will be discussed briefly in this section.  
Levinson (1975) was the first to conduct telephone audit tests in Atlanta (US) in either 
male- (or female-) dominated occupations.49 In both fields, he found compelling evidence 
for a substantial discrimination against the minority, i.e. the ‘sex-inappropriate’ 
candidate: The net discrimination rate against female applicants in male-dominated 
occupations was reported to be 43.2%, whereas net discrimination against males in 
female-dominated occupations even amounted to 64.9%. In their restaurant hiring audit 
study, Neumark et al. (1996) hired testers to hand-deliver CVs at Philadelphia based 
restaurants of differing price (and therefore also pay) range. Women were revealed to 
have substantially lower probabilities of receiving a job offer (-40%) and being invited to 
an interview (-35%) in high-price restaurants. Men in turn were discriminated against 
by low-price restaurant owners at the final stage of the selection process and had a 40% 
lower probability of being offered a job in a low-price restaurant. Nunes and Seligman 
(2000) examined the discriminatory behavior of auto service providers (traditionally a 
male-dominated occupation) in the San Francisco Bay Area (US) and found a net 
discrimination rate against women of 27.5% for unsolicited inquiries and of 45% among 
those employers that actually had vacancies advertised at the time of the study. Using a 
natural experiment, Goldin and Rouse (2000) were able to show that the introduction of 
blind auditioning to hiring procedures substantially increased the chance of female 
musicians being hired in one of the eight major US-orchestras. From this result they 
inferred discriminatory recruitment practices against women in open auditions. 
The first European-based correspondence study was conducted by Firth (1982) in the 
United Kingdom who sent written applications in response to accountant 
advertisements. These results show a significantly lower success rate of females in 
                                                
48  A huge body of literature also focuses on laboratory experiments conducted to test hypothetical 
discriminatory behavior. As laboratory results cannot reliably be transferred to real-world 
decision processes (Weichselbaumer 2004), only field experiments will be presented here. 
49  Male- and female-dominated occupations in audit/correspondence studies are defined by the 
sex-composition or segregation of this occupation by the time of investigation (see for instance 
Levinson (1975) or Carlsson and Rooth (2008b)). 
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higher status occupations such as qualified accountants or senior jobs in commerce. 
Using the correspondence method, Riach and Rich (1987) investigated gender 
discrimination in Australia for seven different occupations. They found a significant net 
discrimination rate against women of 11.8% for computer analyst programers and one of 
16.1% for gardeners. Weichselbaumer (2004) did not only compare success rates of men 
and women, but also controlled for personality traits of females as a possible source of 
discrimination. By creating three types of job applicants — one male candidate, a 
masculine female and a feminine female50 — she tested the hypothesis whether it is sex 
discrimination or personality traits that drive the employer’s decision. Contrary to her 
hypothesis, no significant difference in the discrimination rates of both types of female 
candidates occurred: “Unfavorable treatment in masculine occupations is not 
significantly reduced when a woman provides a masculine identity” (Weichselbaumer 
2004, 181). Both types of female candidates were equally discriminated against in the 
male-dominated area of network technicians (net discrimination rate of 11.8%) and men 
were discriminated against in the female-dominated secretary occupation (46.8%). 
All four recent correspondence studies have been conducted in Europe (Riach and Rich 
2006a; Petit 2007; Carlsson and Rooth 2008b; Kolle 2012b). Riach and Rich (2006a) 
conducted a study in segregated, male- and female-dominated occupations in England 
and found evidence for a substantial discrimination against men in both mixed and 
female-dominated occupations. The net discrimination rate against men in secretary 
positions amounts to 43.1% whereas discrimination against females in male-dominated 
jobs was found to be ‘only’ 23.1%. They interpret their results as being partly driven by 
recently implemented affirmative action policies leading to a “substantial progess in 
opening up professional employment opportunities to women” (Riach and Rich 2006a, 
10). Petit (2007) was able to show that French employers in the financial sector mainly 
discriminate against young women (aged 25) applying to high-skilled administrative 
positions. Women aged 37 however were not discriminated against, even if they had 
family obligations. One possible explanation for this is taste-based co-worker 
discrimination — (male) workers do not accept to be supervised by young women. This in 
turn might decrease worker productivity causing the employer to shy away from hiring 
young women for high-status positions. Another explanation is statistical discrimination 
that induces the employer to anticipate lower long-term productivity of women due to 
the high probability of career interruptions as a consequence of maternal leave and 
family responsibilities. 
                                                
50  Gender types were conveyed to the employer with the help of résumé content that is not 
related to human capital, such as hobbies or the photograph (Weichselbaumer 2004, 169). 
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In Sweden, Carlsson and Rooth (2008b) reported only minor, i.e. one-digit net 
discrimination rates for the ‘minority sex’ in both male- and female-dominated 
occupations. They conclude that demand-side discrimination is not able to explain 
current labor market segregation in Sweden. Up to now, only one gender discrimination 
correspondence study has been conducted in the German labor market. Kolle (2012b) 
investigated the callback probabilities of female applicants in male-dominated 
occupations and found that the female apprenticeship candidate is overall 17% less 
likely to succeed in the initial selection stage. However, subdividing the sample 
according to the two periods the résumés were sent out, Kolle (2012b) found that 
discriminatory treatment only occurred in the period which was closer to the uniform 
commencement of apprenticeship contracts in Germany. Therefore, he assumes that 
short-term-hiring employers vary systematically from employers who fill in vacancies 
well in advance and that discriminatory behavior is directly linked to these firm 
characteristics.  
All in all, field experiments have revealed that gender discrimination is still apparent 
and predominantly exists in sex-stereotyped jobs. This holds true for both men and 
women, i.e. it is always the ‘sex-inappropriate’ candidate who is discriminated against. 
Surprisingly, the discrimination rate against men in female-dominated occupations is 
consistently higher than the one against women in ‘masculine’ jobs. Booth and Leigh 
(2010) for instance find this pro-female bias especially in occupations which are heavily 
female-dominated (share of females greater than 80%). Nevertheless, discrimination 
against females seems to be most prominent in high-status positions. Two of the more 
recent studies (Riach and Rich 2006a; Carlsson and Rooth 2008b) however report 
decreasing discrimination rates of females which might be associated with the effective 
implementation of affirmative action policies. Nonetheless, the nature or origin of 
discriminatory practices — taste-based vs. statistical discrimination — cannot be revealed 
unequivocably by correspondence studies. 
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3.3.2.1.3 Age 
In addition to ethnic minorities and females, another group of (potential) employees 
considered to be discriminated against systematically is older workers. Indirect 
measures of age discrimination have already hinted at a substantial disadvantage of 
older labor force participants. They face a higher unemployment rate, suffer from longer 
unemployment spells (Bendick 1983; McDonald and Chen 1994; OECD 1998) and, when 
re-employed, c.p. earn lower wages than their younger counterparts (Wanner and 
McDonald 1983). This indirect evidence however is not able to separate supply- and 
demand-side effects. It does not become evident from these figures whether ‘older’ 
workers withdraw from the labor market and simply do not offer their labor any longer 
or whether they are discriminated against by potential employers. 
Direct measurement through employment testing can yield more consistent results of 
demand-side ageism. Age discrimination in this case means that there are fewer 
opportunities for older workers that cannot be attributed to lower productivity, but are 
only a consequence of their age (Cain 1986). Despite the growing interest in hard 
evidence for ageism, audit and correspondence studies in hiring have generally focused 
on the influence of race and gender rather than on age. The reluctance to manipulate age 
in these situation tests originates from several challenges this method poses when 
applied to applicants of different ages. As mentioned before, the inherent advantage of 
correspondence studies is that differential response rates to applications can be directly 
attributed to the one single characteristic that varies between these two applicants. 
Every other influence is eliminated by holding everything else constant or randomly 
assigning attributes and isolating these effects during the subsequent analysis. But in 
the case of age “there must inevitably be a variation in the job experience of the different 
age groups” (Riach and Rich 2006b, 2) and the ultimate principle of correspondence 
testing is violated. Differential treatment by employers cannot simply be explained by 
the variation in age, but might also be a response to differences in human capital 
endowments and researchers need to find ways how to match the two groups of 
applicants as closely as possible.51 Another major challenge in employment testing is to 
select occupational fields that are theoretically suitable for applicants of all ages. 
According to Warr (1994), job activities can be classified into four categories according to 
their inherent relationship between performance and age. Age-impaired activities 
(category 1) are characterized by a negative correlation between age and performance. 
Age-counteracted (category 2) and age-neutral (category 3) activities do not show any 
                                                
51  I will address how the researchers that have already conducted age discrimination situation 
testing tried to handle this problem in detail when presenting their respective results. 
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correlation between age and performance for different reasons, whereas in age-enhanced 
activities (category 4) performance is positively correlated with age due to the favorable 
impact of experience. Researchers conducting employment testing are well advised to 
select category 3 activities in order to guarantee a high level of comparability between 
applicants of differing age groups. Additionally, occupations that are not characterized 
by a strong hierarchical career progression need to be investigated. 
Up to now, only few employment testing studies on age discrimination exist. Bendick, 
Jackson and Romero (1996), Bendick, Brown and Wall (1999) and Lahey (2008) have 
investigated employment opportunities for older workers in the US labor market. Riach 
and Rich (2006b, 2007a, 2007b) have conducted three correspondence tests in France, 
Spain and England. The most recent studies on ageism have been conducted by Büsch, 
Dahl and Dittrich (2009) in Germany and Norway52, Albert, Escot and Fernández-
Cornejo (2011) in Spain and Ahmed, Andersson and Hammarstadt (2012) for the 
Swedish labor market.  
Bendick, Jackson and Romero (1996) were the first to test age discrimination using the 
correspondence testing method. By sending unsolicited written applications for three 
different age-neutral, technical and non-technical white-collar occupations to a list of 775 
employers throughout the US, they discovered an average net discrimination rate of 
26.5% against the older applicant (aged 57). In order to account for the obvious job 
experience gap between young (32 years old) and old applicants, they provided the older 
applicant either with work experience unrelated to the current job (high school teacher) 
or indicated extended maternity leaves for women. Additionally, only credentials for the 
last ten years of work experience (which both of the applicants had) were handed in — a 
common practice in the US. Discrimination against older applicants varied significantly 
between geographical regions and industries. Discrimination rates were substantially 
higher in the South and the West (25.6% and 42.2%, respectively). Almost no 
discrimination was reported for the services and retail sector and older applicants had 
only slightly lower chances in finance, insurance and real estate companies. Employment 
agencies and especially manufacturing companies in contrast substantially 
discriminated against older applicants. The study of Bendick, Brown and Wall (1999) 
basically used the same framework, but was designed as an audit study and therefore 
allowed for additional information on age discrimination during the interview stage. 
                                                
52  This study however does not represent an audit/correspondence study in the strict sense. Also, 
Petit (2007) has manipulated the age of his fictitious applicants in his study, but he focused on 
the employment opportunities for middle-aged women only. Hence, the Petit study examines 
gender differences in hiring and has already been presented in section 3.3.2.1.  
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Again using applicants aged 32 and 57 respectively and explaining the additional 25 
years of experience with irrelevant work experience, they found an overall 
discrimination rate of 41.2% against the older applicant. The majority of discriminatory 
behavior however was again found at the pre-interview stage meaning that older 
applicants did not even get their ‘foot in the door’ and were already rejected before being 
able to present themselves. The third US-based correspondence study has been 
conducted by Lahey (2008). In contrast to both previous studies, she did not compare 
applicants of a distinct age, but used applicants of multiple ages between 35 and 62 and 
subsequently categorized them into the age groups ‘young’ and ‘old’. In order to account 
for the different levels of human capital as exposed through work experience, Lahey 
(2008) decided to use only female applicants for entry-level jobs as employers would on 
the one hand readily believe that a woman had taken care of her children for years. On 
the other hand, entry-level jobs such as cashier or secretarial work usually represent 
female-dominated occupations. Just as the other two US-based studies, she provided 
work experience credentials covering the last ten years only. Lahey (2008) found that the 
applicants being classified as young were 42% (46%) more likely to be invited to an 
interview in Massachusetts (Florida). She assumes statistical discrimination (negative 
stereotypes) to be the driver of discriminatory behavior as she does not find evidence for 
any kind of taste-based discrimination. 
Three of the European correspondence tests have been conducted by Riach and Rich 
(2006, 2007a, 2007b). Criticizing the artificial approach of previous age discrimination 
studies of how to account for differences in work experience, they design the older 
applicant of indeed having related work experience. Rational employers should in this 
case prefer the older candidate (aged 47) over the younger (aged 27), less experienced 
one. Preferring the older applicant in this case is therefore not interpreted as 
discrimination against younger applicants, but simply represents rational recruitment 
behavior. Discrimination against older applicants will be present whenever the younger 
applicant is favored although the older one demonstrates substantially higher human 
capital (economically irrational decision). In France (2006), Spain (2007a) and England 
(2007b), Riach and Rich sent unsolicited written inquiries for waiter positions to 
restaurants throughout the country and reported average net discrimination rates 
against the 47-year-old, but mentally and physically active applicant of 58.1% in France, 
64.5% in Spain and 28.8% in England. In France and England, discrimination was 
especially apparent in the capital cities — the net discrimination rates reported for 
London and Paris were 68.2% and 100% respectively. Similar results are reported for 
Swedish restaurant worker and sales assistant applicants (net discrimination rate of 
3 Related Literature  
54 
 
61.7% against a 46-year-old candidate) by Ahemd, Andersson and Hammarstedt (2012) 
and 38-year-old applicants in various Spanish occupations by Albert, Escot and 
Fernández-Cornejo (2011). Many of these discrimination rates even exceed most 
discrimination rates found in race or gender studies although serving restaurant clients 
clearly falls into category 3 of Warr’s (1994) framework and can easily be accomplished 
by a fit and open-minded medium-aged applicant. The most likely explanation for this 
employer behavior is taste-based discrimination induced by the customer, i.e. restaurant 
visitors want to be served by younger waiters. In England, Riach and Rich (2007b) 
additionally tested discrimination in two other contexts: female applicants aged 27 
versus 47 in retail and recent college graduates with a general degree, e.g. in law or 
economics, aged 21 and 39 respectively. The ‘mature age’ graduate’s résumé revealed 
that prior to entering college at the age of 35 she had been working as a secretary for 
eleven years and took care of her child for additional five years. Furthermore, she was 
designed to be divorced in order to signal low probability of future pregnancies. The 
interest section of her résumé did only reveal age-neutral activities. Although showing 
the same educational background and possessing eleven years of (somehow related) work 
experience, the mature graduate was heavily discriminated against (59.6% net 
discrimination rate). Retail sales (female clothing stores) by contrast represented the 
only occupation (not only in this, but also in all previous studies) where older applicants 
were preferred to younger candidates: Here, the significant net ‘discrimination’ rate 
against the 27-year-old applicant was 29.6% which reflects rational choices made by 
retail employers.  
Büsch, Dahl and Dittrich (2009) adopted an approach they call ‘questionnaire study’ 
which is similar to correspondence testing, but differs in one crucial aspect: The decision 
whether to hire one of the fictitious applicants was not made by actual employers in the 
field, but by test persons (students and personnel managers). This indeed reflects only a 
hypothetical hiring decision, but in contrast to laboratory experiments the decision is 
more realistic: Neither the position nor the company in this scenario was ficticious. 
Other than that, all correspondence testing rules applied and age was the only variable 
which was manipulated systematically. The ‘questionnaire study’ approach allows for 
additional measures other than mere response rates. In a questionnaire, subjects were 
not only asked to select the most suitable applicant (hiring decision), but were also asked 
to rank the applicants on twelve capability items reflecting perceived productivity. This 
allowed the researchers to control for perceived productivity in age-neutral white-collar 
jobs. Nevertheless, the older applicant was discriminated against and had a significantly 
lower hiring probability of 22 percentage points in Germany and 12 percentage points in 
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Norway. These few correspondence/audit studies indeed reveal discriminatory practices 
based on applicant age in almost all labor markets. They confirm the mostly arbitrary 
negative stereotypes against older labor force participants (e.g. Rosen and Jerdee 1976a, 
1976b; Kite et al. 2005) that other indirect measures of age discrimination53 and 
laboratory experiments (e.g. Perry and Bourhis 1998; see Finkelstein, Burke and Raju 
1995 or Gordon and Arvey 2004 for a meta-analytic review) have found.  
3.3.2.1.4 Physical Attractiveness 
“What is beautiful is good” (Dion, Berscheid and Walster 1972, 285): Beautiful people 
have been found inter alia to be more successful in mate selection (e.g. Adams 1977), 
student evaluations (Hamermesh and Parker 2003) and political elections (e.g. Adams 
1977; Klein and Rosar 2005). Additionally, they are generally considered to be more 
intelligent (Clifford and Walster 1973; Jackson, Hunter and Hodge 1995) and socially 
competent (Eagly et al. 1991) than unattractive individuals. This pro-attractiveness bias 
is however not only limited to social life, but has also been demonstrated in the 
occupational domain: Even in the labor market, beauty is rewarded. By using earnings 
data from three major US and Canadian household surveys, Hamermesh and Biddle 
(1994) showed that both beauty wage premia and plainness wage penalties exist: On 
average, highly attractive individuals (of both genders) c.p. earn up to 10 percent more 
than average-looking people and individuals of below-average attractiveness earn 5 to 10 
percent less than the average-looking North American.54 Harper (2000) reports similar 
results for UK labor market outcomes and Mobius and Rosenblatt (2006) found 
attractiveness wage premia also in economic experiments.55 Following the exclusion 
principle, most of them conclude that these premia and penalties must be driven by 
employer discrimination à la Becker (1971). In other studies, evidence for customer 
discrimination in Becker’s sense is found: Attractive female door-to-door fundraisers are 
able to raise more money than their less attractive colleagues (Landry et al. 2005) and 
waitresses’s tips were found to increase with breast size and with the mere fact of having 
blond hair (Lynn 2009). However, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994, 1193) also admit that 
“it is difficult to disentangle the effects of alternative sources of earnings differentials in 
the data”. Endogeneity as well as unobserved variable biases are likely to occur when 
applying regression techniques. As it is the case with each other individual difference 
                                                
53  Self-reports of age-discriminated employees (e.g. Johnson and Neumark 1997; Purcell, Wilton 
and Elias 2003), employer surveys (Daniel and Heywood 2007) and macro-data (OECD 1998). 
54  Target attractiveness was measured by panel interviewers on a 5-point-scale and subsequently 
categorized into these three groups. 
55  Other studies that have revealed positive labor market outcomes for more attractive 
individuals are e.g. Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) and Parrett (2003). Hamermesh (2011) 
gives a comprehensive, yet rather narrative overview of how and why ‘Beauty Pays’. 
3 Related Literature  
56 
 
factor, it is impossible to include all regressors affecting an individual’s wage and 
unambiguously attribute residual earnings differentials to attractiveness. This is the 
reason why again direct influence measurements such as field and laboratory 
experiments yield results that are superior to regression techniques. Only with the use 
of experiments, researchers are able to isolate the effect of beauty and hence the level of 
discrimination against unattractive applicants in recruitment. But manipulating 
attractiveness in experiments is not as straightforward as manipulating gender or race 
where the simple use of distinct names conveys group affiliation. According to 
conventional wisdom, ‘Beauty is in the eye of the beholder’. In their meta-analysis, 
Langlois et al. (2000) however were able to reject this argument, as they report levels of 
agreement for adult attractiveness measures exceeding 0.9, both within and across 
cultures. As Hamermesh and Biddle (1994, 1176) state, “…while ‘beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder’, beholders view beauty similarly”. As agreement in attractiveness 
evaluations is generally high, reliability of attractiveness evaluations is high and hence 
it is sufficient to collect and average out beauty assessments of approximately 24 raters 
(Henss 1992). Recently, another more objective measure of facial attractiveness has been 
discovered: facial (a)symmetry. Individuals possessing an ideal facial feature 
arrangement are considered to be more attractive and “individual attractiveness is 
optimized when the face’s vertical distance between the eyes and the mouth is 
approximately 36% of its length, and the horizontal distance between the eyes is 
approximately 46% of the face’s width” (Pallett, Link and Lee 2010, 149). These optimal 
proportions are also referred to as ‘new’ golden ratios which are interpreted “as the first 
‘validated’ measure of facial beauty” (Lopez Bóo, Rossi and Urzúa 2012, 8). 
It is worth mentioning that unattractive individuals usually do not count among the 
groups protected by equal opportunity legislation (Tews, Stafford and Zhu 2009). This 
might be an explanation for the insufficient use of field experiments and employment 
testing in this field — only three correspondence studies (Rooth 2009; Ruffle and 
Shtudiner 2011; López Bóo, Rossi and Urzúa 2012) deliberately manipulating applicant 
appearance exist so far. However, several laboratory experiments measuring the 
attractiveness bias in decision making have been conducted in organizational and social 
psychology. Three relatively recent meta-analyses exist (Jackson, Hunter and Hodge 
1995; Langlois et al. 2000; Hosoda, Stone-Romero and Coats 2003) of which only the 
latter explicitly summarizes the influence of attractiveness on job-related outcomes such 
as selection, hiring and performance evaluation. Including 27 studies in their analysis, 
Hosoda, Stone-Romero and Coats (2003) report a positive relationship between 
attractiveness and job-related outcomes in 55 of 62 instances resulting in a weighted 
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mean effect size of 0.37. Additionally, potential moderators of the attractiveness bias 
were identified: (1) Attractiveness is equally important for men and women (regardless 
of job sex-type), (2) The strength of the pro-attractiveness bias is not influenced by 
provision of job-relevant information, (3) Compared to between-subjects designs, effect 
sizes are larger in within-subject designs, (4) Results do not vary significantly according 
to the type of rater (students vs. professionals) and hence to the type of experiment (lab 
vs. ‘field’ experiment56) although students are more lenient in evaluating targets, (5) The 
magnitude of effect sizes varies as a function of investigated outcomes and (6) Effect 
sizes have decreased over time.  
Up to now, only two correspondence studies have tested the influence of general physical 
attractiveness on hiring decisions in the field (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2011; López Bóo, 
Rossi and Urzúa 2012). Ruffle and Shtudiner (2011) responded to job ads in Israel for 
positions of either high or low customer contact. They either sent applications without a 
picture of the male or female applicant or attached photographs of individuals previously 
rated as being (un)attractive by a panel of impartial judges to the résumé. A significant 
preference for attractive male applicants was found: compared to both men without a 
picture or plain-looking men, callback rates are significantly higher for attractive men. 
Female applicants however do not benefit from attaching attractive pictures. On the 
contrary, women not attaching a picture to their application are called back more 
frequently than both attractive and unattractive women. Albeit, this effect is not 
significant when recruitment is executed by employment agencies leading to the 
conclusion that expected contact intensity and especially female jealousy drives the 
beauty punishment for female applicants. López Bóo, Rossi and Urzúa (2012) however 
manipulated facial beauty in their correspondence test in Argentina by varying the 
levels of facial (a)symmetry. Applicants attaching an optimal picture, i.e. one following 
the golden rule of Pallett, Link and Lee (2010), receive 36% more callbacks than 
unattractive candidates.57 In the ‘unattractive’ condition, the same person’s facial 
symmetry was deliberately varied through the use of a computer program. As no 
evidence for discrimination against applicants not attaching a photograph was found, 
López Bóo, Rossi and Urzúa (2012) only recommend attractive applicants to attach 
photos to their résumé.58  
                                                
56  Field experiments in this context are not understood in the sense of employment testing, but 
simply having résumés ranked by human resource managers/recruiters instead of students. 
57  Unfortunately, no net discrimination rates were reported in these two studies. 
58  In Argentina, it is common to attach a photograph to the application, just as is the case in e.g. 
Germany, Sweden and other European countries. 
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Although most of the experimental studies report positive attractiveness biases, i.e. the 
more attractive person is commonly preferred, the size of the impact remains low in 
comparison to other information provided in the applications, such as personality and 
ability measures (Tews, Stafford and Zhu 2009) or educational credentials (Dipboye, 
Fromkin and Wiback 1975). Furthermore, pro-attractiveness biases are more subtle in 
nature as they differ according to target-rater-congruence in gender and attractiveness. 
Pro-attractiveness biases exist for opposite-sex applicants (Agthe, Spörrle and Maner 
2010) and are especially pronounced for male raters evaluating female applicants (Luxen 
and van de Vijver 2006). This phenomenon may be interpreted as mate selection 
behavior from an evolutionary psychological perspective: Same-sex applicants are not 
systematically favored and the opposite-sex attractiveness bias only occurs when raters 
are told that future contact intensity between them and the applicant will be high. 
Especially, female (student) raters favor unattractive female applicants which can be 
understood as intrasexual competition (Luxen and van de Vijver 2006; Ruffle and 
Shtudiner 2011).59 These perceptions of intrasexual threat however are only revealed by 
average looking raters (Agthe, Spörrle and Maner 2010) and did not occur consistently 
among professional female recruiters (Luxen and van de Vijver 2006). Marlowe, 
Schneider and Nelson (1996) could also show that the extent of attractiveness biases 
tends to decrease with the level of recruiting experience. Nonetheless, managers of all 
experience levels in their study were biased by attractiveness and applicant gender. 
By manipulating application quality and attractiveness, Watkins and Johnston (2000) 
found that attractiveness is only advantageous for applicants with mediocre application 
quality (in terms of education, work experience and previous achievements). Applicants 
with a high-quality application do not benefit (additionally) from their attractiveness, 
while attractive applicants with a moderate application obtain almost as high judgments 
and hiring probabilities as attractive and highly qualified candidates. Job type in terms 
of expected customer (face-to-face) contact — also labeled attractiveness-relevance of the 
job — additionally moderates the attractiveness bias (Beehr and Gilmore 1982; Gilmore, 
Beehr and Love 1986; Tews, Stafford and Zhu 2009; López Bóo, Rossi and Urzúa 2012). 
In line with the customer discrimination notion of Becker, attractiveness is especially 
important in positions involving high levels of customer contact. Furthermore, Heilman 
and Saruwatari (1979) concluded that for female applicants also the hierarchical position 
of the job moderates attractiveness bias: Female attractiveness was of help when 
applying for nonmanagerial positions, but a hindrance in managerial positions. 
                                                
59  Given that the majority of human resources (HR) employees is female, this result might be of 
increased practical relevance to female applicants. 
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The order in which relevant information and physical appearance data are presented to 
raters is also able to moderate the influence of attractiveness (Cann, Siegfried and 
Pearce 1981). Consequently, Cann, Siegfried and Pearce (1981) advise to only allow 
recruiters to look at photos of applicants after having evaluated paper credentials — an 
idea which is implemented into anonymous applications which are very common in the 
US and currently tested in Europe (Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann 2010). Similarly, 
Tews, Stafford and Zhu (2009) recommend providing additional job-relevant information 
in order to minimize attractiveness effects. 
Although the majority of empirical studies testing the influence of applicant appearance 
consider perceived facial attractiveness as a measure of beauty, an individual’s personal 
appearance also includes other attributes such as height, weight, attire, make-up, 
glasses etc. The influence of applicants’ weight — or more precisely obesity — on labor 
market outcomes has not only been tested in wage regression analyses (e.g. Cawley 
2004; Conley and Glauber 2005; Fahr 2006; Han, Norton and Stearns 2009) and 
laboratory experiments (e.g. Pingitore et al. 1994), but also represents the first physical 
attractiveness characteristic actively manipulated in correspondence testing: “…there 
have been no previous attempts to isolate the effect of employer’s perceptions of 
obese/unattractive job applicants on real life labor market outcomes” (Rooth 2009, 711). 
Rooth (2009) manipulated perceived obesity by digitally manipulating photos and 
measured net discrimination rates of 15.2% for male and 16.7% for female obese 
applicants.60 In an attempt to reveal the drivers of discrimination, Rooth (2009) included 
the results of a separate attractiveness rating into the regressions and concluded that 
“the results for women seem to be driven by obesity, while the results for men seem to be 
driven by being less attractive” (Rooth 2009, 712). 
Applicant attire and grooming has also been demonstrated to have an effect on hiring 
evaluations both for women (Mack and Rainey 1990) and for men (Kwantes et al. 2011). 
At least in stereotypical male occupations, traditional business attire helped applicants 
provide increased hiring and promotion probabilities. Altering clothing, hair, make-up 
and jewelry of a female applicant, Mack and Rainey (1990) reported greater hiring 
probabilities for well-groomed female applicants. Focusing solely on cosmetics use, Cox 
and Glick (1986) however found that make-up use is correlated with attractiveness, 
femininity and sexiness, but does not improve the level of expected job-performance. 
Wearing glasses however has been shown to positively bias evaluations of intelligence, 
diligence, honesty and trustworthiness (Manz and Lueck 1968; Argyle and McHenry 
                                                
60  Net discrimination rates calculated from Rooth (2009), table 1, 719-720. 
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1971; Boshier 1975; Harris, Harris and Bochner 1982), but has hitherto not been tested 
in (hypothetical) hiring situations. However, Brown, Henriquez and Groscup (2008) were 
able to show that defendants wearing eyeglasses were perceived as more intelligent and 
therefore judged more favorably in fictitious juror decisions. 
In conclusion, personal appearance, i.e. (facial) attractiveness and other measures such 
as weight or attire, bias selection decisions in hiring, in particular, when expected 
contact intensity between rater and applicant as well as customer contact is high. 
Compared to other pieces of information conveyed in résumés, however, the relative 
impact of attractiveness is rather low. Most of the empirical, and especially 
experimental, research conveyed different levels of attractiveness via manipulation of 
photographs. Relatively few studies (e.g. Forsythe 1990; Pingitore et al. 1994) have 
examined the effect of applicant attractiveness — attire and obesity in the 
aforementioned studies — on interview instead of pre-selection outcomes. 
3.3.2.1.5 Applicant Personality 
Applicant personality represents one of the few individual difference factors that are not 
discriminatory in nature. Applicants showing certain personality traits might be favored 
during personnel selection processes not simply due to an interviewer’s taste for or 
distaste against certain personalities, but because possessing these traits might be 
productivity enhancing for the future job. As personality traits are relatively stable over 
an individual’s lifetime (e.g. Costa and McCrae 1997) and usually cannot be altered by 
the applicant, they nonetheless count among individual difference factors. 
Since the mid-1980s, psychologists have agreed on a construct oriented approach for 
measuring and classifying an individual’s personality: The Five-Factor Model (FFM) 
proposed by Digman (1990) and extended by Goldberg (1993) and Costa and McCrae 
(1992) comprises the so called Big Five personality dimensions Openness (to Experience), 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticisim (or labeled more 
positively: Emotional Stability).61 Considerable consensus exists that these five major 
dimensions encompass the range of an individual’s personality profile to a large extent 
and each of the dimensions is defined as follows (e.g. Tews, Stafford and Zhu 2009; see 
Costa and McCrae 1992 for more details): Openness to Experience is a personality trait 
                                                
61  Other category labels are sometimes used (e.g. autonomy instead of openness to experience), 
but the five dimensions have basically the same meaning and labels can be used 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, some researchers also measure other personality traits such as 
leadership skills (Kuhn and Weinberger 2005), emotional intelligence (e.g. Chia 2005), locus of 
control (e.g. Cook, Vance and Spector 2000; Tay, Ang & van Dyne 2006) or Type A achievement 
(e.g. Cook, Vance and Spector 2000) which sometimes overlap with the Big Five dimensions.  
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reflecting the degree to which someone appreciates adventures, unusual ideas, curiosity 
and the variety of experience. Individuals high on this dimension can be characterized as 
imaginative, original, unconventional and independent. Conscientiousness refers to the 
degree of self-discipline, sense of duty and aim for achievement. Persons possessing high 
levels of conscientiousness can be described as efficient, punctual, well-organized and 
dependable. Extraversion is related to an individual’s preference for human contact and 
basically describes how outgoing people are. Highly sociable, assertive, active, energetic 
and talkative are adjectives commonly used to describe those high in extraversion. 
Agreeableness encompasses somebody’s level of compassion and cooperation. High levels 
of this dimension are reflected by being altruistic, warm, generous, trusting and 
cooperative. Neuroticism (or in contrast Emotional Stability) refers to the tendency to 
easily experience unpleasant emotions. Emotionally stable people are calm, relaxed and 
free from worry whereas being high in neuroticism (i.e. being emotionally unstable) is 
expressed by high levels of anger, anxiety and depression. 
Personality traits are commonly measured through self-reports of individuals. Test 
persons either answer several trait-related questions (e.g. “I pay attention to details” for 
conscientiousness) on a 5-point Likert scale which are partially positively and partially 
negatively coded or position themselves on a continuum between contradictory adjectives 
(e.g. talkative — quiet for extraversion). A frequently cited personality inventory has been 
developed by Costa and McCrae (1992). “Economists are only beginning to understand 
the relationship between personality traits and economic outcomes” (Silles 2010, 131). 
Only recently, economists have included non-cognitive or soft skills (i.e. personality 
traits) into wage regressions and have been able to explain previously unexplained 
variance in individuals’ earnings and labor market success (e.g. Nyhus and Pons 2005; 
Mueller and Plug 2006; Flossmann, Piatek and Wichert 2007; Silles 2010). Additionally, 
numerous studies and meta-analyses (e.g. Barrick and Mount 1991; Tett, Jackson and 
Rothstein 1991; Salgado 1997; Hurtz and Donovan 2000) have been conducted in order to 
empirically test personality-performance linkages. In a second order meta-analysis, 
Barrick, Mount and Judge (2001) summarized the most important findings that are 
relatively consistent in most of the 15 studies included in their sample. In the aggregate, 
conscientiousness is the only valid predictor of overall job performance. Not surprisingly, 
well-organized, punctual and efficient individuals perform better in their jobs regardless 
of job type or examined performance measure. Recently, also emotional stability seems to 
become a more general desirable personality trait, but the predictive value of overall 
performance based on emotional stability is still substantially lower than the one for 
conscientiousness. The remaining three dimensions (agreeableness, extraversion and 
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openness) are only valid performance predictors for some performance measures or types 
of jobs. Extraversion for instance is particularly important for managerial and sales jobs 
involving high levels of interpersonal contact (Mount, Barrick and Stewart 1998). 
Emotional stability and agreeableness in turn are valid predictors only for team 
performance, but not for overall job performance. Following Holland’s (1985) 
classification of occupations62, extraversion is of particular importance in E-type jobs 
(Dunn et al. 1995; Cole et al. 2004) which are characterized by high levels of 
interpersonal contact whereas openness is particularly useful for A- and I-type jobs. 
Despite this substantial evidence for the importance of at least some personality 
constructs in predicting job performance, only few researchers have deliberately 
investigated whether recruiters actually make use of these linkages. Several questions 
arise when examining recruiters’ use of personality in selection processes: (1) Are 
recruiters aware of the personality-performance connection? (2) If so, how do they reveal 
personality traits during selection? (3) Are these perceived personality traits related to 
hiring decisions? (4) In which way can personality traits influence hiring decisions?  
Dunn et al. (1995) have indeed shown that managers use personality descriptions — 
especially descriptions of applicants’ conscientiousness levels — when they are readily 
available to them, i.e. when they are directly attached to the application. In reality 
however, personality profile descriptions are usually not attached to written applications 
nor do applicants reveal an elaborated personality profile in job interviews. Therefore, 
one strand of research has been dedicated to finding out whether recruiters can 
accurately judge the personality profile of someone they have never met before. Brown 
and Campion (1994) assumed that recruiters make inferences about applicants’ 
attributes from the biodata available in résumés, but only Cole et al. (2003a, 2003b, 
2004) have empirically demonstrated that specific biodata items are related to 
personality traits (Cole, Feild and Giles 2003a, 2003b). They could also show that 
recruiters reliably identify the presence of personality-related biodata-items in résumés 
                                                
62  According to a person’s vocational interest and subsequent job choice, Holland (1985) classifies 
each individual as one of the following RIASEC-types: The Realisitc (i.e. R-) Type has “a 
preference for activities that entail explicit, ordered, or systematic manipulation of objects, 
tools, machines, and animals” (Holland 1985, 19). The Investigative (i.e. I-) Type prefers 
“activities that entail the observational, symbolic, systematic, and creative investigation” 
(Holland 1985, 19) of diverse phenomena. Artistic (i.e. A-) Types love to engage in “ambiguous, 
free, unsystematized activites” (Holland 1985, 20), whereas Social (S-) type individuals select 
themselves into occupations that “entail the manipulation of others to inform, train, develop, 
cure, or enlighten” (Holland 1985, 21). Enterprising (i.e. E-) type indivudals also prefer to 
manipulate others, but in order to “attain organizational goals or economic gain” (Holland 
1985, 21). Finally, the Conventional (C-) Type prefers activities that “entail the explicit, 
ordered, systematic manipulation of data” (Holland 1985, 22). 
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(Cole, Feild and Giles 2003b) which could be used for inferences by recruiters. However, 
whether recruiters really form personality impressions from résumé data has not been 
tested in these studies, but e.g. in Cable and Gilovich (1998), Cole, Feild and Stafford 
(2005) and Cole et al. (2009). All of these come to the conclusion that recruiters indeed 
infer personality traits from paper credentials. These inferences however are 
characterized by low inter-rater reliability and low convergent validity measured as 
correlations between recruiters’ perceived applicant personality traits and applicants’ 
self-reported personality profiles (Cole et al. 2009).  
In (simulated) interview settings, it has also been tested whether both laypersons (i.e. 
students) and professional observers (recruiters) accurately judge an applicant’s 
personality. Although not being able to accurately assess all of the single dimensions, 
recruiters are better in holistically judging applicant personality profiles during short 
interview excerpts than laypersons. Student subjects however performed better in 
assessing single personality dimensions, but did not judge the overall profile as 
accurately as recruiters did (Schmid Mast et al. 2011). This is in line with the finding 
reported by Barrick, Patton and Haugland (2001). Recruiters’ judgments correlated more 
strongly with self-ratings than stranger ratings, but ratings from close friends showed 
the highest correlation with the actual personality profile. Schmid Mast et al. (2011, 205) 
assume “that recruiters are better at assessing applicants as a whole … instead of 
assessing how applicants differ on a given personality dimension” as their job is “to 
recommend the best applicant as a whole and not with respect to a specific trait”. Both 
studies emphasize that some of the personality traits could be better assessed by 
interviewers (openness and extraversion for instance) while other less visible, i.e. rather 
internal, traits such as emotional stability could not be detected by recruiters.  
Regardless of inter-rater reliability and convergent validity, the question remains 
whether recruiters actually use their inferences in hiring or invitation decisions and 
whether personality really affects hiring decisions (criterion-related validity). Cole et al. 
(2009) found that perceived levels of extraversion, conscientiousness and openness 
accounted for a significant amount of variance in suitability ratings. Chia (2005) found 
that emotional intelligence — a trait related to agreeableness and emotional stability — 
positively influenced the number of subsequent job interviews and job offers for 
accounting graduates. Using two different occupations according to the RIASEC typology 
(E-type and C-type jobs), Cole et al. (2004) showed that applicants low on 
conscientiousness received the lowest employability ratings regardless of job type and 
that extraversion was only important for E-type jobs in which interpersonal skills are 
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highly valued. This supports the findings by Paunonen, Jackson and Oberman (1987) 
who reported higher employability ratings when personality congruence (i.e. perceived 
person-job match in terms of personality traits) was high. Caldwell and Burger (1998) 
pursued graduates’ success in the labor market by measuring the ratio of initial and 
subsequent interviews as well as the number of job offers in several disciplines. 
Extraversion and conscientiousness were found to be positively correlated with interview 
success. Similar results were reported by Cook, Vance and Spector (2000) who showed 
that invitation to a second interview was positively correlated with achievement striving, 
a trait comparable to conscientiousness, and negatively correlated with trait anxiety and 
locus of control. Further interview success research has also confirmed that high levels of 
conscientiousness and extraversion are associated with interview performance (e.g. de 
Fruyt and Mervielde 1999; Boudreau et al. 2001). In an attempt to explain why 
personality traits influence hiring decisions, Tay, Ang and van Dyne (2006) introduce the 
interviewing self-efficacy (I-SE) as a mediator. I-SE represents the job applicants’ beliefs 
about their interviewing capabilities which is influenced by both personal characteristics 
and past interview success. Another indirect influence is demonstrated by Caldwell and 
Burger (1998): Specific personality traits, i.e. conscientiousness and extraversion, are 
positively correlated with (social and background) interview preparation which in turn 
positively influenced interview success. 
In summary, specific applicant personality traits (especially conscientiousness) are 
indeed positively related to overall job performance. However, recruiters experience 
difficulties in accurately assessing applicants’ personality traits. Low values of inter-
rater reliability and convergent validity are the consequence of this inability. 
Nevertheless, recruiters frequently rely on the personality inferences they made from 
both résumés and interviews (high criterion-related validity). 
3.3.2.1.6 Conclusion 
Individual applicant characteristics which are usually not related to productivity have 
repeatedly been reported to influence selection decisions. Applicants are frequently 
discriminated against on the basis of their race, gender, age or physical attractiveness. 
As most of the discrimination has been found to occur in the initial stages of a selection 
process, i.e. the pre-selection based on paper credentials and résumés, anonymous 
applications might be an appropriate remedy for discriminatory practices in the 
recruitment process. Particularly, applicants in countries with a long tradition of 
voluntarily providing plenty of irrelevant information in applications — such as Germany 
— might benefit from the implementation of anonymous applications.   
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3.3.2.2 Rater Characteristics 
Just as individual differences of applicants have been shown to bias selection decisions, 
specific rater characteristics such as rater gender, age, race, attractiveness and rating 
experience or training are likely to have an impact on rater decisions. Although 
numerous studies include easily observable rater attributes such as gender, age or race, 
these are mainly treated as moderators of applicant individual difference factor effects. 
Rater race for instance is usually only tested in conjunction with applicant race (see e.g. 
Goldberg 2005; Buckley et al. 2007; McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion 2010) and 
consequently, details on the moderating effect of rater race will be presented in section 
3.3.3.1 (Similarity-Attraction Effect). The same applies to rater attractiveness: Rater 
attractiveness is indeed able to moderate the effect of applicant attractiveness on 
interview outcomes (e.g. Agthe, Spörrle and Maner 2010) which has already been 
introduced in Chapter 3.3.2.1.4 (Applicant Attractiveness). Only for very few rater 
characteristics, main effects on interview outcomes have been tested so far. Of these, 
only rater gender and age effects will be discussed in detail in this section.63  
Several papers explicitly deal with the differential effects of rater gender on selection 
decisions. Most of the empirical (field) studies find support for the hypothesis that 
female raters are relatively more lenient in comparison to male evaluators (e.g. Wallach 
and Kogan 1959; Kohn and Fiedler 1961; Warr and Knapper 1968; Deaux and Ferris 
1975; London and Poplawski 1976; Muchinsky and Harris 1977; Rose and Andiappan 
1978; Elliot 1981; Parsons and Liden 1984; Raza and Carpenter 1987; Andreoni and 
Vesterlund 2001; Chapman and Rowe 2001). According to these results, female raters 
tend to award generally higher applicant evaluations, regardless of applicant gender. 
However, this effect is only rarely reflected in final hiring recommendations. Female 
interviewers in Elliot’s (1981) study for instance evaluated applicants’ dress, person, 
manner, effective intelligence and disposition more favorably than did male raters. In 
the overall employability rating however, assessments did not differ by rater gender. 
These results correspond to the findings of Parsons and Liden (1984) and Raza and 
Carpenter (1987). Analogous to Elliot (1981), Parsons and Liden (1984) provide support 
for an increased leniency of female raters when evaluating nonverbal cues of applicants. 
Raza and Carpenter (1987) find significant positive biases in female raters’ specific 
ratings, but not in general employability ratings. Chapman and Rowe (2001) showed 
that female rater generosity is especially pronounced in unstructured or semi-structured 
interviews. Male interviewers’ ratings in their study were however not affected by 
                                                
63  For a review of other rater characteristics such as rater training and experience or rater mood 
effects see e.g. Posthuma, Morgeson and Campion (2002), 31-37. 
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interview structure. Female generosity in applicant ratings can be explained by either 
higher levels of altruism or social preferences for females (Andreoni and Vesterlund 
2001; Croson and Gneezy 2009) or by their better ability to interpret nonverbal cues 
(Hall 1978) or other extraneous factors (Farina and Hagelauer 1975; Elliot 1981). Some 
studies investigating interviewer gender, however, were also able to show that under 
specific conditions, rater gender does not influence selection decisions. Abrevaya and 
Hamermesh (2010) did not find support for any female charity or favoritism in author-
referee pairs in the economic discipline. Investigating submission success of almost 3,000 
submissions to an economic journal for more than 20 years, they found that women are 
not more or less generous than male referees in their rejection or acceptance decisions. 
Although the share of females in economics is quite low — usually being indicative of 
same-sex favoritism — no evidence for (female) gender favoritism was found.  
Rater age is also likely to affect rater evaluations. However, only very few studies have 
independently examined the effect of rater age on selection decisions. Ugbah and Majors 
(1992) recommend applicants to develop different communication strategies dependent 
on interviewer age as they found that younger recruiters (aged 35 or younger) perceive 
applicant communication behaviors differently than those aged 35 or older. In the 
ageism context, Finkelstein and Burke (1998) showed that older raters judged older 
applicants even less favorably, representing higher degrees of ageism for older raters. 
Quite to the contrary, Gibson, Zerbe and Franke (1993) found younger raters to rate 
younger workers more favorably and older raters to evaluate older workers more 
positively on several work-related outcomes. For performance evaluations in supervisor-
subordinate relationships, Griffeth and Bedeian (1989) were able to show that younger 
raters gave systematically lower ratings than older raters. However, just as in a similar 
study on various performance measures conducted by Cleveland and Landy (1981), this 
effect was quite small in comparison to more relevant work-related criteria.  
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3.3.3 The Influence of Social Factors 
In addition to ability signals and individual difference factors of both applicant and 
rater, social factors are also likely to have an impact on selection outcomes. Especially 
the employment interview is a “dynamic social process” (Swider et al. 2011, 1276). 
Posthuma, Morgeson and Campion (2002, 4-5) summarize:  
“At a fundamental level, the interview is a social interaction between the 
interviewer and the applicant. As such, a number of scholars have examined how 
various social factors can influence interview outcomes. This research is predicated 
on the notion that individuals act and reside in a social context and this context can 
influence their behavior and the processes and outcomes of an interview.”  
Of these various factors studied in this particular strand of research, only three — 
Applicant-Rater Similarity, Applicant Fit and Impression Management — will be 
discussed in the following section. Nevertheless, numerous other social factors, e.g. 
initial impressions, verbal and nonverbal behavior and information exchange, can affect 
interview outcomes.64  
3.3.3.1 Applicant-Rater Similarity 
Not only distinct applicant and rater characteristics as outlined in Chapter 3.3.2 are able 
to independently bias selection decisions, but especially in the interpersonal interview 
situation also the (mis)match between interviewer and interviewee characteristics is 
expected to influence selection outcomes. A similarity-attraction effect65 is hypothesized 
to occur whenever candidates with similar characteristics, biographical backgrounds, 
attitudes or perceived personalities are unfoundedly rated more favorably by 
interviewers. According to the popular saying ‘Birds of a feather flock together’, 
interviewers are assumed to prefer similar applicants to dissimilar ones.66 
Empirically, the similarity-attraction effect has not only been shown to occur in romantic 
(e.g. Buss 1985) and platonic personal relationships (Bahns, Pickett and Crandall 2012), 
but also in the organizational context: Interpersonal similarity inter alia positively 
affects supervisor-subordinate evaluations (Turban and Jones 1988; Vecchio and Bullis 
2001), board of director selection (Westphal and Zajac 1995), venture capitalist decisions 
(Franke et al. 2006), buyer-seller relationships (Lichtenthal and Tellefsen 2001) and 
                                                
64  For a detailed review of the social factors not presented here, see e.g. Posthuma, Morgeson and 
Campion (2002, 4-14). 
65  Other commonly used terms for the same phenomenon are similar-to-me effect, similarity 
hypothesis, homophily principle and in-group bias. Although being derived from slightly 
different theoretical assumptions, these terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
66  See Chapter 4.2.3.2 for a theoretical derivation of this effect. 
3 Related Literature  
68 
 
marketing channel relationships (Homburg, Schneider and Fassnacht 2002). The 
phenomenon is not limited to interpersonal relationships, but can also occur in 
interorganizational settings (e.g. Roebken 2010). But, most importantly for the present 
context, the similarity-attraction paradigm has also been tested empirically in both 
simulated (e.g. Rand and Wexley 1975; Howard and Ferris 1996; Buckley et al. 2007) 
and actual appointment/selection decisions (Lin, Dobbins and Farh 1992; Graves and 
Powell 1995, 1996; Prewett-Livingston et al. 1996; Sacco et al. 2003; McFarland et al. 
2004; Goldberg 2005; Bagües and Esteve-Volart 2010; McCarthy, van Iddekinge and 
Campion 2010).  
In the original sense, Byrne (1971) modeled attitudinal similarity to be the driver of 
increased interpersonal attraction (see Chapter 4.2.3.2), but as attitudinal similarity is 
usually unobservable and difficult to operationalize, either actual demographic 
similarity67 or perceived similarity by the interviewer is used as a proxy for attitudinal 
similarity in empirical investigations. Applicant-rater similarity can be measured on 
several dimensions: either (1) purely demographic in terms of gender, race and age, (2) 
biographical in terms of origin and socio-economic status, (3) in terms of human capital 
similarity such as educational level and status, but also (work) experience and tenure, 
(4) relational in terms of having similar transaction partners or (5) in terms of other 
relevant socio-demographic dimensions such as the geographic distance between two 
individuals or organizations.68  
According to the empirical results, similarity actually attracts and influences selection 
and appointment decisions in various occupations such as academia, college and police 
officer recruiting. However, the effects are generally quite small and inconsistent. 
Depending on the similarity dimension examined, similarity either has no effect (age 
similarity), positive (race similarity) or even negative repercussions (gender similarity). 
In none of the empirical studies, age similarity had a significant effect on rater 
evaluations/hiring recommendations (e.g. Lin, Dobbins and Farh 1992; Goldberg 2005).  
Race similarity studies report very inconsistent results (for an overview see e.g. 
McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion 2010), which can be partly explained by their 
different design. Investigating the number of fouls awarded by NBA referees, Price and 
Wolfers (2010) found a substantially negative opposite-race effect for both black and 
white referees. In their field study, Lin, Dobbins and Farh (1992) investigated same-race 
effects in two-person panels of several racial compositions (either panels with (a) both 
                                                
67  Also labeled ‘relational demography’ (e.g. Goldberg 2005). 
68  However, only results for demographic similarity effects will be presented in detail. 
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interviewers of the same race as the applicant, (b) both different from the applicant or (c) 
balanced, i.e. one interviewer of the same and one of another race) during the selection 
for a custodial position. They found a small, but significant same-race bias for black and 
Hispanic applicants which was more pronounced in conventional than in situational 
interviews. Prewett-Livingston et al. (1996) used four-person panels of various racial 
compositions in the selection process of police sergeants, but were not able to include all-
white or all-black panels in order to ensure fairness. As a result, they confirmed a same-
race rating effect in balanced panels and a majority-race rating effect in primarily white 
panels, meaning that in panels with only one black and three white raters, black raters 
also favored the white candidate. Similarly, McFarland et al. (2004) investigated police 
officer applicant success as a function of the racial composition of three-person panels 
and reported that black raters are more prone to the similar-to-me effect, but only in 
predominantly black panels. Buckley et al. (2007) showed videotaped interview 
responses made by actual police officer applicants to several four-person panels of all 
possible racial compositions and found small same-race effects for both black and white 
raters. McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion (2010) reviewed highly structured 
interviews for entry-level managerial positions conducted by two-person panels of 
different race and gender. Neither gender nor race similarity affected interview 
outcomes in their study. Sacco et al. (2003) however were some of the few researchers to 
investigate the effects of racial similarity in one-on-one college recruiting interviews 
instead of panel interviews. As interviewers are supposed to act differently according to 
the interview setting (panel vs. individual)69, they expected results different from 
previous studies. Analogous to McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion (2010), they used 
highly structured interviews and could not find significant similarity-attraction biases.  
In terms of sex similarity biases, results are quite consistent, but in the opposite 
direction than expected by the similarity-attraction paradigm: Broder (1993), Graves and 
Powell (1995 and 1996), Goldberg (2005) and Bagües and Esteve-Volart (2010) report sex 
dissimilarity effects that predominantly arise from female recruiters’ preference for male 
candidates (Graves and Powell 1995, 1996; Bagües and Esteve-Volart 2010).70 Male 
recruiters were mostly not susceptible to sex (dis)similarity effects. Only Goldberg 
(2005), Powell and Butterfield (2002) and Walsh, Weinberg and Fairfield (1987) reported 
                                                
69  Panel interviewers might either be more or less prone to the similarity-attraction effect than 
interviewers in one-on-one encounters: Group dynamics à la Asch (1956) might spur 
stereotypic opinions, but increased accountability due to the need to present one’s evaluation 
of the candidate might limit such biases. Furthermore, it is conceivable that similarity-
attraction effects are balanced out by other panel members’ ratings (see e.g. Sacco et al. 2003). 
70  This result is consistent with the increased physical attractiveness discrimination against 
same-sex female applicants discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.1.4. 
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significant sex dissimilarity effects for male recruiters who preferred female applicants 
(mediated by appearance). McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion (2010) as well as 
Sacco et al. (2003) and Davison and Burke (2000) failed to find any sex similarity effects 
when studying highly structured interviews. Only Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) reported 
the theoretically anticipated same-sex favoritism for female candidates: The more 
females there were on academic promotion committees, the higher the chances for 
female applicants to be promoted to full professorship. 
All in all, both actual and perceived similarity can affect organizational decisions such as 
interview outcomes, but the size and direction of the effect is moderated by several other 
factors. In line with Podolny (1994), alternative evaluation criteria such as the 
homophily principle become increasingly important whenever clear evaluation criteria 
are missing. This might explain why similarity-attraction effects are especially 
pronounced in academic appointment decisions where other criteria cannot always be 
signaled effectively and wrong choice risk is high (Roebken 2010; Fiedler and Welpe 
2008; Bagües and Esteve-Volart 2010).  
Other moderators of similarity-attraction effects are panel composition, interview time 
and structure. The composition of interview panels has been shown to moderate the 
effects of e.g. race- and gender-similarity effects. In short interviews, exposure to more 
detailed information about the applicant is low and consequently, susceptibility to 
homophily effects is higher (Montoya, Horton and Kirchner 2008). Highly structured 
interviews — if executed thoroughly — have been demonstrated to be relatively immune to 
similarity effects. Anticipated future interaction with the partner however is 
theoretically expected to positively bias similarity-attraction effects (reward-cost theory), 
but it has been empirically shown by Layton and Insko (1974) that the similar-to-me 
effect is greater when no interaction is anticipated. It is worth mentioning that 
significant similarity-attraction effects have been reported inconsistently for some 
demographic dimensions and interview situations, but even if these effects have been 
demonstrated, they are generally quite small (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007). In comparison to 
other influencing factors, similar-to-me effects are consistently smaller than e.g. 
measures of ability (e.g. García, Posthuma and Colella 2008) or applicant-ideal similarity 
(Dalessio and Imada 1984). Most of the studies investigating similarity effects 
investigate interview settings (final selection), only Tsai et al. (2011) have examined 
similar-to-me effects derived from résumés in pre-selection, but do not find any 
significant impact of applicant-rater similarity which they label P-P (person-person) fit.
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3.3.3.2 Applicant Fit 
Closely related to the previously discussed similarity-attraction effect is the notion of 
applicant fit. Recruiters do not only look for applicants with specific predetermined skills 
and abilities, but are additionally encouraged to hire applicants that (are perceived to) fit 
optimally into the organization. Applicant fit can hence be regarded as another factor 
that is able to influence hiring recommendations above and beyond other qualifications. 
As applicant fit is not directly observable and conveyed through other characteristics and 
attributes, it is frequently not measured as an independent variable, but rather as a 
mediator between applicant attributes and hiring recommendations (e.g. Higgins and 
Judge 2004; García, Posthuma and Colella 2008) or even as a dependent measure 
(Kristof-Brown, Barrick and Franke 2002).  
Applicant fit research distinguishes between three different types of applicant fit: 
person-person (P-P) fit, person-job (P-J) fit and person-organization (P-O) fit, all being 
distinct dimensions of P-E (person-environment) fit (Jansen and Kristof-Brown 2006). As 
P-P fit is defined as the similarity between the individual recruiter and the applicant 
(Tsai et al. 2011), it has already been introduced and discussed in the previous section 
(similarity-attraction effects). P-J fit describes the extent to which applicants fit with the 
demands of the job vacancy and possess the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) that 
are needed for executing the specific job (Kristof-Brown 2000; Tsai et al. 2011). It can be 
further subdivided into demands-abilities fit and needs-supplies fit (Edwards 1991). P-O 
fit on the other hand rather includes the extent to which the applicants’ values and goals 
correspond to the entire organizational culture (value congruence) regardless of the 
specific job requirements (Cable and Judge 1997; Judge, Higgins and Cable 2000; Jansen 
and Kristof-Brown 2006). P-O fit can be established by selection of suitable applicants 
and/or by socialization within an organization (Chatman 1991). Bretz, Rynes and 
Gerhart (1993) as well as Kristof-Brown (2000) were able to show that P-O and P-J fit 
are actually discernible factors that are independently perceived and utilized by actual 
recruiters. Additionally, P-O fit (or firm-specific employability) constitutes a construct 
that has been demonstrated to be distinguishable from an applicant’s general 
employability (Rynes and Gerhart 1990; Adkins, Russell and Werbel 1994).  
Recruiters’ attempts to select applicants with a substantial amount of P-O and P-J fit 
can be explained by empirical results demonstrating that high levels of both P-O and P-J 
fit are inter alia associated with lower turnover, absence rates and intentions to quit as 
well as higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Chatman 1991; 
O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell 1991; Kristof 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman and 
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Johnson 2005). More specifically, P-O fit has been shown to be related to organization-
focused outcomes such as identification and citizenship behavior, whereas P-J is rather 
related to job- and career-focused outcomes, e.g. career satisfaction (Cable and de Rue 
2002). However, no empirical evidence for the effect of applicant fit on more objective 
performance measures such as productivity exists so far (Kristof 1996). 
Applicant fit can either be measured directly or indirectly (Kristof 1996): Direct methods 
measure the perceived (i.e. subjective) fit by having recruiters rate the perceived level of 
applicant fit. Sample questions (see Kristof-Brown 2000 for more details) to measure 
perceived fit are “To what extent does this applicant fit the demands of the job” for P-J 
fit and “How confident are you that this applicant would be compatible with your 
organization” for P-O fit. Actual, i.e. objective, fit can be measured only indirectly by 
explicitly comparing separately obtained individual and organizational characteristics 
(Kristof 1996). Although being frequently inaccurate, perceived fit has a stronger 
influence on hiring recommendations or selection decisions (Cable and Judge 1997).  
P-O and P-J fit do not only have distinct consequences within the organization, they also 
have different antecedents. Whereas ability signals such as work experience and 
education (Tsai et al. 2011) and performance expectations (García, Posthuma and Colella 
2008) are positively related to P-J fit, perceived P-O is determined by work experience 
(Tsai et al. 2011) or values and personality traits (Kristof-Brown 2000). Nevertheless, all 
fit dimensions are highly intercorrelated (Kristof-Brown 2000; Tsai et al. 2011). 
Especially, perceived, i.e. subjective, applicant fit is significantly and positively related 
to hiring recommendations in both résumé screening and interviews (Cable and Judge 
1997; Kristof-Brown 2000; García, Posthuma and Colella 2008; Tsai et al. 2011). 
Particularly at initial stages — résumé screening and initial interviews — however, P-J fit 
is considerably more important than P-O fit (Bretz, Rynes and Gerhart 1993; Adkins, 
Russell and Werbel 1994), as the initial stages of the selection process are particularly 
designed to eliminate applicants who do not meet the job requirements (Kristof-Brown 
2000). Value congruence in turn is not consistently related to interview invitation 
decisions: Some researchers do not find any correlation between P-O fit and subsequent 
interview invitations, but assume that P-O fit might become more important in later 
selection stages (e.g. Adkins, Russell and Werbel 1994). Examining actual job offer 
outcomes, Cable and Judge (1997) found a substantial impact of P-O fit evaluations and 
conclude that “work values appear to be an important element of the interviewing 
process” (Cable and Judge 1997, 556). Even when controlling for rater-applicant 
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sympathy, applicant attractiveness, work experience, GPA, sex and race, they report a 
44% increase in job offer probability for a one-unit increase in P-O fit.71  
As has been shown, (perceived) fit between the applicant and the job or the organization 
mediates recruiters’ hiring recommendations. In particular, the employment interview is 
a means to establish or increase P-O fit. Additionally, fit perceptions have been shown to 
explain unique variance in hiring recommendations above and beyond other — more 
objective — selection criteria. 
3.3.3.3 Self-Presentation Tactics: Impression Management  
Just as in all other social interactions, “individuals will attempt to influence their 
exchange partner via some form of self-presentation tactic” (Swider et al. 2011, 1276) 
also in the employment interview. Applicants naturally engage in influence tactics, as 
they want to portray a suitable image and try “to present themselves in the most 
favorable light possible” (Swider et al. 2011, 1276). One very common way of self-
presentation is known as Impression Management (IM).72 IM tactics can be defined as 
attempts by interviewees to “create, maintain, protect, or otherwise alter” (Bolino et al. 
2008, 1080) a desired image. At least one of these tactics is utilized by almost every 
applicant during an employment interview (see e.g. Stevens and Kristof 1995; Ellis et al. 
2002; Levashina and Campion 2006).  
IM tactics are a multifaceted phenomenon and can be classified into the following 
categories: (1) verbal vs. nonverbal, (2) assertive vs. defensive, (3) self-focused vs. other-
focused, (4) deceptive vs. truthful, and (5) tactical vs. strategic IM tactics. Verbal IM 
tactics include all activities that are orally conveyed whereas nonverbal tactics reflect 
interviewee behaviors such as eye-contact, nodding or smiling (Kristof-Brown, Barrick 
and Franke 2002; Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005; Chen, Yang and Lin 2010). Verbal tactics 
can be further subdivided into assertive and defensive tactics (Tedeschi and Melburg 
1984). Assertive tactics describe statements in which interviewees proactively promote 
positive information about themselves (Proost et al. 2010), e.g. self-promotion and 
ingratiation tactics. These tactics are primarily used in order to create a favorable image 
or bolster an existing image (Swider et al. 2011). Defensive techniques such as 
justifications, excuses and apologies in contrast are rather reactive in nature and are 
intended to protect or repair a certain image (Proost et al. 2010). Depending on the focus 
of the conversation between applicant and interviewer, all of the verbal tactics can either 
                                                
71  It should be mentioned here that Cable and Judge (1997) report predicted probabilities derived 
from logit regression that should not be interpreted in a linear way. 
72  Other commonly cited dimensions of self-presentation include applicant appearance and 
verbal and non-verbal behavior (Swider et al. 2011).  
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be defined as self-focused or other-focused. Self-focused tactics “maintain attention on 
the candidate and allow him or her to focus the direction of the conversation in areas 
which will allow him or her to excel” (Kacmar, Delery and Ferris 1992, 1253). Self-
promotion, i.e. actively highlighting positive traits, knowledge, skills and attributes 
(McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003; Swider et al. 2011), is the textbook example of self-
focused tactics. In other-focused activities such as ingratiation73, other-enhancement and 
opinion conformity however, “the applicant gives up being the focus of attention and 
instead employs more subtle mechanisms of influence” (Kacmar, Delery and Ferris 1992, 
1253). Other-focused tactics shift the focus of the conversation to the interviewer by e.g. 
complimenting him or her on the interview conduct or previous achievements (Chen, 
Yang and Lin 2010; Proost et al. 2010).  
Depending on the authencity of the message conveyed by the applicant, self-focused IM 
tactics can either be classified as deceptive or truthful. Whereas truthful attempts such 
as self-presentation are intended to manage an existing image by simply highlighting 
positive traits, deceptive techniques such as slight or extensive image creation are 
intended to create a non-existing and false image by polishing or even fabricating 
responses (Swider et al. 2011). Rosenfeld (1997) additionally distinguishes between 
tactical, i.e. focusing on bolstering a positive short-term impression only in the interview, 
and more long-term focused, strategic techniques aiming at conveying credibility and 
trustworthiness also for a future collaboration.  
Self-promotion has been shown to be the most frequently used (and therefore empirically 
studied) self-focused and ingratiation, i.e. tactics applied in order to evoke interpersonal 
liking, the most commonly adopted other-focused tactic (e.g. Proost et al. 2010). Assertive 
tactics are employed significantly more often than defensive ones (Stevens and Kristof 
1995; Kleinmann and Klehe 2010). The presence (and therefore effectiveness) of IM 
tactics in field settings can be measured through postinterview surveys filled out by 
either the interviewer or the applicant.74 Another, more objective way to measure IM 
tactic use is possible whenever video- or audiotaped actual interviews are examined: An 
impartial coder rates the extent of certain tactics by reviewing the tapes (e.g. Stevens 
and Kristof 1995).  
                                                
73  Ingratiation in this context reflects all tactics “used to increase interpersonal attraction or 
liking by employing subtle mechanisms of influence (i.e., verbally praising the other person, 
conforming with the opinion of the other person)” (Proost et al. 2010, 2157). 
74  In laboratory settings, applicant IM tactics can of course be actively manipulated by the 
researcher. 
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Although the use of IM tactics is very common among all applicants, several antecedents 
influence the augmented use of these techniques. Certain applicant characteristics, 
especially personality traits, stimulate the use of specific tactics. For instance, 
extraverted individuals tend to engage in self-promotion activities and applicants high 
on agreeableness prefer the use of other-focused tactics (Kristof-Brown, Barrick and 
Franke 2002). But to an even larger extent, interviewer characteristics (Delery and 
Kacmar 1998) and situational influences such as interview format (Ellis et al. 2002; 
Peeters and Lievens 2006; van Iddekinge, McFarland and Raymark 2007) and IM 
instructions (Peeters and Lievens 2006) affect IM tactic use. 
The differential effectiveness of diverse IM tactics has been empirically demonstrated in 
the field (Gilmore and Ferris 1989; Stevens and Kristof 1995; Delery and Kacmar 1998; 
Ellis et al. 2002; McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2002; McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003; 
Higgins and Judge 2004; Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005; Chen, Yang and Lin 2010) as well 
as in laboratory settings (Kacmar, Delery and Ferris 1992; Knouse 1994a; Howard and 
Ferris 1996; Kristof-Brown, Barrick and Franke 2002; Peeters and Lievens 2006; Varma, 
Toh and Pichler 2006; van Iddekinge, McFarland and Raymark 2007; Proost et al. 2010; 
Kleinmann and Klehe 2010; Swider et al. 2011). Self-promotion is the tactic most 
commonly found to be positively affecting interview outcomes such as interviewer 
evaluations and hiring recommendations (e.g. Stevens and Kristof 1995; Tsai, Chen and 
Chiu 2005). Ingratiation — the most commonly used other-focused tactic — is also 
positively related to interview outcomes (e.g. Proost et al. 2010), but the effect of self-
focused tactics on hiring recommendations is more pronounced, i.e. self-focused tactics 
lead to increased hiring recommendations. Nonverbal behaviors have mainly been shown 
to affect interview outcomes in laboratory experiments, but only inconsistently in actual 
field settings (Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005). Deceptive tactics require intensive applicant 
effort and concentration which on average leads to lower quality responses. Hence, 
deceptive image creation is likely to be noticed by interviewers and is negatively related 
to interview outcomes (Swider et al. 2011). But IM tactics do not only influence interview 
outcomes, but also pre-selection outcomes. Résumés containing IM (e.g. self-promoting 
descriptive or ingratiating statements) are evaluated more favorably than résumés 
without these statements (Knouse 1994a; Varma, Toh and Pichler 2006).  
The paths through which IM tactics impinge on final rater evaluations are also quite 
different. Ingratiation for instance has a positive effect on interviewer affect or liking 
and fit, whereas self-promotion increases levels of perceived competence (Higgins and 
Judge 2004; Proost et al. 2010). As the positive main effect of certain IM tactics has been 
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demonstrated abundantly in the past decades, recent IM research focuses on the 
conditions under which IM tactics are most or least effective (Swider et al. 2011). 
Attested moderators of IM tactic effectiveness are among others interview format 
(McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003), structure (Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005) and length 
(Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005), initial interviewee impressions (Swider et al. 2011) and 
interviewer affectivity (Chen, Yang and Lin 2010). According to a meta-analysis 
conducted by Barrick, Shaffer and DeGrassi (2009), research design (field vs. laboratory 
setting) does not moderate the effects of IM tactics.75 Structured interviews are likely to 
affect IM effectiveness: The more structured the interview, the weaker the relationship 
between IM tactic and evaluations (Tsai, Chen and Chiu 2005; Barrick, Shaffer and 
DeGrassi 2009). In addition, IM tactic use does not affect interview outcomes in role 
plays (McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003). But also IM tactic use is contingent on 
interview format: In situational interviews and role plays, other-focused IM tactics are 
predominantly used whereas self-focused IM tactics are favored by applicants being 
confronted with unstructured, experience based or behavior description interviews (Ellis 
et al. 2002; McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003).  
Although profound understanding about the use and effectiveness of IM tactics as well 
as their moderators and mediators in employment interviews exists, it still remains an 
unresolved question whether IM tactic influence constitutes an unsolicited bias or rather 
a job-related and hence desirable attribute. Rosenfeld (1997, 801) postulates the latter 
interpretation and states that “the ability to positively ‘sell’ oneself is often a desirable 
attribute both in the employment interview and in later on-the-job settings”. According 
to Rosenfeld (1997), especially strategic IM tactics reflect desirable applicant attributes. 
Barrick, Shaffer and DeGrassi (2009) however only report a low predictive validity of IM 
tactic use. In their meta-analysis, IM tactic use was significantly correlated with 
interview ratings (r=.47), but only slightly correlated with job performance (r=.15). 
                                                
75  However, certain tactics have been shown to only affect outcomes in laboratory settings (e.g. 
nonverbal behavior).  
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3.3.4 The Influence of Situational and Other Extraneous Factors 
Regardless of any individual peculiarities of both rater and ratee and independent from 
their interpersonal interaction in the selection process, extraneous factors that are not at 
all related to applicant performance or job requirements may as well have an impact on 
the selection decision. One of the most frequently researched situational influences on 
selection interview outcomes (and especially validity) is interview structure. Macan 
(2009, 204) concludes in her recent review that a “major finding in interview research a 
few years ago is that interviewer judgments based on structured interviews are more 
predictive of job performance than those from unstructured interviews”. However, 
substantial disagreement exists among researchers about what really constitutes a 
(highly) structured interview (Macan 2009). According to Campion, Palmer and Campion 
(1997), interview structure is able to improve interview validity and reliability through 
enhancing either interview content or the evaluation process. They developed the 
following fifteen components of structure that need to be considered in order to develop 
truly highly structured interviews:  
(1) Base Questions on a Job Analysis,  
(2) Ask Exact Same Questions of Each Candidate,  
(3) Limit Prompting, Follow-up Questioning, and Elaboration on Questions, 
(4) Use Better Types of Questions,  
(5) Use Longer Interview or Larger Number of Questions, 
(6) Control Ancillary Information, 
(7) Do Not Allow Questions from Candidate Until after the Interview,  
(8) Rate Each Answer or Use Multiple Scales, 
(9) Use Detailed Anchored Rating Scales, 
(10) Take Detailed Notes, 
(11) Use Multiple Interviewers,  
(12) Use Same Interviewer(s) across All Candidates, 
(13) Do Not Discuss Candidates or Answers between Interviews, 
(14) Provide Extensive Interview Training and 
(15) Use Statistical rather than Clinical Prediction. 
As researchers investigating the effects of (highly) structured interviews on interview 
validity and reliability do not consistently incorporate all of the 15 components (see e.g. 
Macan 2009; McCarthy, van Iddekinge and Campion 2010), results of the moderating 
impact of interview structure vary substantially (Macan 2009). However, it has been 
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shown already in earlier chapters that increasing the level of interview structure helped 
e.g. reducing female rater generosity or similarity-attraction biases.  
Closely linked to interview structure is the situational influence of interview panels or 
committees on interview outcomes. According to Campion, Palmer and Campion (1997), 
interviews conducted by two or more interviewers are likely to be more reliable and valid 
than interviews conducted by an individual evaluator alone. Empirical evidence on the 
impact of panel interviewing versus individual interviewing however has been 
contradictory and inconclusive (Dixon et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the previous discussion 
on similarity-attraction effects has revealed that panel composition in terms of gender or 
race is able to impact interview outcomes, or more specifically moderate discriminatory 
biases (e.g. McFarland, Ryan and Kriska 2003; Buckley et al. 2007; Bagües and Esteve-
Volart 2010; Zinovyeva and Bagues 2011). In the same vein, panel size, age and 
functional composition can influence interview outcomes. No empirical evidence for the 
influence of these types of panel composition criteria on personnel selection decisions 
exists so far. However, Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson (2012) found that trial outcomes 
in the US are affected by juror age: Controlling for the effect of age on jury selection, 
older jurors are found to be more likely to convict than their younger colleagues. 
In addition to the level of interview structure, further interview design considerations 
(Huffcutt, van Iddekinge and Roth 2011) such as interview medium, the extent of pre-
interview information given to the interviewer(s) or simply the interview time and order 
are extraneous factors that might — directly or indirectly — impact interview outcomes. 
Three main interview mediums (face-to-face, phone and videoconference) are frequently 
used by recruiters. However, empirical evidence of their impact on recruiter evaluations 
has been conflicting: Storck and Sproull (1995) for instance report that raters using 
videoconference technology evaluate candidates less favorably, whereas Chapman and 
Rowe (2001) find that applicants interviewed face-to-face are at a disadvantage. 
Granting interviewers access to applicant information — test scores, résumés or 
application blanks — prior to the interview is also likely to bias post-interview outcomes 
(e.g. Dipboye 1982; Phillips and Dipboye 1989; Dougherty, Turban and Callender 1994). 
These pre-interview impressions and subsequent interviewer expectations have been 
shown to result in a confirmatory bias (Huffcutt, van Iddekinge and Roth 2011) which is 
expressed in modified interviewer behavior.  
Several empirical studies conducted in the 1970s (Hakel, Ohnesorge and Dunnette 1970; 
Wexley et al. 1972; Landy and Bates 1973; Heneman et al. 1975; Wexley, Sanders and 
Yukl 1993) have examined the influence of interviewee order effects. These studies 
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suggest that “an interviewer’s evaluation may be partly a function of the characteristics 
of preceding interviewees” (Heneman et al. 1975, 748). These contrast or assimilation 
effects (Landy and Bates 1973) confirm what is well-known from anecdotal evidence that 
raters evaluate applicants relative to other interviewees. Mediocre interviewees may 
then appear to be more qualified when being preceded by poorly performing candidates. 
However, empirical evidence for this phenomenon has mainly been found in the artificial 
setting of laboratory experiments and could not be detected in the field (Landy and Bates 
1973). Additionally, Wexley et al. (1972) as well as Latham, Wexley and Pursell (1975) 
showed that an appropriate amount of training and advice can eliminate (unsolicited) 
contrast effects.76  
Finally, even the time of the day an interview is scheduled is likely to influence rater 
decisions. Empirical evidence from judicial decisions — a field where rater objectivity is of 
even greater significance than in personnel selection — suggests that in each of the three 
daily decision sessions, the percentage of favorable rulings drastically drops at the end of 
each session and returns to ‘normal’ levels after the food break (Danziger, Levav and 
Avnaim-Pesso 2011). As this shows that even judicial decisions are not immune to 
extraneous factors, selection interviews presumably are not either and the scheduled 
interview time might exogenously predetermine part of the interviewee’s success. 
  
                                                
76  These findings most likely explain why no more empirical research on contrast effects has 
been conducted since then. 
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3.4 EVALUATION OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
Recapitulating what has been discussed in the previous sections, it becomes obvious that 
diverse selection processes have been examined empirically so far. Numerous factors 
have been shown to positively or negatively affect selection outcomes, including objective 
ability signals, but also individual difference factors of both applicants and raters as well 
as social and situational factors. Stipend awarding decisions however have only been 
investigated explicitly by very few authors.  
Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) were the only researchers aiming at 
understanding (merit-based) stipend granting behavior in Germany. However, they only 
contacted successful stipend applicants, i.e. actual scholarship recipients, and compared 
their characteristics and attributes to those of the entire German student body. In doing 
so they gained in-depth information about scholarship recipients’ social background for 
instance, but were not able to elucidate the selection process that eventually led to the 
uneven distribution of stipends. It is not possible to conclude from their survey whether 
or not students from lower social classes simply did not apply (self-selection) or were 
discriminated against during stipend awarding decisions. In order to learn more about 
potential drivers of scholarship selection decisions, empirical evidence from other 
selection processes was presented.  
The analysis of related educational selection decisions (particularly, college admission 
decisions) revealed that no coherent selection criteria catalogue exists, but that the 
outcome is mainly dependent on the individual decision to apply to a college (self-
selection) and on the institution’s idiosyncratic admission policy (see e.g. Manski and 
Wise 1983). However, selection decisions in most of the (US-) institutions are based on 
both meritocratic and non-meritocratic criteria (Rigol 2003). Comparing college 
admission decisions to scholarship granting decisions, several similarities, but also 
differences can be observed. Evidently, meritocratic influence factors are likely to be 
identical (i.e. grades and previous academic achievement) and will most probably execute 
a similar influence on decisions. However, admitting somebody to college might differ 
from awarding somebody a stipend as the first decision is rather designed to open up the 
future opportunity to obtain tertiary education, i.e. providing somebody with better 
opportunities. Scholarship awards in turn represent a reward for previous achievements 
and will not necessarily be linked to somebody’s future potential. Nevertheless, a lot of 
parallels are to be expected in these two selection decisions.  
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Another huge body of research which has been presented in detail is dedicated to the 
investigation of success factors in personnel selection. Various influence factors have 
been empirically examined both in the lab and in the field. Although both recruiters and 
scholarship raters will be susceptible to and therefore make use of similar signals and 
social or individual difference factors, the extent to which these factors are able to 
influence the final decision will vary widely.  
It needs to be considered that the purpose of selection is completely different in these 
two situations: Whereas personnel managers search for somebody who should optimally 
match the job or organizational requirements and needs to execute predetermined tasks 
within the organization, scholarship raters want to reward somebody for previous 
achievement and support him or her without actually getting in touch with this person. 
Future contact intensity in personnel selection is usually expected to be high whereas 
stipend awarding evaluators are most likely to never see the applicant again after the 
interview. Hence, especially individual difference and social factors are expected to be 
less important in such situations where contact intensity is anticipated to be low — if not 
non-existent.  
Furthermore, choosing the wrong candidate in personnel selection can become very 
costly for the recruiter. In a stipend awarding context on the other hand, wrong choices 
will not be detrimental to the individual evaluator. Consequently, evaluators are not 
likely to select applicants as thoroughly as recruiters do as they do not have to bear the 
consequences of an inefficient, i.e. suboptimal, choice. Finally, signaling one’s ability 
might also differ according to the specific selection purpose: In personnel selection, 
signals are provided in order to demonstrate (potential) productivity which is not 
necessary in stipend awarding decisions as no ‘obligation’ exists to increase future 
productivity. Accordingly, an evaluator’s utility function is likely to differ significantly 
from the one of a recruiter. Nevertheless, most of the above mentioned influences from 
either educational or personnel selection decisions serve as a suitable basis for 
hypotheses development in the present context. 
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PART B:  THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL SCHOLARSHIP APPLICATIONS — 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
4 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theoretical assumptions presented in the following section begin with a sociological 
discussion of who forms the so-called elite in a society and therefore represents the 
target population of any scholarship or grant aiming at supporting future ‘leaders’. 
Theories of how elites are formed will be elaborated. Subsequently, the decision whom to 
award a grant will be theoretically considered as an economic decision under 
uncertainty. Therefore, the basic assumptions of New Institutional Economics and the 
more detailed frameworks of Agency Theory and Job Market Signaling in particular will 
be outlined and slightly adapted to the present case. As the decision whom to award a 
scholarship will probably not entirely be an objective one based solely on effective signals 
provided by the applicants, possible evaluator biases (inefficiencies) will be explained 
using the neoclassical theory of discrimination as well as the similarity-attraction 
paradigm which is widely used in the psychological and social sciences. 
4.1 SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH: ELITES 
Although the term ‘elite’ is currently omnipresent, a coherent definition of elites has yet 
to be reached in the social sciences. There are several strands of elite research that 
define the term ‘elite’ differently. These can basically be distinguished into the pre-
fascist classical elite theories and the post-fascist functional elite theories. These two 
directions differ mainly in the understanding of how members of a certain elite are 
recruited from the entire population.  
4.1.1 Classical Elite Theories 
An aspect which most of the classical attempts to define elites have in common, is the 
mass-elite distinction: The ‘elite’ contrasts strongly with the rest of a population, which 
is commonly referred to as the ‘crowd’ or the ‘masses’. That is the reason why all the 
classical works dealing with the notion of elites (Mosca 1896/1939; Pareto 1916/1935; 
Michels 1911/197077) are closely linked to and subsequently have been published 
immediately after Le Bon’s The Crowd — A Study of the Popular Mind (1896/2001). 
Although Le Bon (2001) neither uses the term ‘elite’ nor the one of ‘ruling class’, he 
provided the basis for the classical elite-crowd distinction by defining the (organized or 
                                                
77  In order to enable the reader to understand during which time the classical elite theories 
evolved, the respective publication’s year of the first edition is provided in this context. The 
year indicated after the “ / ” denotes the edition which was actually used for the present thesis. 
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psychological) crowd as a “a single being […] subjected to the law of the mental unity of 
crowds” (Le Bon 2001, 13) as opposed to a “small intellectual aristocracy” (Le Bon 2001, 
10) that has always created and directed civilizations. 
Mosca (1939) adopts Le Bon’s concept and defines the relationship between the elite on 
the one hand and the crowd on the other hand as follows: “In all societies [...] two classes 
of people appear: a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the 
less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the 
advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed 
and controlled by the first” (Mosca 1939, 50). According to Mosca (1939), this 
constellation is inevitable, as the ruling class possesses mental superiority over the 
crowd. Affiliation to the ruling class is not directly accomplished by heredity, but rather 
through nurture: Certain values and traditions are passed on to the next generation. 
Inevitably, upper-class descendants possess these characteristics and attributes more 
often than a crowd offspring. Following Mosca’s (1939) understanding, upward mobility 
(from the crowd to the ruling class) is possible whenever vertically mobile people adopt 
exactly these characteristics that constitute affiliation to the ruling class. 
Pareto (1935) on the other hand defines elites rather functionally and counts all “people 
who have the highest indices in their branch of activity” (Pareto 1935, 1423 §2031), i.e. 
those, who are most capable in their particular field, among the class of people which is 
called elite. This class is further divided into a governing and a non-governing elite 
whereas members of the first group “directly or indirectly play some considerable part in 
government” (Pareto 1935, 1423 §2032) and affiliates of the latter group constitute the 
rest. This constellation leads to a societal trichotomy (governing elite — non-governing 
elite — crowd). Whether or not members of the governing elite possess superior capacity/ 
ability to non-governing elite members is however not clearly conveyed by Pareto (1935). 
According to Pareto (1935), direct and indirect heredity is a means of entering the elite 
class, but circulation is also essential to the continued existence of elites: Whenever elite 
members lose characteristics important for belonging to an elite, they descend to a lower 
class. Conversely, people stemming from the lower class may move up to the elite 
whenever they possess some crucial characteristics of this particular elite. In Pareto’s 
(1935) sense, the use of violence and deceit is permitted — if not necessary — for a well-
functioning elite: Pareto (1935) states that revolutions only emerge as a consequence of 
the ruling classes’ reluctance to use violence. 
The third fundamental classical elite theory is Michel’s (1911/1970) Law of Oligarchy. 
Focusing on the possibility of intraparty political democracy, Michel (1970) posits that 
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each consistent organization — even a democratic political party — needs a leader. Michel 
(1970) identifies this fact as the beginning of the end of democracy. Conditioned by either 
gratitude, worship or intellectual inferiority, the crowd shows a psychological need for 
guidance leading to the inevitability of leadership in each form of societal life. Michel 
(1970) pessimistically postulates that even in democratic societies, one clique of the 
ruling class is simply replaced by another. Compared to aristocracy, democracy cannot 
be understood as a remedy for this rule, but only as the lesser of two evils. 
All three classical elite theories have in common that a small number of people belonging 
to the elite possess materially, intellectually and psychologically superior abilities to the 
mentally inferior, but numerically larger crowd which is in need of guidance (Hartmann 
2004). The obvious ideological proximity to fascist views has discredited all classical elite 
theories legitimately after World War II and led to the emergence of pluralistic 
functional elites which are considered to be far more important nowadays and especially 
better suited to match the nature and characteristics of scholarship applicants in a 
democratic societal system than the classical approaches. 
4.1.2 Functional Elite Theories 
On closer consideration, the term elite historically rather originated from the notion of 
functional or performance elites than from what Mosca (1939), Pareto (1935) and 
Michels (1970) developed: In the 18th century, the French bourgeoisie used the term in 
their combat against aristocracy and the clergy when fighting for equal rights and 
opportunities for everybody (Hartmann 2004). According to their principles, individual 
achievement should determine the social standing more than the social background and 
the circumstances somebody was born into. This notion exactly encompasses the idea of 
performance elites: individual achievement and performance are the primary sources of 
access to a certain elite. The contemporary meaning of elites is also reflected in its 
encyclopedic definitions: “a minority group of persons who hold positions of eminence 
and power in some field, especially in the social or political field” (Encyclopedia 
Britannica 1975, 854). German lexica define elites as follows: “[zu frz. élire »auswählen«] 
… eine Auslese darstellende Gruppe von Menschen mit besonderer Befähigung, 
besonderen Qualitäten; Führungsschicht” (Brockhaus 2006, 769)78. According to Meyers 
Grosses Taschenlexikon (2003, 1747), an elite represents a “politisch oder sozial 
führende Minderheit”.79 
                                                
78  Own translation: ‘[from the French language élire ‘select’] … a selective group of persons with 
extraordinary ability or qualifications; ruling classes’. 
79  Own translation: ‘a politically or socially leading minority’. 
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This definition of (functional) elites has dominated the elite discussion since the 1950s 
and all authors dealing with this area of research share two main assumptions 
(Hartmann 2004): 
(1) In modern societies, there is no unique ruling class or elite, but several competing 
elites in different areas (functions) of societal life exist. 
(2) Theoretically, access to these elites may be granted to everyone as heredity is no 
longer the basis for elite recruiting, but the individual’s performance irrespective 
of the individual social background determines the affiliation to a certain elite. 
The existence of plural competing functional elites goes back to Mannheim (1935/1967) 
who divided the formerly considered ruling class into six sub-elites: political and 
organizing elites, intellectual and artistic as well as moral and clerical elites. All types of 
elites are equally important and essential for a society, but they serve different 
functions: Whereas business, administration, politics and military constitute the first 
two types and its members are supposed to organize society, the remaining four types 
serve the purpose of developing a society’s distinctive science and culture (Hartmann 
2004). 
Individual achievement being the basis for recruiting new members is the second crucial 
characteristic of functional elites. Heredity and/or possession recede in importance, 
whereas performance becomes the dominant elite selection principle for all sub-elites in 
industrialized societies (Dreitzel 1962; Keller 1963). Nevertheless, Dreitzel (1962) 
emphasizes that access to elites is only in theory open to everyone. As performance is 
highly correlated with education and access to education is unequally distributed among 
different social classes, this indirectly leads to unequal chances of success to get access to 
a certain elite. Dreitzel (1962) and Keller (1963) both denote that equal access to elite 
positions for everyone is only an ideal state that societies try to achieve. It does not 
necessarily mean that all elite positions are allocated solely on the basis of performance 
(Dreitzel 1962; Keller 1963). 
As a consequence of better access opportunities for individuals from lower social classes, 
the magnitude of all types of elites increases and subsequently, exclusiveness decreases. 
The elite population hence becomes more heterogeneous which involves both risks and 
opportunities for the relevance of elites in a society (Hartmann 2004).  
Important proponents of the currently dominating functional elite theory are e.g. 
Lasswell (1934, 1936), Dahrendorf (1962), Dreitzel (1962) and Keller (1963). According to 
Hartmann (2004), most prominent opponents of these functional elite theories are Mills 
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(1956, 1958) and Bourdieu (1989, 1991, 1996), but also Domhoff (1967, 1980, 1983) and 
Dye (1976, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1994) do not agree with the functional elite idea. 
They strongly disagree with all of the above mentioned authors in the following crucial 
aspect: They all deny the existence of several sub-elites, but again bring back the notion 
of one single ruling class (‘Power elite’ or ‘Classe dominante’). Though admitting some 
kind of internal differentiation, they argue that this unique elite is controlled by 
members from the economically dominant class. This contradicts the second basic 
assumption of functional elite theory — openness to everyone. As social background 
mainly determines educational opportunities and consequently paves the way for 
outstanding performance, Mills (1956, 1958) and Bourdieu (1989, 1991, 1996) even deny 
the factual equality of access. The intensive discussion of equal opportunities on the one 
hand and performance as main driver of success in entering an elite on the other hand 
shows that there is no uniform understanding of how elites look like in industrialized 
societies. This might be the reason why contemporary (empirical) elite research focuses 
mainly on understanding the actual composition of elites and their respective power80 
rather than developing new theoretical assumptions about their structure and power. 
The lack of distinct established criteria that need to be satisfied in order to rank 
somebody among a certain elite shows how difficult it is to identify potential elite 
members. As this is exactly the purpose of most merit-based scholarships, it is 
worthwhile to closely examine how evaluators perform such a difficult task. 
  
                                                
80  The most important empirical findings have been presented in Chapter 3.1. 
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4.2 THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
Whereas the sociological approach tries to define ‘ideal’ scholarship holders by 
identifying to which social group they will belong in the future, the economic approach 
basically examines the decision whom to award a stipend as an utmost rational decision. 
In the economic discipline, each decision can be understood as a decision under 
uncertainty and this also holds absolutely true in scholarship awarding decisions: The 
evaluator does not know the applicant, the applicants usually do not know the selection 
criteria and — as the previous section dealing with elites has shown — evaluators do not 
even exactly know whom they are looking for, but need to rank one candidate over the 
other. This results in several information asymmetries that have to be dealt with. How 
market asymmetries in general can be optimally handled, will be elaborated in the 
following sections. 
4.2.1 Agency Theory 
Apart from any sociological understanding of elites, the decision whom to award a 
scholarship can basically be understood as a typical principal-agent-problem (e.g. Ross 
1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Grossman and 
Hart 1983). Based on the ultimate assumption of New Institutional Economics — the 
incompleteness of information in markets and the subsequent incompleteness of 
contracts signed in these markets — the principal (in this case the evaluator) cannot 
directly observe the qualities of the agent (here: the applicant). Additionally, other 
components considered in principal-agent-problems are individual utility maximization 
of all actors and their respective risk aversion. In agency problems, three main 
situations may arise from the informational gaps prevailing in the market: adverse 
selection, moral hazard and hold-up. Whereas both moral hazard and hold-up emerge 
mainly from ex-post information asymmetries, adverse selection problems already exist 
ex ante of a contract completion.81 Ex ante, the principal is not able to identify all 
characteristics of the agent who might have hidden intentions that may result in ex-post 
opportunistic behavior. Agents of low or below average (under the threshold level) 
quality will intentionally try to hide their undesirable characteristics. However, since 
good or above average agents are not able to distinguish themselves from the former, 
they might decide to exit the market. Akerlof (1970) discusses this phenomenon in his 
famous ‘Market for Lemons’ for the used car market, inter alia, and shows how hidden 
                                                
81  As the present thesis only addresses the selection of appropriate candidates and not the 
principal or agent behavior after the contract has been completed, only ex ante problems will 
be discussed in detail. For a comprehensive explanation and discussion of moral hazard and 
hold-up situations, see e.g. Holmström (1979,1982); Hale (2009); Picot et al. (2012). 
4 Theoretical Background  
88 
 
intentions may lead to the successive market exit of above-average providers and the 
subsequent market breakdown. Whenever an agent with below-average qualities, i.e. an 
unsolicited contractual partner, is selected by the principal, the concept of adverse 
selection applies. The principal will only — if ever — ex post be able to detect the true 
characteristics and intentions of the agent. 
In order to minimize or even avoid adverse selection problems, the existing information 
asymmetry needs to be reduced ex ante. According to agency theory principles, there are 
three ways how to diminish informational gaps before a contract is completed: These 
three are signaling, screening and self-selection which are briefly explained in the 
following section.  
Signaling activities are initiated and conducted by the better informed party, i.e. the 
agent. Good or above average agents signal their ability in order to distinguish 
themselves from less capable, i.e. undesirable, agents. In order to do so, outstanding 
agents provide certain signals showing their ability. For a signal to be effective in 
reducing information asymmetries, two basic assumptions need to be fulfilled:  
(1) For ‘good’ or desirable agents, the value of producing this signal needs to 
exceed the cost of producing it.  
(2) For ‘bad’ or undesirable agents, the individual cost of producing the signal 
needs to exceed the respective value of the signal.  
A frequently used example for effective signaling in hiring situations is providing 
university diplomas: In order to demonstrate the potential employer (principal) the 
future productivity (the desired attribute for the employer), able agents provide a 
university diploma. Regardless of any productivity gain through acquiring this diploma, 
this signal serves a mere allocation function. As the principal believes that the ability to 
acquire a university diploma is correlated with productivity, providing such a signal 
hence increases the value of this agent to the company. The probability of being hired by 
the principal increases dramatically and as a consequence thereof, the desirable agent’s 
value of producing this signal exceeds the costs of producing it (time spent in university, 
waiver of income during these years = opportunity costs etc.). Undesirable agents in turn 
are generally not able to provide a diploma as their cost of education would exceed the 
value of this signal. Employers anticipate this interaction and therefore require a 
diploma in the present case. Spence (1973) developed a model specifically incorporating 
signaling activities of job market applicants and the subsequent consequences for the 
principal’s selection process which will be presented in detail in a subsequent section.
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Analogous to signaling activities accomplished by the better informed side, the principal 
may also engage in activities that reduce the agent’s information advantage. These 
activities all fall into the category of screening and comprise all attempts of the principal 
to reveal the attributes of interest. Typical examples of screening activities in the job 
market include assessment centers that are designed to test certain characteristics 
(cognitive ability, flexibility, resistance to stress etc.) and the potential performance of 
applicants, but also résumé screening and contacting previous employers (reference 
checks) can be considered powerful screening activities. 
A third way of selecting the desired agents from a pooled market with both desirable and 
undesirable agents is self-selection. Whenever signaling and/or screening do not lead to a 
satisfying result, self-selection might: Every time principals are not sure whether or not 
the agents incorporate the desired attributes, they might make them choose between 
alternative contracts. While choosing one of the contract alternatives, agents reveal some 
of their hitherto hidden characteristics. Prominent examples include the choice between 
contracts with a fixed versus a variable salary. An agent preferring the fixed rate is more 
likely to be a ‘lazy’ employee than the one volunteering to accept the variable pay. A 
company (principal) offering an above average wage to future employees will also be 
likely to demand above average effort. Following self-selection logic, only those agents 
who are willing (and able) to provide above average performance will apply for the job 
(Sadowski 2002). The same even holds true for the entire career path decision: High 
school graduates for instance select themselves into different areas or jobs based on what 
they assume about their future working conditions. Those willing to work hard and 
overtime in exchange for an above average salary might decide to study Business 
Administration or Law whereas those who value their leisure time higher than the 
additional earnings might start an apprenticeship in the public sector. These 
illustrations show how offering specific contracts may induce self-selection leading to 
agents sorting themselves into categories.  
In the case of scholarship applications, a self-selection effect can be observed whenever 
the group of applicants shows significantly different, i.e. ‘better’, attributes than the 
entire student population. The principal — here the scholarship granting organization — 
tries to offer a contract which only attracts suited applicants. By demanding several 
additional documents such as letters of reference and language certificates, the 
organization only attracts students willing to invest enough time (and money) to be able 
to hand in all of these documents. 
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4.2.2 Spence’s Job Market Signaling Theory  
As already mentioned in the previous section, Spence (1973) elaborated a (principal-
agent) model that explains signaling activities and their consequences in the job market. 
He defines hiring as an investment decision under uncertainty due to asymmetric 
information on job markets. Potential employers cannot observe the abilities of the 
unknown applicant and need to screen the applicants. Applicants need to signal their 
ability using a set of different signals and indices which in turn lead to employers’ 
conditional probabilistic beliefs about the applicant’s suitability. Signals are defined by 
Spence (1973) as alterable characteristics of an applicant and are therefore subject to 
manipulation by the applicant. Manipulating, i.e. improving these signals, often involves 
costs which Spence (1973) refers to as signaling costs. The costs to achieve a certain 
signal (e.g. a university degree) need to vary between two different applicants, only then 
a signal can be a selective signal and successfully distinguish the more suitable 
applicant from another less qualified one. This is known as the signaling cost condition. 
Indices in turn are attributes which are not alterable by the applicant such as gender, 
background, age, name etc. The wage offered by the employer is then a function of the 
applicant’s signals and indices (Spence 1973).  
The job market signaling model can be applied in the current situation, but some 
adjustments need to be made. For example, the evaluator cannot offer distinct wages or 
rates to differently suited applicants, but needs to decide whether or not a candidate 
fulfills the requirements expected in turn for a predetermined scholarship rate. 
Candidates will only be awarded the scholarship whenever they surpass a certain 
threshold, i.e. a certain expectancy level of the principal. 
In line with Spence’s (1973) theory, signals are assumed to have a greater impact on the 
employer’s conditional probabilistic beliefs of the candidate’s employability than indices 
as the former can be manipulated (improved) by the candidate and therefore follow a 
function of the candidate’s effort (cost) and abilities. Whenever indices — which usually 
cannot be altered or manipulated by the applicant — have a major influence on the 
recruiter’s decision, although some convincing signals have been provided, this may be 
considered a sign of discrimination (in the workplace). How an employer’s evaluation 
may be influenced by discriminatory practices will be addressed in the following 
subsection.82  
                                                
82  The reader might also expect a discussion of Human Capital Theory (Becker 1993) in the 
context of investments in education. As the present thesis however deals with effective ability 
signaling in an academic — and not in a work-related — context, differences in human capital 
endowments do not immediately assist in explaining selection success in education contexts. 
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4.2.3 Theories Explaining Inefficiencies in Decision Making 
Whenever factors that are not associated with the (potential) productivity of an 
individual play a major role in selection decisions, this is directly linked to a loss of 
economic efficiency (Bendick 2007). Both the (economic) theory of discrimination and the 
(sociological) similarity-attraction theory represent attempts to explain these 
inefficiencies in decision making. 
4.2.3.1 The Theory of Discrimination 
Discrimination occurs whenever members of a minority are treated less favorably than 
members of a majority group although they possess identical productive characteristics 
(Heckman 1998). Being treated less favorably can occur on several dimensions: either 
minority group members are offered a lower wage for the same productivity or they need 
to work harder (i.e. show a higher productivity) for the same wage (Arrow 1973). This is 
commonly referred to as income inequality or wage differentials due to discrimination in 
the workplace. But also in recruitment, discrimination is likely to occur and would lead 
to biased screening and preferential hiring of majority group members (Borjas and 
Goldberg 1978). The rationale behind employers’ discriminatory practices may either be 
taste-based (Becker 1971) or statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973) besides 
other sociological/psychological explanations for discriminatory treatment not tackled in 
this work.  
Taste-based discrimination implies that certain employers (or more general: decision 
makers) exist who have prejudices against particular groups of people. Becker (1971) 
calls this a certain ‘taste for discrimination’ which means they see an inherent 
disadvantage of employing minority group members. This disadvantage originates from 
one of the three major sources within and outside the organization: (1) Employer 
discrimination (2) Employee or co-worker discrimination and (3) Customer 
discrimination. In scenario (1), the employers’ behavior lacks objectivity as they do not 
base their decisions solely on productivity attributes of the applicant, but express their 
subjective preferences when refusing an — objectively suitable — applicant. Employers 
that discriminate against an applicant in the second scenario do so as they are aware of 
their current employees’ distaste for working with someone from this particular minority 
group. Scenario (3) explains employers’ behavior by their fear to employ a person that 
their customers have prejudices against. Taste-based discrimination is likely to lead to 
income inequality as members of minority groups have to compensate for these 
prejudices by either accepting a lower wage for the same productivity as a majority 
group member or working harder (showing a higher productivity) for the same wage.  
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Statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973) in turn does not attribute 
discrimination to prejudices or tastes, but states that employers discriminate due to a 
lack of information about the skills and the quality of job applicants. Statistical 
discrimination in particular can be understood as a solution to the asymmetric 
information distribution. As employers only have limited information about an applicant 
and therefore cannot perfectly assess that person’s true quality, they simply infer from 
prior knowledge about the group’s mean performance. The decision is then based on 
stereotypes about the discriminated group’s average (prior) performance and may lead to 
discriminatory hiring and/or wage differentials (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973). For 
scholarship applicants belonging to certain minority groups, statistical discrimination 
could occur in the sense that evaluators have made unpleasant experiences (e.g. 
dropping out of the sponsored program) with other previously selected persons of this 
minority group and infer a lower quality of all applicants from their previous experience. 
In the present case, evaluators’ previous experiences with students of the same minority 
group — students with a migrational background for instance — might have formed a 
comparably low reputation of this specific minority group in the evaluators’ minds. They 
then — in the absence of an alternative — infer a generally lower mean performance of 
these students. 
4.2.3.2 The Similarity-Attraction Paradigm and In-Group Favoritism 
In the social sciences, it is argued that decisions of individuals are not solely driven by 
rational considerations. Emotional factors such as affect and interpersonal attraction are 
theorized to have an effect on the decision outcome as well (Berscheid and Walster 1969; 
Byrne 1971). In economic terms, these non-rational effects are commonly regarded as 
inefficiencies during the (rational) decision process as they lead to a result which is 
inferior to the optimal result solely based on rational considerations. One of the most 
frequently cited interpersonal attraction theories is the so called similarity-attraction 
paradigm. It hypothesizes that the (perceived) similarity between two individuals, e.g. 
an applicant and an evaluator, is able to influence the interpersonal attraction which in 
turn leads to a positive bias in the judgment of this particular person (Byrne 1971). 
According to Byrne and Neumann (1992), affective responses are inherent in any 
interpersonal encounter and do not only persist in emotionally driven decisions such as 
marital relationships, but also in organizational issues.  
In particular, attitudinal similarity — i.e. similarity in general attitudes and values — is 
one of the factors that can lead to interpersonal attraction. This effect increases with the 
respective importance of an attitude: People are particularly attracted to others who 
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share similar important attitudes such as attitudes concerning war and peace or family 
(Byrne 1971). In the absence of any information about attitudinal similarity, also 
similarity in personal characteristics of two individuals may indirectly lead to positively 
biased judgments: Demographic similarity — e.g. in race, gender and age — causes 
perceived similarity of values and attitudes which then again lead to interpersonal 
attraction. The same holds true for biographical similarity or similarity in physical 
attributes such as physical attractiveness. In interview situations, both interview 
conduct (questioning strategy and non-verbal behavior, for instance) and information 
processing (i.e. what the evaluator remembers after the interview) might be affected by 
interpersonal attraction and lead to more favorable judgments (Byrne 1971). 
Closely linked to the similarity-attraction bias are in- or intergroup biases. Intergroup 
bias “refers generally to the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership 
group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the 
out-group) or its members” (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002, 576). In the social 
sciences, this phenomenon can be explained by several theories, of which Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) is one of the most frequently cited. In addition to merely 
stating that somebody is attracted to another person and consequently treats him or her 
favorably, social identity and other theories try to explain why in-group biases occur. 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that in-group biases may create or reinforce a person’s 
group identification, his or her in-group status and as a result also this person’s self-
esteem. Other theoretical justifications for the existence of such a similar-to-me effect 
include Learning Theory (Byrne 1971; Lefkowitz 2000) and Self Categorization Theory 
(Turner 1987; Jackson et al. 1991). But as it is not the purpose of this thesis to explain in 
sociological terms, why evaluators favor similar people and/or people belonging to their 
in-group, all of the above mentioned theories are used simultaneously to explain 
similarity biases. The important commonality of all these theoretical approaches is the 
possible positive bias towards people that are similar to the evaluator which will be 
analyzed in more detail in this thesis. 
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5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Before being able to empirically analyze success factors of scholarship applications, a 
theoretical model as well as testable hypotheses need to be developed.  
5.1 THE MODEL 
In a strict sense, the selection of a suitable applicant during a stipend selection process — 
just as in every other selection process — is preceded and determined by two independent 
decisions: On the one hand, the individual decision to apply for a scholarship and on the 
other hand the institutional or evaluator decision to award a specific applicant with the 
stipend. The individual decision to apply for a scholarship program (let it be ܣ௜) is a 
function of the anticipated utility of applying to this program which in turn is certainly 
dependent on several personal characteristics of a potential applicant. However, how and 
why an applicant decided to send an application to this particular organization is usually 
unobservable by the recruiter or researcher studying selection processes. Only 
information about applicants who decided to apply (i.e. ܣ௜ ൌ 1) is available. Therefore, 
the theoretical model presented below only includes the second decision, i.e. the 
institution’s decision to award somebody a stipend, thus implicitly assuming that ܣ௜ ൌ 1. 
This model may then be interpreted as the selection decision conditional on application.  
Let us assume that evaluators during a scholarship selection process are able (or at least 
try) to predict the potential of a given applicant by what they can infer from the 
application. This generalized potential is most certainly determined by several ‘sub-
potentials’, e.g. hard and soft skills, academic potential and non-academic potential etc. 
As predicted by Agency and Job Market Signaling Theory, applicants (agents) signal 
their ability and evaluators (principals) screen the applicants in order to reveal the 
characteristics and attributes of interest by interpreting both signals and indices. As has 
been demonstrated in the literature review, rater characteristics as well as social and 
situational factors might also affect the selection decision. Evaluators form an 
impression about each candidate by assuming his or her (unobservable) generalized 
potential ௜ܲ with the use of the available signals and indices. Impression formation can 
also be affected by all the other factors extraneous to the applicant’s objective potential.  
Formally, a specific applicant’s potential ௜ܲ can be simply denoted as 
௜ܲ ൌ ߙଵܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ 	ߙଶܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙଷܧݔݐపሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ ߝ௜    
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Note that the vector ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ represents all respective influence factors of applicant ݅ which 
can be interpreted as ability signals in Spence’s (1973) sense. These may comprise direct 
measures of ability such as educational attainment, e.g. grades and class rank, or 
experience, but also more indirect measures such as the number and intensity of 
extracurricular activities (ECAs), recommendations delivered in LORs, home institution 
characteristics (e.g. university quality and reputation), previous achievements or awards 
and other productivity or ability signals. The vector ܫԦ௜ comprises all the characteristics 
defined as indices by Spence (1973) that cannot be manipulated by the applicant but 
which are nevertheless revealed in an application. Examples of these indices are all 
applicant individual difference factors such as gender, race or age. ܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜	stands for all 
other (extraneous) factors that might affect impression formation and decision making 
such as rater characteristics or social and situational influences. These are most likely to 
not only have a direct influence on the perceived potential ௜ܲ, but are also able to 
moderate the influence of both signals and indices. That is the reason why the model 
describing applicant potential needs to be amended by two interaction terms: 
௜ܲ ൌ ߙଵܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ 	ߙଶܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙଷܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ ൅ ߙସܧݔݐ	ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜	ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ ߙହܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ܫԦ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  
Similarly, different applicant signals and indices are not assumed to be substitutes, but 
will presumably have an additive, i.e. a complimentary effect, on perceived applicant 
potential. This interaction takes into account that certain ability signals and 
demographic characteristics (indices) might reinforce themselves:  
௜ܲ ൌ ߙଵܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ 	ߙଶܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙଷܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ ൅ ߙସܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜	ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ ߙହܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙ଺ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ	ܫԦ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  
Note that the disturbance term ߝ௜  contains all of the other attributes that might 
influence an evaluator’s perception of an applicant’s potential which we are, however, 
not able to measure or observe. This can e.g. include the more subjective impression 
evaluators are able to form during an interview.  
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As the maximum number of stipends awarded in a given selection period is usually 
limited (as a consequence of certain budget constraints), an applicant’s success is not 
only determined by his or her individual potential, but has to be evaluated in relation to 
the competing applicants’ potential. In contrast to labor market and especially 
recruitment decisions, evaluators are not able to offer distinct wages as a function of an 
individual applicant’s potential. The scholarship rate is predetermined by organization ݆, 
and therefore successful candidates need to surpass a certain threshold potential level, 
called ܮ௝, in order to be awarded the stipend. This threshold level is in turn determined 
by both minimum requirements of organization ݆ ( ௝ܱ) and the applicant pool’s average 
potential ( పܲഥ): 
ܮ௝ ൌ ߚଵ ௝ܱ ൅	ߚଶ തܲ௜ ൅ ௝߱      
Again, we allow for some noise in the formation of the threshold level ܮ௝ by including the 
disturbance term ௝߱. As a consequence of a minimum applicant ‘quality’, the 
unobservable selection probability of applicant ݅ ( ௜ܵ) depends on both the applicant’s 
individual potential ௜ܲ 	and the threshold level ܮ௝. More specifically, in order to be 
awarded the stipend, the individual potential needs to exceed the threshold level: 
Pr	ሺ ௜ܲ െ ܮ௝ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ ௜ܵ      
ൌ Pr ቀ൫ߙଵܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ 	ߙଶܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙଷܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ ൅ ߙସܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜	ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ ൅ ߙହܧݔݐሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ௜ܫԦ௜ ൅ ߙ଺ܵଓ݃పሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ	ܫԦ௜ ൅ 	ߝ௜൯ െ
൫ߚଵ ௝ܱ ൅	ߚଶ పܲഥ ൅ ௝߱൯ ൐ 0ቁ        
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5.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In concordance with functional elite theory, an individual’s performance represents the 
only determinant of elite affiliation. Consequently, evaluators awarding stipends aimed 
at supporting future elite members, individual (past) performance should determine 
selection success to a large extent. Past performance however is reflected in certain 
ability signals applicants (agents) provide in their application. During a (perfectly) 
rational decision process, evaluators (principals) should base their decision solely on 
these credible signals of ability in order to evaluate a candidate’s past performance and 
future potential. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 states as follows 
Hypothesis 1:  The provision of credible ability signals increases an applicant’s chances 
to be awarded the stipend.  
Ability signals provided in a scholarship application include various aspects of an 
individual’s academic and non-academic performance. These include direct proofs of 
academic performance such as school and university grade certificates which applicants 
are usually required to hand in with an application. But also more indirect information 
about an individual’s (previous) performance such as university quality or reputation, 
work experience (internships), extracurricular activities and letters of recommendation 
are usually available in written applications. Additionally, any further credential 
candidates provide in their application may (even inadvertently) serve as a signal of 
their suitability. Additional certificates and prior awards, but also remarkable rhetoric 
skills for instance may also signal an increased suitability for being awarded a stipend. 
However, evaluators need to be able to interpret all signals in order to decide whether or 
not they are both credible and expedient for stipend awarding. The interpretation of 
certain signals is facilitated whenever both their direction and range is well-known to all 
evaluators. High school and university grades for instance represent signals evaluators 
(usually professors or academic assistants) are familiar with. Furthermore, grades (at 
least within one country or educational system) are standardized and considered to be an 
objective measure of performance. As a consequence, the amount of interpretation 
needed is minimal and grades are likely to represent the most credible and reliable 
ability signal provided in an application. Hence, Hypothesis 2 can be derived as follows 
Hypothesis 2: Among all ability signals, educational attainment signals (especially 
grades) will have the strongest effect on the probability of being awarded 
the stipend. 
5 Conceptual Model 
98 
 
Just as in other more extensively researched selection processes with a huge supply-
demand imbalance, the scholarship selection process will most likely be divided into 
several stages. The pre-selection (or sifting) stage of any selection process is aimed at 
identifying appropriate and inappropriate candidates based on their résumés and 
application forms. In personnel selection, appropriateness in this sense can be defined as 
fulfilling all the necessary requirements (i.e. KSAs) for executing this particular task 
and this can be captured in the applicant P-J fit construct. As the empirical literature on 
applicant fit has shown, P-J fit is mostly evaluated in pre-selection and only candidates 
who fulfill (most of) the job requirements (high P-J fit) will be further considered in the 
selection process and invited to job interviews for instance. In subsequent stages, 
recruiters then compare applicants who are theoretically (i.e. on paper) all able to 
perform the task. In personnel recruitment, P-O fit assessments, e.g. value congruence 
between organization and applicant, become more important in these stages as P-J fit 
has usually already been determined at an earlier stage. In the stipend awarding 
context, something like P-J fit might also exist, representing the individual ability to 
perform the ‘task’ the award is linked to, which is usually ‘studying’ in the context of 
university stipends. P-J fit (or its equivalent in the scholarship awarding context) is 
assessed during pre-selection based on the ability signals provided in an application and 
inappropriate candidates will already be eliminated during this early stage. During final 
selection (in an interview for instance) however, only applicants are considered who have 
been found to fulfill the minimum requirements (acceptable P-J fit) and variance in P-J 
fit (and therefore in the quality of ability signals) will be substantially lower in final 
selection. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is developed. 
Hypothesis 3: The influence of ability signals will be more important in paper-based 
pre-selection than in (person-to-person) final selection. 
In contrast to personnel selection, evaluators in a stipend awarding process do not 
necessarily have an ideal candidate in mind as no direct task exists which needs to be 
fulfilled by the successful applicant. Consequently, no consensus exists among 
evaluators concerning the explicit characteristics of a stipend awardee. On the contrary, 
evaluators look for applicants promising to become future elite members which can be 
defined by diverse abilities and skills. These abilities are not mutually exclusive and a 
combination of several abilities and/or skills might be particularly promising. However, 
performing poorly on one dimension may not be counterbalanced by scintillating on 
another dimension. Insufficient academic performance for instance will not be 
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compensated for by additional extracurricular activities or vice versa. Accordingly, 
different ability signals will not represent substitutes, but rather complements: 
Hypothesis 4: Different ability signals will not have a substitutive, but a 
complementary effect on awarding probabilities. Therefore, reinforcing 
interaction effects of different ability signals will occur. 
Assuming a perfectly rational decision process made by scholarship evaluators, non-
productivity-related applicant characteristics such as gender or race are not likely to 
have an impact on selection decisions. However, the hiring discrimination literature has 
shown that recruiters do not decide perfectly rationally and discriminate against certain 
applicants due to several reasons. Discrimination against certain minority groups occurs 
as a consequence of either taste-based or statistical discrimination as has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 4.2.3.1. Albeit, in a stipend awarding process several of the 
theoretically anticipated sources of (hiring) discrimination are simply non-existent. Out 
of the three distinct sources of taste-based discrimination (employer, employee and 
customer discrimination), only one is applicable in the current context. As neither ‘co-
workers’ nor ‘customers’ exist in a scholarship context, the only rationale behind taste-
based discrimination could be the evaluator’s own distaste against certain minority 
candidates. Statistical discrimination in turn might occur whenever an evaluator has 
previously made an unpleasant experience with other students belonging to the same 
minority group and — to the best of their knowledge and in the absence of further 
information — infers a lower generalized ability for all affiliates of this minority group. 
Examples of unpleasant experiences of this kind can be either general (e.g. performing 
poorly in university or never being punctual) or stipend specific (e.g. dropping out of the 
program although being awarded the stipend). But as evaluators usually do neither meet 
successful applicants nor get any information on how actual awardees perform after 
having been selected, they should not observe group differences in performance. In 
addition, as a lot of other ability-related information is provided in the application, e.g. 
grades, certificates etc., uncertainty about applicant quality should be rather low. 
Consequently, in the very unlikely case of discrimination, less favorable treatment 
treatment occurs due to evaluator's idiosyncrasies, but should not occur in the aggregate 
of all selection decisions or on average. However, in order to be able to empirically test 
the occurance of discrimination in the present study, Hypothesis 5 states as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Applicant characteristics (indices) will affect the selection probability, i.e. 
discrimination will occur. 
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Some types of indices however are expected to have an influence on selection decisions 
without being indicative of discrimination in selection. Age, personality and social 
background of an applicant for instance are expected to affect evaluator decisions 
indirectly. Younger students will (c.p.) be preferred to older students as being young and 
having achieved the same as an older student will most likely be interpreted as an 
indirect ability signal reflecting higher motivation. Similarly, in concordance with elite 
theory, individuals from higher social classes will c.p. have higher chances to be granted 
the scholarship as they do not only possess increased human, but also social capital 
which can be especially advantageous in final selection stages (interview). Nevertheless, 
this again cannot simply be interpreted as discrimination against working class 
applicants. To a greater degree, originating from a high socio-economic background leads 
to increased rhetoric skills which in turn represents a signal for increased aptitude. 
Analogous to applicant characteristics, rater characteristics are not expected to have any 
effect on rational selection decisions. In personnel selection, it has indeed been shown 
that female evaluators are more lenient in evaluating candidates on several work-related 
outcomes, but in terms of final selection decisions this leniency usually ‘disappears’. 
Furthermore, increased interview structure has been demonstrated to rule out the 
influence of individual rater characteristics on selection probabilities. In order to be able 
to falsify the assumption of any rater characteristic effect, Hypothesis 6 is developed:  
Hypothesis 6: Selection probabilities will be dependent of individual rater 
characteristics. 
In the same vein, the influence of further social and situational factors such as 
applicant-rater similarity, panel composition and interview time is expected to be non-
significant, but needs to be tested in order to reduce a possible omitted variable bias. 
Hypothesis 7: Applicant-rater similarity will lead to more favorable ratings. 
Hypothesis 8: Situational or extraneous factors will affect selection decisions. 
In general, pre-selection decisions are expected to be more predictable than final 
selection decisions (based on written applicant credentials) as the amount of 
unobservable factors and hence the noise included in the model increases in final 
selection decisions. Hypothesis 9 accordingly states 
Hypothesis 9: The amount of explained variance in pre-selection decisions will be 
greater than in final selection decisions. 
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PART C:    EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL SCHOLARSHIP 
APPLICATIONS 
6 THE DATA SET 
6.1 METHOD AND DATA 
In order to address the previously established hypotheses and research questions, an 
empirical analysis of actual stipend applications and awarding decisions was conducted. 
One single, sample scholarship program was investigated and it was observed and 
analyzed in retrospect, who was actually a) invited to an interview after the sifting 
process and b) finally awarded the scholarship.  
As has been discussed in the theoretical part, analyzing real decision processes yields 
superior results to both experiments and surveys (in terms of external validity). Only by 
examining real decisions made in the field, the researcher is able to reveal true 
preferences that evaluators or recruiters are not likely to admit in e.g. surveys (revealed 
versus stated preferences). In field experiments, however, only a limited number of 
variables of interest can be actively manipulated and tested. As previous empirical 
findings on stipend awarding decisions are rare, it was not possible to select appropriate 
experimental treatment variables. Instead, it is the purpose of this thesis to provide in-
depth insight into various previously unknown signaling and screening activities in 
scholarship selection processes.  
The data set used for answering the research questions was provided by the ‘Deutsche 
Akademische Austauschdienst’ (DAAD), an independent German exchange service which 
regularly awards scholarships to academics of any degree. In concordance with 
functional elite theory, the organization’s mission is to award stipends solely on the basis 
of individual performance:  
„Even in controversial times, the DAAD is committed to an elite sponsorship which 
is purely performance-oriented, secured by independent academic committees and 
hence accessible to everybody who complies with these high standards. Apart from 
intellectual abilities, stipend awardees need to possess a personality profile which 
gives reason to expect that the stipend awardee will directly or indirectly return the 
favor and pay the sponsoring society something back from what he or she has 
earned with the aid of the stipend.” 83 
  
                                                
83  Own translation from http://www.daad.de/portrait/wer-wir-sind/programme/08941.de.html.  
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It can be easily revealed from this mission statement that the present stipend program 
represents a purely merit-based scholarship program. Stipends are not awarded as a 
function of a student’s financial need or socio-economic status (as it would be the case in 
means-tested scholarship programs), but based on individual achievement only.  
The applications all stem from the same subdivision of this exchange service and two 
subsequent application periods84 have been examined. In the investigated sample, all 
applicants are either German (i.e. possessing the German citizenship) or educational 
residents in Germany (meaning they have obtained their high school diploma in 
Germany or at a German high school). Non-residents are not able to apply for this 
specific kind of scholarship and are therefore not represented in the sample. All of the 
applicants for this particular scholarship program (called ‘Germans to North America’) 
are undergraduate students who wish to spend two semesters (i.e. approximately nine to 
ten months) at a North American university and hope to be financially supported by the 
institution.85  
The application process 
In order for an application to be considered, students need to hand in at least86 the 
following documents 
- Application form (including a photograph), 
- Typed complete curriculum vitae (CV), including course of studies, 
- Detailed description of the curriculum to be studied abroad (max. 5 pages), 
- Reference letter and standardized evaluation form of a faculty member, 
- Table of previous academic achievements at university,  
(Copies of grade certificates, intermediate examination certificates or diplomas), 
- Copy of high school diploma (including grades for individual subjects) as well as a 
- Language certificate (either TOEFL or another approved certificate). 
  
                                                
84  The investigated scholarship periods, i.e. the period in which applicants planned to study 
abroad, were the academic years 2008/09 and 2009/10. Stipend awarding was decided upon 
one year prior to departure , i.e. in 2007 for 2008/09 and in 2008 for 2009/10. 
85  The financial assistance granted to those awarded the scholarship is substantial and should 
cover most of the expenses the students have during their stay abroad. It adds up to 850€ per 
month plus a fixed monthly medical insurance rate plus tuition fees up to 15,000€/year per 
person. 
86  Further certificates or information handed in by the applicant were also forwarded to the 
evaluators. 
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All complete written applications handed in before the expiration of the application 
deadline are distributed among several individual pre-selection evaluators who are 
asked to invite approximately 50% of all applicants to an interview. Pre-selection 
evaluators are professors teaching in diverse fields at different German institutions who 
volunteered to be part of this selection process. Applications are distributed among 
different evaluators on the basis of the applicant’s distinct field of studies which should 
be identical or at least related to the evaluator’s field of research. Evaluators are not 
bound to assess specific KSAs of applicants, but are simply asked to invite the most 
promising of all candidates. As stated in the organization’s mission, stipend awardees 
should possess appropriate intellectual abilities as well as a promising personality 
profile. In order to justify their decision and to be able to compare different applicants, 
evaluators are asked to assign each candidate a pre-selection score ranging from 0-100. 
Actually, this pre-selection score is subdivided into three differently weighted categories 
in order to provide evaluators with some guidelines: Pre-selection evaluators are asked 
to assign 0-55 (out of the 100) points for academic qualification, 0-15 points for 
extracurricular qualification and 0-30 points for the specific project (goals and 
preparation of the stay abroad). Usually, all applicants receiving a score ranging from 80 
to 100 are subsequently invited to an interview. Therefore, in addition to the documents 
handed in by the applicant, the data set also comprises distinct evaluation forms stating 
each candidate’s individual and total pre-selection scores and whether or not the 
applicant was invited to an interview and therefore further considered in the application 
process. Additionally, information about the pre-selection evaluator (e.g. gender, 
position, age, and field) is available.  
Whenever applicants have successfully ‘survived’ the sifting phase, they have been 
invited to a personal interview in front of a committee. In this case, further information 
about the interview situation and structure (day, time & length), the evaluation 
committee (size, gender and age composition) and the outcome of the selection interview 
(final score and scholarship awarded: yes or no) has been recorded and can be used for 
analysis.  
All of the variables that could be extracted from both paper applications and pre-
selection or interview notes and used for further analysis will be presented in detail in 
the following subsection (Descriptive Statistics). 
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Initially, the data set contained 504 complete scholarship applications.87 These represent 
all of the applications handed in for this specific scholarship program in the two 
application periods examined. 243 of all applications were handed in for the first 
selection round conducted in 2007 (scholarship period: 2008/09) and the remaining 261 
applications were decided upon in 2008 (scholarship period: 2009/10). Complete paper 
files were made accessible to the researcher so that numerous (possible) independent 
variables could be extracted from the above mentioned paper documents.  
6.2.1 The Applicant Pool 
6.2.1.1 Applicant Characteristics 
48.6% of all applicants (245) were female and 51.4% (259) were male. In terms of the 
application decision made by the individual student, no gender differences could hence 
be observed and both female and male students applied for a study-abroad scholarship in 
(almost) equal shares. At the time of application, i.e. one year prior to starting their 
semester abroad, applicants were on average 21.9 years old. The youngest of all 
applicants was 19, the oldest 32. In terms of duration of study, the average applicant had 
already studied for 4.4 semesters when applying for the stipend, but again the range 
between the shortest (2nd semester) and longest (14th semester) length of study was 
substantial. Most of the applicants (79.4%) desire to study in the United States of 
America while 20.6% plan to spend their year abroad in Canada.88 65.5% of all 
applicants indicate that they will need to pay tuition at their guest institution.89 
Whenever tuition fees have to be paid by the student, they on average add up to 
US$ 21,95390 for the entire stay abroad, but again tuition fees are not uniformly 
distributed. Some applicants only expect to pay US$ 1,570 whereas others envisage 
tuition fees as high as US$ 80,000. 139 applicants (27.8%) indicate to take part in an 
organized study-abroad program offered by their home institution. Most of the 
applicants (97%) plan to attend lectures in English language. The remaining 3% of all 
applicants intends to study in French language (at Canadian universities only). 
                                                
87  However, not all of the applications could be used in the subsequent multivariate analysis due 
to missing values in important explanatory variables (see Chapter 7 for details). 
88  Note that all of the applicants in this specific program want to study abroad in North America. 
Students wanting to get financial assistance for a stay elsewhere would apply for another 
program in another subdivision of this organization. 
89  Although all North American institutions require tuition fees, tuition can be waived in some 
cases. Examples for these exemptions are bilateral agreements between partner universities or 
entire federal states (e.g. Baden-Wuerttemberg and Ontario). 
90  Tuition fees indicated in € or CAD have been transformed into US$ for the ease of 
interpretation and comparison. 
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In terms of previous sponsorships, 22.6% of all applicants indicate to receive BAföG.91 74 
candidates, i.e. 14.7% of all applicants, indicate to have been awarded another merit-
based stipend before. Most of these previously awarded candidates (30) indicate to be a 
scholarship recipient of the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’, the most renowned 
of the eleven ‘Begabtenförderungswerke’ in Germany. Other organizations that have 
previously supported candidates include ‘e-fellows.net’ (9 applicants) and the ‘Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’ (7 applicants), but also specific programs offered by the respective 
home institution have been mentioned (7 applicants). 212 of all 504 candidates (42.1%) 
additionally state in their application that they have also applied for other scholarships 
offered by other institutions promising to support their planned stay abroad. 
The applicants are students of 64 different higher education institutions in Germany 
which are almost all public institutions (98%). More than three quarters of all applicants 
are enrolled at a German university (76.4%). 15.4% of all candidates indicate to study at 
a technical university and the remaining 8.2% of all applicants are enrolled at a 
university of applied sciences.92 The home institution of 42.8% of all applicants is located 
in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and 13.6% indicate to be currently enrolled 
at a Bavarian tertiary education institution. Only 10% of all applicants study at an 
institution located in North-Rhine-Westphalia, the most heavily populated of all German 
states. Very few applicants (5.2%) are enrolled at an institution which is located in one of 
the new Eastern states of Germany. 37.3% of all applicants study a subject counted 
among ‘Law, Economics or Social Sciences’ and 28.4% are categorized as students of 
‘Linguistic and Cultural Sciences’. The disciplines ‘Engineering’ and ‘Mathematics, 
Informatics and Natural Sciences’ are represented in the sample 71 times (14.1% of all 
applications) and 85 times (16.9%), respectively. The remaining 17 applicants are 
enrolled in ‘Arts’, ‘Medicine’ or interdisciplinary fields.93 
In terms of educational attainment, especially high school and university grade averages 
need to be mentioned. The average scholarship applicant has passed secondary school 
with a grade average of 1.8 (range: 1.0 — 3.7) and has achieved university grades 
averaging 1.9 (range: 1.0 — 3.7). It needs to be mentioned here that the German grade 
system is different from the American grading system for instance. In Germany, 1.0 
                                                
91  A German nationwide means-tested sponsorship especially developed for students whose 
parents could otherwise not afford sending their children to university or school. For more 
details on this needs-based program, see Chapter 2. 
92  University of applied sciences = ‘Fachhochschule’. 
93  Due to the peculiarities of the study of art, the German Academic Exchange Service offers 
separate programs especially designed for art students. This fact might explain the relatively 
low share of art students in the present sample. 
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represents the best grade (reflecting excellent performance) and 6.0 the worst grade 
(reflecting insufficient achievement). As it is reverse coded, a 1.0 therefore corresponds 
to an A in the American system, a 2.0 to a B, a 3.0 to a C, and so on. In order to pass a 
course, a student needs to achieve at least a 4.0 which means the grade needs to be lower 
than or equal to 4. This grading system is utilized both in high school and university. 
Accordingly, averages of 1.8 and 1.9 respectively correspond to a B(+) in the American 
system. 
In their CVs, 84.3% of all applicants indicate some kind of extracurricular activity 
(ECA). These activities can be classified into several categories which are spread among 
all applicants as follows94: 48.2% of all applicants are involved in the organization of 
youth, sport or recreation activities, 24.8% of all applicants voluntarily work for a social 
services provider whereas 22.8% put effort into cultural activities. 17.7% indicate to 
pursue a political and 14.3% a clerical ECA. 21.2% engage in ECAs related to their 
student association or faculty and 14.5% have been a member of the student 
representation in high school. Finally, 8.1% voluntarily support exchange students at 
their home institution.  
As requested by the scholarship granting organization, applicants provide both free-form 
recommendation letters and a standardized evaluation sheet filled in by the 
recommender, usually a faculty member of the home institution. Only one 
recommendation letter and evaluation sheet was required, but several applicants 
handed in multiple LORs. On average, 1.3 LORs were handed in which were all very 
generous: On a scale from 0-10 (0 reflecting not at all and 10 perfectly suitable), the 
average applicant achieved 9.25 points. In addition, 83.4% of all recommenders indicated 
to know the recommendee well.  
In Germany, written applications frequently contain additional information which are 
not requested by e.g. employers or evaluators, but are provided commonly on a voluntary 
basis. Statements about the applicant’s parents count among this additional 
information. In the current applicant pool, 33.5% of all applicants voluntarily mentioned 
their parents, or more precisely, their parents’ occupation and status. Of the 169 
applicants who provided information about their parents, 70.4% come from an academic 
parental home, i.e. based on the indicated current occupation or academic degree, at 
least one parent has presumably graduated from university.  
                                                
94  As numerous ECAs can be pursued by any individual applicant, multiple answers were 
possible and the percentages do not add up to 100. 
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6.2.1.2 Comparison to the Entire German Student Body 
In order to correctly interpret the previously presented characteristics of all applicants, 
the applicant pool needs to be compared to some kind of reference category. In the 
present case, the average German student represents an appropriate reference. 
As has been discussed in the model development section, the individual decision to apply 
e.g. for a scholarship precedes the actual application. Only when a student’s, i.e. a 
potential applicant’s, utility of applying is greater than the utility of not applying, he or 
she will make the effort of collecting all the necessary documents and handing them in. 
Hence, it is anticipated that those students who actually decided to apply for the 
scholarship (and whose application we are consequently able to analyze) differ 
significantly from the average student. If this is indeed the case, the applicant pool 
represents a (positively) self-selected group of students which will presumably not only 
be more self-confident, but also more qualified (e.g. in terms of grades) than the average 
German student. 
The following table contrasts some of the characteristics that could be observed among 
all applicants with the characteristics of an average German student. With the help of 
this comparison, we can find out whether the applicant pool represents a distinct, 
(positively) self-selected group of students or whether applicants do not differ 
significantly from ‘usual’ students in Germany. Information about the average student’s 
characteristics was obtained from several official sources including Isserstedt et al. 
(2007), Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) as well as various publications from 
the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Destatis 2009, 2011c; Schmidt 2009). Of 
course, this comparison is only descriptive in nature and does not control for confounding 
effects, but nevertheless sheds some light on the scholarship application decision of 
German students. 
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Variable of Interest  Average Value of … Applicant Pool German Student Body
Study‐Abroad Intentions/Experience 
Percentage of students with study‐abroad intentions/exper. 100% 15%95 
Academic Achievement 
High School Grade Average 1.80 2.296 
University Grade Average  1.94 2.297 
Type of Home Institution  Data from Destatis (2009)
University  76.4%  66.3% 
Technical University  15.4%  n.a. (incl. in Universities) 
University of Applied Sciences  8.2%  29.6% 
Location of Home Institution  Data from Destatis (2009)
Baden‐Wuerttemberg  42.8%  12.9% 
Bavaria  13.6%  12.8% 
Berlin  7.4%  6.7% 
Brandenburg  1.0%  2.3% 
Bremen  1.2%  1.6% 
Hamburg  0.4%  3.6% 
Hesse  3.0%  8.5% 
Lower Saxony  5.8%  6.9% 
Mecklenburg‐Hither Pomerania  0.2%  1.8% 
North Rhine‐Westphalia  10.0%  23.9% 
Rhineland‐Palatinate  7.6%  5.3% 
Saarland  2.0%  1.1% 
Saxony  3.2%  5.3% 
Saxony‐Anhalt  0.8%  2.6% 
Schleswig‐Holstein  0.8%  2.4% 
Thuringia  0.0%  2.5% 
Other  0.2%  ‐ 
Home Institution in New Eastern State (Berlin excl.) 5.2% 14.5% 
Work Experience    Data from Isserstedt et al. (2007) 
Student completed vocational training prior to studying 5.6% 25% 
Previous Sponsorships 
BAföG  22.6% 25.5%98 
Any Merit‐Based scholarship   14.7% 1.1%99 
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’  6.0% 0.5%100 
Extracurricular Activities  Data from Fischer (2006)
Share of Students Pursuing an ECA   84.3% 66.7% 
Applicant Characteristics  Data from Destatis (2009)
Share of Female Students  48.6% 47.8% 
Share of Students Born in Germany  91.8% n.a. 
Average Student Age  21.9 years 25.3 years 
Table 6-1  Comparison of Applicant and Average German Student Characteristics 
                                                
95  Isserstedt et al. (2007), 166. 
96  Data obtained from the ‘HIS-Studienberechtigtenbefragung’ 2006-2010 (HIS 2012).  
97  Wissenschaftsrat (2007), 32.  
98  Schmidt (2009), 168. Calculation: 494,480/1,941,763 students in 2007 (Destatis 2008). 
99  Middendorff, Isserstedt & Kandulla (2009), 14 (Calculation: 20,794/1,941,763 students in 07). 
100  Middendorff, Isserstedt & Kandulla (2009), 14 (Calculation: 8,717/1,941,763 students in 07). 
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First and foremost, all students having applied for the examined scholarship program 
definitely intend to study abroad for several months. This fact alone reflects a certain 
self-selection: Only 15% of all advanced students101 in Germany report to have ever 
studied abroad for some time (Isserstedt et al. 2007). Although — to the best of my 
knowledge — no comprehensive study exists which has empirically tested the 
determinants of a study-abroad decision, it might be assumed that those actually 
studying abroad differ significantly from the average student. With the help of surveys, 
some researchers have tried to shed some light on the determinants of studying abroad. 
Heublein et al. (2011) for instance have directly asked a sample of advanced students for 
their reasons to go or not to go abroad during their studies. Acquiring new experience, 
getting to know other cultures, improving their language skills and boosting their career 
opportunities count among the most frequently indicated motives for studying abroad. 
Frequently mentioned arguments against a semester abroad are financial difficulties, 
long separation from family and friends, the organizational effort needed to prepare such 
a stay, loss of time, low compatibility of study programs and difficulties in obtaining 
information about study-abroad possibilities (Heublein et al. 2011). From these answers 
it can be inferred that internationally mobile students indeed differ (positively) from the 
average student, e.g. in terms of openness to experience, determination, motivation, 
assertiveness and simply organizational skills. In terms of academic achievement, some 
differences between the applicant pool and the German student population are apparent. 
Whereas all stipend applicants exhibit high school grade averages of 1.8 and university 
grade averages totaling 1.94, the average German student has ‘only’ achieved a 2.2 (HIS 
2012) and a 2.2 (Wissenschaftsrat 2007) respectively. Hence, especially students with 
particularly good grades seem to apply for a scholarship. This fact might on the one hand 
reflect the applicants’ anticipation of certain selection criteria: As students expect grades 
to play an important role in the selection process, only those with ‘adequate’ grades 
apply. Similarly to what Manski and Wise (1983) found for college applications, 
applicants try to anticipate the selection criteria used by the selecting organization. On 
the other hand, the explanation for the difference in academic achievement could be that 
all students planning to go abroad differ from the average student also in terms of 
grades. It is feasible that only students with better grades — as an indicator for high 
levels of determination, motivation and diligence — decide to go abroad and consequently, 
the applicant pool rather resembles the group of all students going abroad.102  
                                                
101  Advanced student: In the 6th (university of applied sciences) or 8th (university) semester. 
102  However, no data on the grade distribution of internationally mobile and immobile German 
students exists that would allow for a more detailed investigation. 
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Although almost one third of all German students are enrolled at a university of applied 
sciences, only 8.2% of all applicants study at this type of institution. This proportion 
most closely corresponds to the share of students from universities of applied sciences 
among all scholarship recipients in Germany: In their survey, Middendorff, Isserstedt 
and Kandulla (2009) have found that only 8% of all actual scholarship recipients are 
enrolled at a university of applied sciences. In the present case, two distinct explanations 
may exist for the observed imbalance: Either students from universities of applied 
sciences decide to go abroad to a lesser extent than students from a ‘regular’ university 
or students enrolled at these institutions do go abroad, but do not apply for a 
scholarship. Reasons for their reluctant application behavior could be a lower self-esteem 
in comparison to university students or a mere paucity of information about these 
stipend possibilities. Looking at the results of Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla 
(2009) who have examined unconditional scholarships, i.e. not attached to a certain 
program or project, one can find support for the reluctant-application-behavior 
hypothesis. On the other hand, as the Isserstedt et al. (2007) survey data show, the 
share of students from universities of applied sciences possessing study-abroad 
experience is indeed substantially lower than for university students: Whereas 19% of all 
university students have made some international experience during their studies, only 
8% of all university-of-applied-sciences students have made this experience. Possible 
reasons for their study-abroad reluctance are on the one hand their predetermined 
curriculum not allowing for any delays and on the other hand their (on average) lower 
socio-economic background leading to increased financial constraints (Isserstedt et al. 
2007). However, this again would be an argument for an increased share of applicants 
for a stipend promising to financially support study-abroad projects. But on the other 
hand, students from universities of applied sciences might have other means of financial 
support at their disposal: means-tested scholarships such as BAföG which are only 
available for students from less affluent families or corporate stipends from companies 
collaborating closely with these kinds of institutions. Hence, various explanations for the 
type-of-institution differences are plausible, but it needs to be emphasized that only a 
minority of all applicants study at a university of applied sciences. 
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One of the most striking differences between the applicant pool and the entire German 
student body is the distribution of home institution locations across Germany. This 
differential distribution is most apparent for the federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
and North Rhine-Westphalia, as can be derived from figure 6-1.103 Whereas only 12.9% of 
all German students study at an institution located in the federal state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg (Destatis 2009), more than two fifths (42.8%) of all applicants are enrolled 
at an institution located in this state. On the contrary, only 10% of all applicants come 
from an institution located in North Rhine-Westphalia although almost one quarter of 
all German students (23.9%) study at an institution located in this federal state 
(Destatis 2009). Additionally, only very few applicants (5.2%) are from one of the 
German institutions located in the new Eastern states (Berlin excluded) although 14.5% 
of all German students are enrolled at these institutions (Destatis 2009). 
 
Figure 6-1  Location of Home Institution: Applicant Pool versus Student Population  
Sources: Destatis (2009) and Own Data Set 
 
  
                                                
103  Note that for the ease of illustration only selected federal states are presented here. 
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Several explanations for this substantial imbalance are conceivable. First of all, students 
from Baden-Wuerttemberg could be extraordinarily eager to study abroad for some time. 
However, no empirical data to test this hypothesis is available. Heublein et al. (2011) for 
instance did not differentiate between students from varying federal states. Isserstedt et 
al. (2007) did not indicate state-specific study-abroad rates either.104 Another possible 
reason for the increased share of Baden-Wuerttemberg students in the applicant pool 
would be the superior academic ‘quality’ and hence an increased self-confidence (and 
application success expectation) of these students. Indicators for academic quality could 
either be the individual grade average or the ranking results of the universities they are 
attending. The comprehensive overview of university grades published by the 
Wissenschaftsrat (2007) however does not differentiate between students from different 
federal states. In terms of high school grades however, such a differentiation is made by 
the KMK (2006): The average Baden-Wuerttemberg high school student indeed achieves 
better grades than those in most other federal states — only high-school graduates from 
Thuringia are slightly better. However, this difference does not seem to be substantial in 
comparison to high school graduates in Lower Saxony and Berlin who have achieved the 
worst grade averages. In the applicant pool however, students from Baden-
Wuerttemberg indeed demonstrate significantly better grades than the remaining 
applicants: In comparison to students from all other federal states, they have achieved 
high school grade averages of 1.6 (other states 1.9; ݌ ൏ .001) and university grade 
averages of 1.9 (other states 2.0; ݌ ൏ .05). Similarly, in terms of home institution quality 
— measured by both CHE-research-reputation and study-situation rankings105 — Baden-
Wuerttemberg applicants also study at higher quality institutions (see table 6-2)106. 
Home Institution 
Ranking 
Federal State of Home Institution=
Baden‐Wuerttemberg?  Difference  Significance 
Yes   No
Study Situation   2.18  2.58 ‐.40  ***
Research Reputation   0.29  0.16 0.13  ***
Table 6-2  Home Institution Reputation: Baden-Wuerttemberg Applicants versus Other 
 
                                                
104  Only the study-abroad behavior of students having graduated from high school in ‘new’ and 
‘old’ federal states of Germany was compared, but no significant differences were found. 
105  For an explanation of how the CHE-ranking is calculated see table 6-7 on p. 121 or visit 
www.che-ranking.de. 
106  Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent tables and figures are own illustrations based on 
the data set collected during this research project. 
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This fact might indirectly, i.e. via an increased self-confidence, encourage them more to 
apply for a merit-based stipend. Furthermore, students from these institutions are likely 
to represent a positively self-selected group as only the best students decide to study at 
high-reputation institutions in the first place. 
In addition to quality advantages, students from Baden-Wuerttemberg might simply be 
more acquainted with the specific stipend possibility offered by the investigated 
organization. As we are not able to directly test the degree of familiarity with the 
particular program, a proxy for program prevalence is needed. The number of evaluators 
teaching at institutions located in each federal state might serve as a proxy, as it is 
feasible that evaluators are actively promoting the program at their home institutions. 
However, only two out of 30 evaluators have been teaching at a Baden-Wuerttemberg 
university which might not explain the increased fraction of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
applicants. On the contrary, six evaluators came from North Rhine-Westphalia, the 
federal state where comparatively few applicants were enrolled. If the degree of 
familiarity with the stipend possibility had an influence, North-Rhine Westphalian 
students were even expected to apply more frequently than they did, as the scholarship 
granting organization investigated here is headquartered in Bonn, North Rhine-
Westphalia. However, only 10% of all applicants study in this federal state of Germany. 
Reversing the chain of reasoning presented above for the case of Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
we would expect lower quality students and institutions to be located in North Rhine-
Westphalia. As no comprehensive overview on university quality in different federal 
states exists, we again use applicant and their university’s quality as a proxy for overall 
academic quality. Applicants studying at a North Rhine-Westphalian institutions indeed 
have only achieved high school grade averages of 2.0 which are significantly worse than 
those of all other students (1.77, ݌ ൏ .05), but in terms of university grades they do not 
differ from the rest of the applicant pool. Home institution quality measured as an 
institution’s research reputation is also significantly lower for North Rhine-Westphalian 
applicants (see table 6-3).  
Home Institution 
Ranking 
Federal State of Home Institution=
North Rhine‐Westphalia?  Difference  Significance 
Yes   No
Study Situation   2.51  2.41 .10 +
Research Reputation   0.15  0.22 ‐.07  **
Table 6-3  Home Institution Reputation: North Rhine-Westphalian Applicants versus Other 
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Looking at table 6-1, another location-related difference becomes obvious: Only 
comparably few students from institutions located in one of the Eastern federal states of 
Germany apply for a scholarship. Again, one possible reason might be a lower study-
abroad rate among students from these states. However, Isserstedt et al. (2007) showed 
that the study-abroad rate does not vary for students from ‘new’ and ‘old’ federal states. 
As the average income per capita in the new states is lower than in the rest of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (VGRdL 2011), one would expect students in these regions 
to be more in need of scholarships. However, they could be more reluctant to apply for a 
merit-based stipend as they are more frequently entitled for a (non-competitive) means-
tested scholarship. Indeed, 19.6% of all BAföG recipients study in one of the new states 
(Destatis 2011c) although ‘only’ 14.7% of all students are enrolled at institutions located 
in Eastern Germany. However, this difference does not fully account for the observed 
differential application rates for ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ students. Other factors such as 
institution and applicant quality107, student self-confidence, institutional support and 
stipend tradition might also play a role in determining the individual decision to apply 
for a merit-based scholarship.  
Another salient difference can be observed in the share of students who have completed 
vocational training prior to their studies. Whereas one quarter of all German students 
has already completed an apprenticeship before studying, only 5.6% of all applicants 
possess this kind of work experience. Again, several explanations for their reluctance to 
apply are feasible. It is worth testing whether students having completed an 
apprenticeship prior to studying go abroad less frequently than students who have 
started studying directly after completion of high school. Reasons for this could be 
increased financial constraints and the expected time loss which might both be more 
important to students who have already completed three years of vocational training. 
This in turn leads to a lower individual marginal utility of studying abroad. However, no 
data on this particular decision are available — Heublein et al. (2011) for instance did not 
differentiate between students with or without completed apprenticeships. Secondly, one 
might argue that a delayed decision to attend university, i.e. only after having completed 
a 3-year apprenticeship, can be interpreted as a sign of insufficient determination. These 
students could fear that their past decisions might be interpreted as hesitancy which in 
turn leads them to refrain from applying for scholarship programs. Due to missing data 
to test the assumptions, however, these arguments remain speculative in nature. 
                                                
107  A comparison of applicant grades as well as institution quality (ranking) was not possible due 
to the small number of observations for institutions located in Eastern federal states.  
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Finally, applicants also differ from the average student in terms of previous merit-based 
scholarships, the amount of extracurricular activities and age. A substantially higher 
fraction of previously awarded students exists among applicants (14.7% versus 1.1% of 
all students). Presumably, having been awarded another stipend before increases a 
student’s self-esteem and encourages him or her to also apply for other programs. In 
terms of ECAs, 84.3% of all applicants indicate to pursue at least one of these activities 
while ‘only’ two thirds of all German students do so (Fischer 2006). Again, applicants 
might assume e.g. from the stipend-granting organization’s mission that ECA will 
constitute an important selection criterion. Whether or not this expectation causes 
(potential) applicants to start pursuing (or simply mentioning) an ECA or whether only 
students who are active anyway apply for a scholarship, cannot be answered in this 
context.  
In terms of applicant characteristics, no differences in gender or origin between the two 
groups (all students vs. all applicants) could be observed. However, it is salient that 
applicants are 3.4 years younger than the average student. This could again be an 
indicator for increased determination and motivation, but it could also be caused by the 
simple fact that applicants for a study-abroad scholarship are usually still at the 
beginning of their studies and have not completed apprenticeships prior to studying.  
Summarizing, the applicant pool does not represent a random sample of average 
German students. Only particular students seem to decide to apply for a scholarship and 
several self-selection effects occur prior to applying for a scholarschip program.  
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6.2.2 Pre-Selection Situation 
In the first selection round, 30 different evaluators were in charge of assessing the 
applicants’ potential and were asked to invite approximately 50% of all applicants to an 
interview. As mentioned earlier, all evaluators were professors from several German 
institutions. The average evaluator age was 54 years: The youngest evaluator was aged 
33, the oldest 68 at the time of selection. Only six of all evaluators, i.e. 20%, were female. 
This almost exactely corresponds to the share of female professors in Germany which 
amounted 19.2% in 2010 (Destatis 2012b). On average, one evaluator had to decide upon 
24 applications during this first selection round. Again, the range was substantial: Some 
evaluators only had to evaluate two applications whereas others needed to choose 
between 40 different applicants.  
In terms of pre-selection outcomes, two measures are available for each candidate. The 
pre-selection score on a scale from 0-100 and the binary decision whether or not the 
applicant is invited to an interview. The average pre-selection score totals 75.4 and 
ranges from 19.5 to 100. In total, 54% of all applicants, i.e. slightly more applicants than 
the 50% desired by the organization, passed the first selection round and were 
subsequently invited to an interview. This percentage was consistent for both examined 
periods: In 2007, 131 out of 243 applicants (53.9%) and in 2008, 141 out of 261 applicants 
(54%) ‘survived’ the first selection round. One peculiarity in terms of evaluator gender 
however is salient. When we observe pre-selection success quotas separately for male 
and female evaluators, a certain female leniency in pre-selection decisions becomes 
obvious. 
Invitation  Evaluator Gender  Total 
Male  Female 
Yes  215  
(52,57%) 
57  
(60,00%) 
272  
(53,97%) 
No  194  
(47,43%) 
38  
(40,00%) 
232  
(46,03%) 
Total  409  
(100%) 
95  
(100%) 
504  
(100%) 
Table 6-4  Invitation Quotas according to Pre-Selection Evaluator Gender 
As can be derived from table 6-4, female evaluators even suggest inviting 60% of all 
applicants to an interview although being asked by the organization to sort out half of all 
applicants in this first selection round. Male evaluators also slightly exceed the limit as 
they on average invite 53% of all applicants they are asked to assess. 
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6.2.3 Final Selection Situation 
Only 254 of the 272 applicants which were invited to a selection interview actually 
attended the interview.108 Individual selection interviews took place from 9 am to 7 pm 
on three consecutive days in four parallel committees and interview times were 
distributed as presented in table 6-5. 
Interview beginning between  Frequency Percentage 
09 am to 09:59 am  34 13.4 % 
10 am to 10:59 am  38 15.0 % 
11 am to 11:59 am   40 15.7 % 
12 pm to 1:30 pm  39  15.4 % 
LUNCH BREAK  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐LUNCH BREAK‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
2 pm to 2:59 pm  37 14.6 % 
3 pm to 3:59 pm  22 8.7 % 
4 pm to 4:59 pm  21 8.3 % 
5 pm to 6:59 pm  23 9.1 % 
Total  254 100.00 % 
Table 6-5  Interview Times 
Applicants had to present themselves in front of a selection committee (panel interview) 
composed of three to seven evaluators (average number of panel members: 4.35). 
Committees were mainly built on a subject-specific basis which means that evaluators 
and applicants in general should teach and study in related areas. Most of these 
evaluators had also been involved in the preceding pre-selection assessments and only 
very few evaluators were appointed for interview selection only. The average share of 
female evaluators in the panel amounted to 26%, but some committees were also 
completely composed of female or male evaluators. Therefore, the share of female 
evaluators ranged from 0 to 100%. In 82% of all cases however, applicants were 
confronted with an interview panel predominately consisting of male evaluators, i.e. the 
majority of evaluators were men. On average, evaluators were aged 52.4 years (range: 
                                                
108  Most of the 18 students who did not show up declined the offer on the basis that they had 
either dropped their study-abroad-plans or had already been awarded another scholarship. It 
needs to be mentioned that these 18 students differ slightly from the remaining 254 applicants 
who have actually attended the interview. For instance, the ‘no shows’ more often attend a 
technical university and have more frequently managed to be supported by another merit-
based stipend program (esp. ‘Studienstiftung’). Furthermore, each of these 18 students 
pursues at least one extracurricular activity. On the other hand, relatively few of these ‘no 
shows’ have handed in a TOEFL. In terms of their study abroad plans, comparably many of 
the ‘no shows’ planned to attend a THE Top10 guest institution. However, only very few of 
them wanted to attend an institution in the US-Northeast, but rather planned to study in the 
US-West. Comparatively many interview annulations occurred in the stipend period 2009/10. 
A more detailed comparison of descriptive statistics for the two groups (‘no shows’ vs. 
‘interviewed applicants’) is provided in Appendix 1.  
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43.5 to 62 years). This again closely corresponds to the average age of all university 
professors in Germany which amounted 51.2 years in 2011 (Destatis 2012c). 
The average selection interview lasted 14 minutes, but some applicants were only 
interviewed for three minutes whereas others presented themselves for more than 20 
minutes. After having interviewed an applicant, the committee discussed his or her 
aptitude and agreed upon a final selection score on a scale from 0 to 100. Again, scores 
above 79 led to a positive decision, scores below that threshold resulted in a rejection of 
the candidate. Final scores averaged 80.2 points and ranged from 60 to 95. In total, 
57.5% of all interviewees were awarded the stipend in the end. As presented earlier, the 
percentage of applicants invited to an interview did not differ significantly between the 
two selection periods, but the ratio of subsequently awarded scholarships did: Whereas 
64% of all interviewed applicants were awarded a grant in 2008/09, only 51% of the 
interviewees in 2009/10 managed to receive a scholarship. 
Stipend awarded?  Stipend Period Total 
2008/09 2009/10
Yes  80
(64,00%) 
66
(51,16%) 
146 
(57,48%) 
No  45
(36,00%) 
63
(48,84%) 
108 
(42,52%) 
Total  125
(100%) 
129
(100%) 
254 
(100%) 
Table 6-6  Stipend Awardings according to Stipend Period 
The main reasons for this difference are variations in budget constraints between the 
two distinct selection periods. Hence, during the multivariate analysis of selection 
success, the selection year always needs to be included as a control variable. 
6.2.4 Overview of Descriptive Statistics and Operationalization of Variables 
In order to give a comprehensive overview of all the variables extracted from 
applications and selection contexts, table 6-7 summarizes all variables of interest for the 
subsequent multivariate analysis of the scholarship selection process. This list does not 
only include applicant and evaluator characteristics, but also contextual factors. 
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Variable  Operationalization # of Obs. Mean  SD  Min Max
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Pre‐Selection Score  On a scale from 0 to 100 504 75.42  14.08  19.5 100
Invitation to Interview  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .540  ‐  0 1
Final Selection Score  On a scale from 0 to 100 254 80.23  6.07  60 95
Scholarship Awarded  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .290  ‐  0 1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Academic Achievement       
High School Grade Average 
Grade average in German high 
school system (1.0 being the best 
& 6.0 the worst grade) 
504  1.80  .577  1  3.7 
(Preliminary) University Grade 
Average 
Grade average in German 
university system (1.0 being the 
best & 6.0 the worst grade) 
489  1.94  .551  1  3.67 
Field of Studies       
Engineering  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .141  ‐  0 1
Mathematics, Informatics and 
Natural Sciences  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  504 .169  ‐  0  1 
Law, Economics and Social Sciences  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  504 .373  ‐  0  1 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  504 .284  ‐  0  1 
Other  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  504 .034  ‐  0  1 
Status of Home Institution       
Private Home Institution  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 501 .022  ‐  0 1
Public Home Institution  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 501 .978  ‐  0 1
Type of Home Institution       
University  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .764  ‐  0 1
Technical University  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .154  ‐  0 1
University of Applied Sciences Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .082  ‐  0 1
Location of Home Institution (Federal State) 
Baden‐Wuerttemberg  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .428  ‐  0 1
Bavaria  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .136  ‐  0 1
Berlin  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .074  ‐  0 1
Brandenburg  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .01  ‐  0 1
Bremen  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .012  ‐  0 1
Hamburg  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .004  ‐  0 1
Hesse  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .03  ‐  0 1
Mecklenburg‐Hither Pomerania Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .002  ‐  0 1
North Rhine‐Westphalia  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .10  ‐  0 1
Lower Saxony  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .058  ‐  0 1
Rhineland‐Palatinate  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .076  ‐  0 1
Saarland  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .02  ‐  0 1
Saxony  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .032  ‐  0 1
Saxony‐Anhalt  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .008  ‐  0 1
Schleswig‐Holstein  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .008  ‐  0 1
Other  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .002  ‐  0 1
Home Institution in one of the New 
Eastern States?  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 
500
.052  ‐  0  1 
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Reputation of Home Institution      
Home Institution Ranking 1 
CHE‐Ranking 2010, School Grade 
(1.0 being best & 6.0 worst grade) 
assigned by students for the 
perceived teaching situation 
348  2.42  .514  1.5  4.1 
Home Institution Ranking 2 CHE‐Ranking 2010, Percentage of 
professors perceiving this 
institution as leading in the 
specific subject area (allowed to 
name up to 5 universities) 
324  .211  .210  .004  .836 
Home Institution THE Top100  Dummy (Yes, i.e. listed as Top 
European University in THE 
Ranking 10/11=1, 0 otherwise) 
504  .375  ‐  0  1 
Home Institution Ranking 3 THE Ranking 2010/11 Top 
European Universities, Overall 
Scores (higher scores= better 
reputation) 
189  52.22  6.06  47  67 
Home Institution Ranking 4  THE Ranking 2010/11 Top 
European Universities, Overall 
Position (higher position=lower 
reputation) 
189  53.93  25.93  9  79 
Academic Degree Pursued       
 ‘Bachelor’  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 495 .149  ‐  0 1
 ‘Diplom’  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 495 .570  ‐  0 1
 ‘Examen’  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 495 .097  ‐  0 1
 ‘Magister’  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 495 .184  ‐  0 1
Duration of Study       
Semester  # of semesters studied 504 4.39  1.69  2 14
Elementary Student  Dummy (semester 1‐3 at time of 
application=1, 0 otherwise)  504  .190  ‐  0  1 
Previous Work Experience (Apprenticeship) 
Completed Vocational Training Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .056  ‐  0 1
Second‐Chance Education109  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .018  ‐  0 1
Work Experience Part‐Time       
Number of Part‐Time Jobs  Total # of part‐time jobs the 
applicant has mentioned in CV   504  1.92  1.72  0  9 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time Job  
only at University   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  503  .157  ‐  0  1 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time Jobs  
both at & outside University  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  503  .193  ‐  0  1 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time Job  
only outside University   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  503  .416  ‐  0  1 
No Part‐Time Job   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 503 .235  ‐  0 1
Number of Internships  # of internships mentioned (CV) 504 1.50  1.37  0 9
Duration of Internships  Cumulative duration of 
internships (in months)  503  3.13  3.87  0  33 
                                                
109  Second-chance education describes the fact that a student did not receive the eligibility of 
university admission directly after 13 years of schooling (the traditional way), but had left 
school earlier and had been working for several years (or had completed an apprenticeship for 
instance) before returning to school education as an adult. 
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Other Scholarships       
‘BAföG’  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .226  ‐  0 1
Previous Merit‐Based Stipend  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .147  ‐  0 1
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’ Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .060  ‐  0 1
Also Applied for Other Scholarships  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .421  ‐  0 1
Extracurricular Activites     
Extracurricular Activities Mentioned  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .843  ‐  0 1
Type of Extracurricular Activity (Multiple Choices possible)
Youth/Sports/Recreation  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .482  ‐  0 1
Social  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .248  ‐  0 1
Arts & Culture  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .228  ‐  0 1
Political  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .177  ‐  0 1
Clerical  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .143  ‐  0 1
Student Association/Faculty   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .212  ‐  0 1
Student Representation (High School)  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .145  ‐  0 1
Student Exchange   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .081  ‐  0 1
Number of Extracurricular Activities (ECAs) 
One Type of ECAs  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .290  ‐  0 1
More than one Type of ECAs  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .516  ‐  0 1
No Extracurricular Activity  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .194  ‐  0 1
Strength of Extracurricular Activities (ECAs), measured as combination of leadership positions & assumed effort
High ECA  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .065  ‐  0 1
Medium ECA  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .274  ‐  0 1
Low ECA  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .504  ‐  0 1
No ECA  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .157  ‐  0 1
Letter of Reference       
Recommendation  On a scale from 0 to 10 477 9.25  .708  5 10
Recommending Person=Professor  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .681  ‐  0 1
Good Relation to Recommending 
Person  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise)  475  .834  ‐  0  1 
Language Proficiency       
Language Skills  On a scale from 0 to 100 491 88.61  9.35  40 100
TOEFL  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .562  ‐  0 1
Project‐Specific Statements       
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .452  ‐  0 1
Tuition Fees   Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .655  ‐  0 1
Amount of Tuition Fees  in Thousand US$ 494 14.22  13.98  0 80
Participant in Organized Study Progr.  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 500 .278  ‐  0 1
Private Guest Institution  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .276  ‐  0 1
Top50 Guest Institution  Dummy (THE‐Subject‐Ranking 
1‐50 =1, 0 otherwise)  504  .437  ‐  0  1 
Top10 Guest Institution  Dummy (THE‐Subject‐Ranking 
1‐10 =1, 0 otherwise)  504  .181  ‐  0  1 
Top5 Guest Institution  Dummy (THE‐Subject‐Ranking 
1‐5=1, 0 otherwise)  504  .067  ‐  0  1 
Guest Institution in Canada  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .206  ‐  0 1
Guest Institution in US‐Midwest Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .131  ‐  0 1
Guest Institution in US‐Northeast  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .236  ‐  0 1
Guest Institution in US‐South  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .177  ‐  0 1
Guest Institution in US‐West  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .250  ‐  0 1
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Applicant Characteristics       
Gender  Dummy (Female=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .486  ‐  0 1
Glasses  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 499 .178  ‐  0 1
Born in Germany  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .918  ‐  0 1
Age  In years at time of application 504 21.87  1.45  19 32
Parents Mentioned in CV  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .335  ‐  0 1
Parents=Academics  Dummy (mentioned as academic 
in CV=1, 0 otherwise)  504  .236  ‐  0  1 
Professional Aim=Research/Science  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 434 .143  ‐  0 1
Pre‐Selection Evaluator Characteristics and Pre‐Selection Situation
Evaluator Gender  Dummy (Female=1, 0 otherwise) 504 .188  ‐  0 1
Evaluator Age  In years at time of selection 498 53.56  9.33  33 68
Applications/Evaluator  # of applications one evaluator 
needs to assess  504  23.73  10.37  2  40 
Length of Application  # of pages of application 504 22.01  8.17  5 147
Number of Additional Certificates  # of additional, i.e. non‐required, 
certificates handed in  504  2.78  4.08  0  63 
Applicant‐Pre‐Selection‐Evaluator Similarity 
Gender Similarity  Dummy (same gender=1) 504 .540  ‐  0 1
Regional Similarity  Dummy (study/teach in same 
federal state=1, 0 otherwise)  498  .052  ‐  0  1 
Institutional Similarity  Dummy (study/teach at same 
type of institution=1, 0 otherwise)  498  .845  ‐  0  1 
Field‐of‐Study Similarity  Dummy (study/teach in the same 
field=1, 0 otherwise)  504  .651  ‐  0  1 
Evaluation Committee Characteristics 
Size of Evaluation Committee  # of evaluators in committee 254 4.35  .941  3 7
Fraction of Female Evaluators  # of female evaluators divided by 
# of all evaluators in committee  254  .260  .210  0  1 
Mainly Male Evaluators  Dummy (Yes, i.e. >50% male 
evaluators=1, 0 otherwise)  254  .815  ‐  0  1 
Average Evaluator Age  Average age of evaluators in 
committee  254  52.41  5.42  43.5  62 
Dispersion Evaluator Age  Standard deviation of evaluator 
age in committee  254  16.02  6.25  4.24  27.48 
Interview Framework       
Interview Duration  Duration of interview (in minutes) 254 13.89  2.61  3 21
Interview Position  (# of applicants the committee 
has already interviewed) – 1  254  6.52  3.95  1  16 
Interview Time: 09‐09:59 am  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .134  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 10‐10:59 am  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .150  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 11‐11:59 am  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .157  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 12‐01:30 pm  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .154  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 02‐02:59 pm  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .146  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 03‐03:59 pm  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .087  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 04‐04:59 pm  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .083  ‐  0 1
Interview Time: 05‐06:59 pm  Dummy (Yes=1, 0 otherwise) 254 .091  ‐  0 1
Year       
Selection Year  Dummy (1=2008, 0=2007) 504 .518  ‐  0 1
Table 6-7  Descriptive Statistics 
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7 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SELECTION SUCCESS 
Given that an applicant has decided to hand in an application, we are able to observe 
whether or not he or she was successful in selection and has been awarded a scholarship. 
With the help of all the information revealed during the application process, we are able 
to empirically link individual success (or failure) to specific applicant and rater 
characteristics as well as other extraneous factors and can subsequently identify 
determinants of scholarship awarding success. But in order to be able to empirically 
investigate scholarship selection success, we first need to elaborate how success in this 
case can be defined. In the present context, several possibilities for defining scholarship 
selection success are available. How success is defined in turn ultimately determines the 
applicable empirical specification and testing strategy. Therefore, it will be discussed in 
the following section which empirical specifications may be applied before the results of 
the most suitable alternative(s) will be presented in subsequent chapters. 
7.1 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE: EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION POSSIBILITIES 
As has been mentioned before, every applicant is assigned a specific metric score on a 
scale from 0-100 (both in pre- and in final selection). Accordingly, success could be 
defined in terms of this metric: The higher the (pre-)selection score, the higher the 
probability of being awarded the scholarship (or being invited to an interview). Being 
able to observe individual selection success on such a quantitative scale, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression would be the appropriate testing methodology (e.g. Hair et al. 
2010). For every one-unit increase in any of the independent variables, the respective 
change in the predicted score can be computed (holding every other influence constant) 
and significant determinants of high (or low) selection scores can be identified. The 
empirical specification of the OLS model would look as follows 
ܻሺܵܿ݋ݎ݁ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜ 
However, one of the prerequisites for applying OLS regression is the metric character of 
the endogenous variable ܻ — the selection score ranging from 0 to 100 in this context. As 
OLS regression assumes a linear relationship, a one unit increase in this scale needs to 
reflect the same change in success probability at every position in the distribution. 
However, evaluators are completely aware of the fact that applicants who surpass the 
threshold of 80 points on this scale are invited to an interview or awarded the 
scholarship respectively. Therefore, the increase from 79 to 80 points is likely to have a 
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different impact on selection success than the increase from 50 to 51 (definitely not 
successful) or 90 to 91 (definitely invited or awarded) for instance. Consequently, the 
metric nature of the (pre-) selection scores needs to be scrutinized. From figure 7-1 it can 
be derived that evaluators in fact tend to assign selection scores around 80 more 
frequently than selection scores far below or far above this threshold. 
 
Figure 7-1  Kernel Density Estimates of Pre-Selection and Final Selection Scores 
The accumulation of selection scores around this threshold could be accounted for by the 
use of the natural logarithm of selection scores as dependent variable, the application of 
quantile regression or a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Albeit, it is of major 
interest to this research who is awarded a scholarship (based on several signals and 
indices provided in an application). I.e. the decision whom to invite to an interview or 
whom to grant the stipend is a binary one — either somebody is accepted or rejected. 
Whether applicants just failed (i.e. they achieved scores ranging from 75 to 79 for 
instance) or whether they were clearly not suitable (reflected by scores far below 70) is 
only of minor importance to the present research. Hence, success (vs. failure) in 
scholarship awarding decisions should rather be defined in a binary way as ‘awarded’ vs. 
‘rejected’. In this case, the dependent variable is a qualitative one, as it can only attain 
two different values (accepted vs. rejected). This leads to a different empirical 
specification, as OLS regression techniques are only applicable to quantitative response 
variables (e.g. Wooldridge 2009). 
For the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables, several possibilities exist (Gujarati 
and Porter 2009). Of these, the linear probability model (LPM) as well as probit and logit 
regression are the most frequently applied techniques. This is why their applicability in 
the present context will be discussed.  
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As the regressand in the current case is dichotomous and can only attain values of 0 (i.e. 
rejected) and 1 (accepted), typical linear regression models cannot directly be applied. In 
models where the regressand ܻ is qualitative, the objective is to determine the 
probability of an event to occur, i.e. ܻ attaining a certain value. In the case of 
dichotomous outcome variables — such as the scholarship awarding decision — the 
probability that the event will occur, i.e. ܲሺܻ ൌ 1ሻ, or will not occur (ܲሺܻ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺܻ ൌ
1ሻ) add up to 1. ܲ is then modeled as a function of various explanatory variables ௜ܺ. The 
LPM directly models this conditional probability ܲ and consequently its counterpart 
1 െ ܲ as a linear function of the explanatory variables ௜ܺ (Gujarati and Porter 2009) 
ܧሺ ௜ܻ| ௜ܺሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜ ൌ ௜ܲ 
The conditional expectation of this model ܧሺ ௜ܻ| ௜ܺሻ	is then interpreted as the conditional 
probability of ௜ܻ ൌ 1 which in turn can be determined by using simple OLS estimation 
(Gujarati and Porter 2009). The underlying assumption of LPM is consequently that the 
probability of ௜ܻ equaling 1 increases linearly with ௜ܺ. However, as probabilities by 
definition need to range between 0 and 1, ܧ	needs to be restricted to this area. The 
difficulty to restrict the calculated values of LPM to values within this boundary is the 
most severe shortcoming of this model.110 Usual OLS estimation does not take into 
account that 0 ൑ ܧሺ ௜ܻ| ௜ܺሻ ൑ 1	as this is an inequality restriction and hence the calculated 
values పܻ෡  can attain values less than 0 and greater than 1 (Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
In these cases, the calculated ෠ܻ௜ values need to be adapted in retrospect, i.e. ෠ܻ௜ is 
assumed to be 0 for negative model outcomes and ෠ܻ௜ is defined to be 1 for calculated ෠ܻ௜ 
values greater than 1. Hence, the LPM is easy to apply to categorical outcome variables 
as modeling and interpretation follow simple OLS rules, but does not specify the 
underlying model correctly and needs to be adapted in several cases. In order to avoid 
this retrospective adaptation, other regression models for categorical outcome variables a 
priori limit the values of ෠ܻ௜ to the range from 0 to 1. This improves model specification, 
but on the other hand exacerbates coefficient interpretation. Among these models, logit 
and probit regression will be presented here as these are regression methods which 
account for the aforementioned shortcoming and restrict the range of the predicted 
values of Y෡୧ between 0 and 1. 
  
                                                
110  Further problems are e.g. the non-normality of disturbances, heteroscedastic variances of 
disturbances as well as ambiguous values of the R² measure (Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
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Logistic regression (or the logit model) models the probability of ܻ ൌ 1, i.e. being awarded 
a scholarship, as a cumulative logistic distribution function as follows 
௜ܲ ൌ 11 ൅ ݁ି൫ఉబା∑ ఉ೔௑ഢሬሬሬሬԦ೙೔సభ ାఌ೔൯ ൌ
1
1 ൅ ݁ି௓೔ ൌ
݁௓೔
1 ൅ ݁௓೔ 
1 െ ௜ܲ ൌ 11 ൅ ݁௓೔ 
௜ܲ
1 െ ௜ܲ ൌ
݁௓೔
1 ൅ ݁ି௓೔ ൌ ݁
௓೔ 
ܮ௜ ൌ ݈݊ ൬ ௜ܲ1 െ ௜ܲ൰ ൌ ܼ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺ
ሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜ 
Note that in the logit model, the probability is a priori, i.e. by definition, restricted to 
remain within the range of 0 to 1 and approaches these boundaries asymptotically 
(Gujarati and Porter 2009). This specification represents a better model fit than LPM 
which models this relationship as being linear. However, for this specification, the usual 
OLS procedure is not applicable as ௜ܲ is now nonlinear in ܺ and the ߚ௜. Nevertheless, 
through the use of a (logistic) linking function logistic regression combines several 
advantages: The transformation of probabilities into log odds (݈݊ ቀ ௉೔ଵି௉೔ቁ) restricts the 
values of ௜ܲ to the range from 0 to 1, but allows ܼ and hence the logit ܮ௜ to vary from െ∞ 
to ൅∞ (e.g. Urban 1993; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Pampel 2000; Menard 2002; Long 
and Freese 2006; Gujarati and Porter 2009). As a result of this logit transformation, ܮ௜ is 
linear in ௜ܺ, but as stated before, the probability ௜ܲ and the ߚ௜	are not. Consequently, 
interpretation of probability changes induced by a one-unit change in one of the 
regressors cannot be interpreted as straightforward as in OLS or LPM models. Due to 
the selected linking function, only the change in the log odds (=logits) occurs as a linear 
function of ௜ܺ. Nonetheless, interpretation can be facilitated through the use of odds 
ratios instead of probabilities (Pampel 2000). The odds are simply the probability of an 
event occurring divided by the probability of an event not occurring (Menard 2002): 
௜ܲ
1 െ ௜ܲ ൌ ܱ݀݀ݏ 
Odds ratios are then calculated by dividing the odds of one group, e.g. female, divided by 
the odds of the other group, e.g. male (Menard 2002). Odds ratios can attain values 
ranging from 0 to ൅∞. Values less than 1 reflect a lower probability of the event 
occurring than the event not occurring and odds ratios ൐ 1 represent a higher probability 
of occurring than non-occurring. If the probability for both groups is the same, i.e. 0.5, 
the odds ratio equals 1. Comparing both equations (Odds vs. logit), one can easily see 
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that the logit is simply the natural logarithm of the odds. Hence, logistic regression 
coefficients (the	ߚ௜) can be interpreted as the change in log odds as a response to a one-
unit change in one of the independent variables. As standard OLS is not applicable to 
logits, parameter estimation is conducted using the maximum-likelihood (ML) method 
(Backhaus et al. 2011). 
Analogous to logit regression, probit regression also models ௜ܲ to remain within the 
boundaries of 0 and 1 by the use of a linking function (Gujarati and Porter 2009). The 
main differences between these two approaches are the theoretical assumption as well as 
the underlying cumulative distribution function (CDF). Whereas logit regression 
transforms the probability of an event occurring into odds ratios and assumes that the 
natural log of these odds is linearly related to the regressors, probit regression models 
the binary outcome with the help of a latent variable ܫ (Gujarati and Porter 2009). This 
latent variable can be interpreted as a utility index which is determined by one or more 
explanatory variables. The larger the respective value of ܫ, the greater the probability of 
the event occurring, in our case the greater the probability of being awarded a 
scholarship. More importantly, it is assumed in probit regression that a critical or a 
threshold level of ܫ (ܫ∗) exists: Utility indices equal to or greater than ܫ∗ will lead to ܻ ൌ 1 
and those below ܫ∗	will be associated with ܻ ൌ 0 (Gujarati and Porter 2009). Although 
both the index ܫ and the threshold level ܫ∗	are unobservable, it is assumed in the probit 
model that the latent variable ܫ is normally distributed. Hence, ܲ	ሺܫ∗ ൑ ܫሻ	can be 
computed from the standardized normal CDF. 
௜ܲ ൌ ܲሺܻ ൌ 1|ܺሻ ൌ ܲሺܫ∗ ൑ ܫሻ ൌ ܲ ൭ܼ௜ ൑ 	ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜൱ ൌ ܨ ൭ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜൱ 
This directly reveals the second difference between logit and probit regression. Whereas 
logit regression assumes a logistic distribution of ௜ܲ, the basis of probit regression is the 
standardized normal CDF (Gujarati and Porter 2009). In practice, both models obtain 
quite similar results111 and do only differ slightly at the tails of their distribution (see 
e.g. Gujarati and Porter 2009, 572 for an illustration). For the ease of interpretation 
through the use of odds ratios, the logistic regression has been chosen and logit results 
only will be presented subsequently.112  
  
                                                
111  Actually, multiplying the probit coefficient by 1.81 (or multiplying the logit coefficient by 0.55) 
yields the respective logit (probit) coefficient (Gujarati and Porter 2009, 571). 
112  For a comparison of coefficients, probit estimations of all models are available in Appendix 2. 
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7.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: LOGIT REGRESSION 
In order to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, several logit models 
with differing sets of independent variables have been estimated and will be discussed in 
this section. Furthermore, the models do not only vary in the number of regressors 
included in the estimation, but also the dependent variable ܻ can be modeled in different 
ways. Whereas section 7.2.1 models the success of all applicants to be awarded the 
scholarship without differentiating between pre-selection and final selection success, 
section 7.2.2 discusses success at each selection stage independently. In section 7.2.3, an 
estimation modeling both pre- and final selection success simultaneously will be 
presented and compared to the previous results. Due to the non-linear nature of logit 
regression, only main effects will be presented in the empirical models. Interaction 
effects have also been tested and the result of the most important ones will be displayed 
and interpreted in the discussion section (Chapter 7.3). 
7.2.1 Overall Success 
As has been mentioned before, the major interest of this research is to find out who 
among the applicant pool is awarded a scholarship and why. It has already been 
concluded in Chapter 6 that the applicant pool represents a specific, positively self-
selected group of students that differs from the entire German student population in 
many aspects. But given this self-selected group of those who decided to apply, who is 
successful in selection and who is not? This can be demonstrated by empirically modeling 
the dependent variable ܻ ൌ 1 whenever an applicant has been awarded the scholarship 
and ܻ ൌ 0 if he or she was rejected. If we do not differentiate between rejection after pre- 
and rejection after final selection, we consider the selection process as a black box. In 
this case, the overall success of an applicant can be modeled as a function of different 
independent variables  
ܮ௜ ൌ ݈݊ ൬ ௜ܲ1 െ ௜ܲ൰ ൌ ܼ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ పܺ
ሬሬሬԦ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜ 
In line with Hypothesis 1, several ability signals are expected to influence evaluator 
outcomes. While Estimation I models the influence of the most credible ability signals 
only — i.e. previous academic achievement, measured in grades — on individual awarding 
success, Estimation IIa-c additionally include further ability signals which can 
reasonably be expected to have an effect on the selection success of an applicant.  
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ܮூ௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮூூ௔௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌݉݁ݎ݅ݐܾܽݏ݁݀௜
൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜
൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮூூ௕௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Estimation IIa and IIb only vary slightly in terms of how previous sponsorship influence 
is included in the model: Whereas Estimation IIa models the influence of any previous 
merit-based stipend, Estimation IIb includes a Dummy-Variable for recipients of the 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ stipend only. Estimation IIc resembles 
Estimation IIb very closely, but additionally models the influence of the applicants’ field 
of study on their success rates.  
ܮூூ௖௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܨ݈݅݁݀݋݂ܵݐݑ݀ݕ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Estimation III further includes individual difference factors which are not expected to 
influence selection success. Note that based on the available literature on discrimination 
in hiring, further individual difference factors, e.g. physical attractiveness, IM tactics 
and personality, are likely to influence evaluator decisions and hence, these influences 
should be controlled for. However, not all of these influences have been recorded during 
the investigated selection process. Consequently, these influences cannot be tested 
directly and are thus incorporated in the disturbance term ߝ௜ only. 
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ܮூூூ௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10 ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩ݈ܽݏݏ݁ݏ௜
൅ ߚଵ଼݈ܲܽܿ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ൅ ߚଵଽܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Logit regression coefficients for all of the above mentioned estimations are provided in 
table 7-1. All model specifications are subsequently compared using different Goodness-
of-Fit (GoF) measures. These include the following: 113 
Percentage of cases correctly classified: Assuming that every record with a predicted 
probability greater than 0.5 leads to a predicted outcome of 1 and every record with a 
predicted probability less than 0.5 leads to a predicted outcome of 0, the model outcomes 
can be compared to the real outcomes and can hence be classified as correct or incorrect 
(e.g. Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Backhaus et al. 2011).  
Pseudo R²: As logit regression coefficients are calculated through the use of ML-
estimations, no ‘real’ R² measure as it is known from OLS estimations exists (Hair et al. 
2010). However, several pseudo R² measures have been developed which resemble the 
‘real’ R² only in terms of their range being restricted from 0 to 1 (Urban 1993). 
1) McFaddens (adjusted) R²: Is based on the comparison of the log-likelihood values of 
the full and the null, i.e. intercept only, model (McFadden 1974) and is defined as 
ܯܿܨܽ݀݀݁݊ݏ	ܴ² ൌ 1 െ	 LLி௨௟௟LLூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧ 
  whereas:  ܮܮி ൌ ܮ݋݃ െ ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀	݋݂	ݐ݄݁	ܨݑ݈݈	ܯ݋݈݀݁	 
 ܮܮூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧ ൌ ܮ݋݃ െ ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀	݋݂	ݐ݄݁	ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܿ݁݌ݐ	ܯ݋݈݀݁ 
McFaddens-R² is a relative GoF measure as it indicates the relative improvement of 
the current model in comparison to the intercept model (Backhaus et al. 2011). 
The adjusted version penalizes models with too many predictors by including a 
measure of the number of predictors (K). Note that adjusted McFaddens-R² can take 
negative values (Gordon 2012). 
                                                
113  For a detailed explanation of all GoF measures used here, see e.g. Veall and Zimmermann 
(1996), Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) or Long and Freese (2006). An overview of all these R² 
can also be found at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/psuedo_rsquareds.htm. 
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ܯܿܨܽ݀݀݁݊ݏ	ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀	ܴ² ൌ 1 െ	LLி௨௟௟ െ ܭLLூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧ 
2) Cox-Snell-R²: This pseudo R² designed by Cox and Snell (1989) reflects the 
improvement of the full model over the intercept model as follows: 
ܥ݋ݔ െ ݈݈ܵ݊݁ െ ܴ² ൌ 1 െ	൬Lூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧Lி௨௟௟ ൰
ଶ
௡
 
Note that Cox and Snell’s pseudo R² has a maximum value that is below 1 
(Backhaus et al. 2011). 
3) Nagelkerke R²: The Nagelkerke R² adjusts the R² of Cox and Snell (1989) in such a 
way that the possible value range is extended to 1 (Backhaus et al. 2011). This is 
done by dividing the Cox-Snell-R² by the maximum R², i.e. by 1 െ	൫Lூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧൯
మ
೙: 
݈ܰܽ݃݁݇݁ݎ݇݁	ܴ² ൌ
1 െ	൬Lூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧Lி௨௟௟ ൰
ଶ
௡
1 െ	൫Lூ௡௧௘௥௖௘௣௧൯
ଶ
௡
 
4) McKelvey & Zavoina R²: This pseudo R² follows the structure of the ‘usual’ R² and 
calculates the quotient of the variance of the latent variable and the sum of the 
latent variable variance and the standard error variance (McKelvey and Zavoina 
1975): 
ܯܿܭ݈݁ݒ݁ݕ	&	ܼܽݒ݋݅݊ܽ	ܴ² ൌ ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	ݕ
∗	
ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	ݕ∗ ൅ ܸܽݎ݅ܽ݊ܿ݁	݋݂	ߝ 
 
5) (Adjusted) Count R²: The Count R² measure (Long and Freese 2006) does not follow 
the usual R² logic, but simply divides the number of correctly classified cases (see 
above) by the number of total counts:  
ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ	ܴ² ൌ #	݋݂	ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ	ܥܽݏ݁ݏܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ  
As even with random guessing, e.g. saying everybody was awarded the scholarship, 
one would already correctly classify 50% (given a normal distribution of both 
outcomes) of the cases. In order to control for this baseline prediction, the adjusted 
Count R² subtracts the count of the most frequent outcome ݈ from both the correct 
and the total counts (Long and Freese 2006): 
ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ	ܴ² ൌ #	݋݂	ܥ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ	ܥܽݏ݁ݏ െ ݈ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	 െ ݈  
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In addition to the pseudo R² measures, another GoF measure with a slightly different 
approach will be used for model comparison: The AIC(*n). The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative goodness of fit of multivariate models which 
have been estimated by the use of the ML-method (Akaike 1973) and is calculated by 
ܣܫܥ ൌ െ2	ܮܮ ൅ 2ܲ 
where P is the number of parameters in the statistical model, and LL is the maximized 
value of the likelihood function for the estimated model (Long and Freese 2006). The AIC 
is not only a GoF measure, but can be used as a means of model selection: Among a set of 
different models, the model with the minimum AIC value is the preferred model (von 
Auer 2007). Unlike Likelihood-Ratio (LR)-comparisons, model selection with the help of 
the AIC can also be conducted for models that are not nested (Long and Freese 2006). 
Based on all of the above mentioned GoF measures, the best model will be selected and 
discussed subsequently. As logistic regression coefficient interpretation is exacerbated as 
a consequence of the logistic linking function, also marginal effects and odds ratios will 
be presented, but for the preferred model only. However, the reader needs to keep in 
mind that marginal effects in non-linear models cannot be interpreted globally — as it 
would be the case in OLS regression —, but only hold true for a specific combination of all 
the other independent variables. Whenever marginal effects will be presented in this 
thesis, they represent the marginal effect of a change in the variable of interest for a 
standard applicant (unless otherwise specified). Standard applicants possess average 
values of all metric independent variables, e.g. grades or language proficiency. For 
dummy variables however, average values are not useful. Consequently, standard 
applicants belong to the respective dummy category which has occurred most frequently 
within the applicant pool. Standard applicants exhibit the combination of characteristics 
described in Appendices 3-5. For the ease of readability, the respective values of all other 
independent variables will also be presented alongside with the marginal effects. 
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Logistic Regression Coefficients114  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  I  IIa  IIb  IIc  III 
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐1.194*** ‐1.043*** ‐0.975***  ‐0.943***  ‐0.908***
University Grade Average  ‐1.790*** ‐1.708*** ‐1.654***  ‐1.692***  ‐1.592***
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐0.941 ‐0.855 ‐0.605  ‐0.673
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.501 ‐0.583 ‐0.549  ‐0.507
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.597  ‐/‐
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.278  ‐/‐ 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.233  ‐/‐
Other Fields of Study  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.916  ‐/‐
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills ‐/‐ 0.031* 0.031*  0.032  0.029
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 0.807*** 0.908***  0.948***  0.859***
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job
at University  ‐/‐ ‐0.148 0.156 0.205  0.186
both at University & outside University ‐/‐ ‐0.007 0.054 0.103  0.147
outside University   ‐/‐ ‐0.131 ‐0.070 ‐0.018  ‐0.009
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  0.105  0.110  0.149  0.118 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.229  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  1.144*  1.166*  1.164* 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  0.341  0.340  0.301  0.407 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ ‐0.005 ‐0.004 ‐0.002  ‐0.004
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ 0.270 0.267 0.345  0.317
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐/‐ 0.023 ‐0.062 ‐0.095  0.014
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ 0.098 0.142 0.136  0.235
US‐Midwest ‐/‐ 0.466 0.430 0.383  0.513
US‐Northeast ‐/‐ ‐0.282 ‐0.312 ‐0.359  ‐0.285
US‐South  ‐/‐ 0.146 0.161 0.111  0.146
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 1.023** 0.983**  0.949**  1.004**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.967** 0.911**  0.935**  0.952**
Letter of Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ 0.238 0.239 0.240  0.231
Recommending Person=Professor  ‐/‐ 0.964*** 0.942***  0.951***  1.014***
Good Relation to Recommending Person ‐/‐ 0.694 0.692 0.703  0.698
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.072
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.308
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.849
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.272*
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.163
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐1.092*** ‐4.096*** ‐4.128***  ‐4.433***  ‐5.151***
Observations    429  429  429  429  429 
Pseudo R²    0.193 0.286 0.293 0.297  0.306
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
Table 7-1  Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimations I-III 
                                                
114  Pairwise correlations between all independent variables have been calculated for all models 
presented below. The results of these multicollinearity tests are available on request. 
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Goodness of Fit and  
Model Comparison 
Estimation Number115
I  IIa IIb IIc  III
Cases correctly classified  74.59%  77.86%  78.09%  78.55%  77.86% 
Log‐Likelihood Full Model  ‐215.007  ‐190.239  ‐188.420  ‐187.229  ‐184.844 
LR 
(Prob>LR) 
102.779 
(0.000) 
152.316  
(0.000) 
155.954 
(0.000) 
158.335 
(0.000) 
163.106  
(0.000) 
Mc Fadden’s (Adjusted) R²  0.193  
(0.182) 
0.286 
(0.177) 
0.293 
(0.184) 
0.297 
(0.173) 
0.306 
(0.179) 
Cox‐Snell R²  0.213  0.299  0.305  0.309  0.316 
Nagelkerke R²  0.300  0.420  0.429  0.434  0.445 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²  0.361  0.517  0.522  0.528  0.542 
(Adjusted) Count R²  0.746  
(0.187) 
0.779 
(0.291) 
0.781 
(0.299) 
0.779 
(0.291) 
0.786  
(0.313) 
AIC  1.016  1.022  1.014  1.027  1.020 
AIC*n  436.015  438.477  434.839  440.458  437.688 
Table 7-2  Goodness-of-Fit Measures Estimations I-III 
As can be seen in table 7-2, all of the presented models do explain stipend awarding 
decisions better than the intercept (or null) model, as all Likelihood-Ratio (LR) tests lead 
to the rejection of the null-hypothesis.116 Additionally, the pseudo R² values are 
comparably high for logit models.117 Following Estimation IIc, one would correctly 
classify 78.55% of all cases, but adjusted for the baseline correct classification rate 
(adjusted Count R²), Estimation III provides the best classification. Additionally, 
Estimation III attains the highest values in most of the pseudo R².  
As Estimation III provides the best fit in most of the GoF measures118, the results from 
this estimation will be discussed subsequently. Considering the AIC however, one would 
prefer Estimation IIb, but as all AIC values are quite comparable, Estimation III was 
chosen due to the relatively high pseudo R² values. Consequently, results from this 
estimation will be discussed in detail and marginal effects for a standard applicant 
derived from Estimation III results are provided in table 7-3.119  
                                                
115  Note that Estimation IIa and Estimation IIc are not nested in Estimation III. 
116  In an LR-test, the null-hypothesis states that all of the coefficients derived from the model are 
equal to zero, i.e. they do not have an influence on the model outcome (Long and Freese 2006). 
117  Usually, in logit regression, low pseudo R² values are the norm (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) 
and values of 0.2 < R² < 0.4 are already considered excellent results (Urban 1993). 
118  The respective best GoF measure is always printed in bold in all of the GoF-tables. 
119  As a consequence of missing values in important explanatory variables some cases had to be 
excluded from the analysis. However, the sample of applicants finally included in the 
subsequent estimations does only differ slightly from the entire applicant pool as can be 
derived from the descriptive statistics in Appendix 6. 
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Marginal Effects after Estimation III  dy/dx  Value of X 
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average ‐.1552** 1.76 
University Grade Average ‐.2723*** 1.89 
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University  
University of Applied Sciencesi ‐.0939 0 
Technical Universityi ‐.0745 0 
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills .0050 88.85 
TOEFLi  .1128* 1 
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job  
at Universityi .0334 0 
both at University & outside Universityi .0261 0 
outside University i ‐.0015 1 
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’i  .0209  0 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ i   .2542  0 
Applied for other Scholarshipsi  .0774  0 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US) ‐.0007 14.643 
Private Guest Institutioni .0590 0 
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐.0024 0 
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West  
Canadai  .0428 0 
US‐Midwesti .0999 0 
US‐Northeasti ‐.0449 0 
US‐Southi  .0259 0 
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity  
One Type of ECAsi .2144* 0 
More Types of ECAsi .1213* 1 
Letter of Reference 
Recommendation .0396 9.26 
Recommending Person=Professori .1267* 1 
Good Relation to Recommending Personi .0965 1 
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Genderi  .0125 0 
Glassesi  .0572 0 
Born in Germanyi .1118 1 
Age  ‐.0465* 21.84 
Parents=Academicsi ‐.0266 0 
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad Program 
Selection Year 
incl.
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
4.39 
0 
0 
1 
i dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 Table 7-3  Marginal Effects for Standard Applicant after Estimation III 
As expected in Hypothesis 2, both high school and university grades have an important 
influence on selection success. Applicants with a high school grade average of ‘only’ 2.76 
c.p. have a 15.5 percentage points (pps) lower probability of being awarded the 
scholarship than standard applicants. Poor university grades are even punished more 
severely, as a candidate possessing all characteristics of a standard applicant, but 
differing only in terms of having achieved ‘only’ a university grade average of 2.89 has a 
27.3 pps lower chance of being awarded the stipend. Other effective ability signals are 
the provision of a TOEFL (+0.1128) as well as stating one or more types of ECAs in the 
CV. Here it seems particularly advantageous to concentrate on one type of activity only, 
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as this leads to a 21.4 pps higher chance of being successful with the application, 
whereas stating more than one type of activities is also rewarded (in comparison to 
stating no ECA at all), but for a standard applicant (on all other dimensions), the 
increase in ‘winning probability’ is only 12.1 pps. Finally, providing an LOR issued by a 
professor (instead of a research assistant or assistant professor) is also considered an 
effective signal (+0.127) although the content, i.e. the recommendation itself, does not 
significantly increase awarding probabilities. All other theoretically expected ability 
signals such as type of home institution, language skills, (part-time) work experience, 
previous sponsorships/awards or guest institution characteristics do not have an effect 
on award probability.120 In line with the hypotheses, individual difference factors in 
general do not affect awarding decisions. Only one of the individual difference factors 
that could be empirically tested has an influence on selection success: Age. An applicant 
being standard on all other dimensions, but aged 23 at the time of application, i.e. one 
year older than the standard applicant, has a 4.7 pps lower chance of being awarded the 
stipend.  
Although Estimation III delivers a quite satisfactory model fit, it does not account for the 
peculiarities of each selection stage. In the overall success measure, it was only observed 
whether or not somebody was accepted or rejected in the end, but it was not 
distinguished between somebody who was rejected in pre-selection and somebody who 
‘survived’ the first selection round, but was rejected after the interview. As the literature 
review has revealed that determinants of selection success vary widely between pre- and 
final selection, it is worthwhile looking at both stages separately.  
                                                
120  At least this holds true for a standard applicant. Due to the non-linear nature of logistic 
regression, it might be that the aforementioned ability signals are effective for candidates with 
a different combination of some or all the other independent variables. 
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7.2.2 Separate Investigation of Each Selection Stage 
The literature review has revealed that recruiters (or more general evaluators) base 
their decisions in paper-based pre-selection on different criteria than in person-to-person 
interviews. Grades are e.g. expected to play a more important role in paper-based 
selection than in final selection (compare Hypothesis 3). In the case of stipend awarding 
decisions, the same result might be found. When looking at the present selection process, 
a comparison of both pre- and final selection scores assigned by evaluators is especially 
suited to figure out whether or not evaluators base their decision on the same or 
different evaluation criteria. If we assume that the same signals are effective in both 
pre- and final selection, pre- and final selection scores are expected to be highly 
correlated, meaning that somebody who was able to achieve a high score in pre-selection 
will be likely to also achieve a high score in final selection. Figure 7-2 shows the 
distribution of pre-selection scores (abscissa) and final selection scores (ordinate) for all 
applicants who have been interviewed in the final round.121 
 
Figure 7-2  Distribution of Pre- and Final Selection Scores in Comparison 
It appears from figure 7-2 that there is a positive correlation between pre- and final 
selection scores. However, this correlation is not at all perfect, as ݎ௉ௌ;ிௌ ൌ 0.427 (݌ ൏
0.001) and a high pre-selection score (>90) does not guarantee final selection success, i.e. 
being awarded a scholarship, and vice versa.122 Hence, a separate investigation of each 
stage is warranted. 
                                                
121  Applicants who have been rejected after pre-selection were not assigned a final selection score. 
122  All applicants with final selection scores ൒ 80 are awarded the stipend (red line in figure 7-2). 
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7.2.2.1 Pre-Selection Success 
In order to compare the separate investigation of pre-selection success with the overall 
success probabilities, the same regressors as in Estimation I-III have been chosen for 
Estimations IV-VI. This time however, the regressand ܻ is different. The dependent 
variable is no longer ஺ܻ௪ (yes or no), but ூܻ௡௩. This variable equals 1 whenever an 
applicant was successful in pre-selection, i.e. invited to an interview, and 0 whenever an 
applicant was rejected during pre-selection. 
ܮூ௏௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮ௏௔௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌݉݁ݎ݅ݐܾܽݏ݁݀௜
൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜
൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮ௏௕௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮ௏ூ௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10 ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩ݈ܽݏݏ݁ݏ௜
൅ ߚଵ଼݈ܲܽܿ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ൅ ߚଵଽܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௜ 
In addition to the independent variables that have been tested in Estimations I-III, it is 
now also possible to include pre-selection specific (situational) variables such as 
evaluator gender and age in the model. This is done in Estimation VIIa and VIIb. 
Analogous to Estimation IIc, Estimation VIIb additionally includes the applicant’s field 
of study. 
7 Econometric Analysis of Selection Success  
139 
 
ܮ௏ூூ௔௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10 ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩ݈ܽݏݏ݁ݏ௜
൅ ߚଵ଼݈ܲܽܿ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ൅ ߚଵଽܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݋ݎܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜
൅ ߚଶଶܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݋ݎܣ݃݁௜ ൅ ߚଶଷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ܮ௏ூூ௕௜ሺ ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10 ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩ݈ܽݏݏ݁ݏ௜
൅ ߚଵ଼݈ܲܽܿ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ൅ ߚଵଽܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݋ݎܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜
൅ ߚଶଶܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݋ݎܣ݃݁௜ ൅ ߚଶଷܨ݈݅݁݀݋݂ܵݐݑ݀ݕ௜ ൅ ߚଶସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
The logistic regression coefficients obtained from model Estimations IV to VIIb are 
displayed in table 7-4. Analogous to the previous section, model fit will be analyzed and 
compared with the aforementioned GoF measures in table 7-5. Marginal effects for a 
standard applicant will be presented in table 7-6 for the most suitable estimation only.
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Logistic Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number
Dependent Variable: Invitation (Yes=1 No=0)  IV Va Vb VI  VIIa  VIIb
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐1.402*** ‐1.195*** ‐1.244*** ‐1.257***  ‐1.434*** ‐1.679***
University Grade Average  ‐1.649*** ‐1.531*** ‐1.471*** ‐1.561***  ‐1.579*** ‐1.726***
Home 
Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐1.568** ‐1.549** ‐1.288*  ‐0.797  ‐0.287
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.540 ‐0.575 ‐0.453  ‐0.143  ‐0.134
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  1.180*
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐0.202 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.970**
Other Fields of Study  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.631
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills  ‐/‐ 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.050**  0.046** 0.046**
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 1.454*** 1.551*** 1.492***  1.483*** 1.579***
Work 
Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job 
at University   ‐/‐ ‐0.234 ‐0.212 ‐0.134  ‐0.247  ‐0.289
both at University & outside 
University  ‐/‐  0.928*  0.994**  1.077**  1.209**  1.238** 
outside University   ‐/‐ ‐0.254 ‐0.178 ‐0.203  ‐0.338  ‐0.255
Recipient of 
other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  ‐0.361  ‐0.341  ‐0.421  ‐0.553  ‐0.509 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.897**  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  2.337**  2.306**  2.160*  2.280* 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  ‐0.243  ‐0.274  ‐0.196  ‐0.065  ‐0.184 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ 0.018* 0.020* 0.018  0.015  0.021
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ ‐0.720* ‐0.715 ‐0.711  ‐0.912*  ‐0.870*
Guest Institution=Top10 University   ‐/‐ ‐0.753* ‐0.823** ‐0.740*  ‐0.724*  ‐0.593
Guest 
Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ 0.016 0.091 0.043  0.202  0.367
US‐Midwest  ‐/‐ ‐0.020 0.029 0.049  0.329  0.293
US‐Northeast  ‐/‐ 0.873* 0.906* 0.985*  1.205** 1.253**
US‐South  ‐/‐ 0.403 0.488 0.497  0.577  0.567
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.895** 0.945** 0.835*  1.008** 1.021**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 1.108*** 1.114*** 1.107**  1.303*** 1.330***
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ 0.629** 0.651** 0.612**  0.698** 0.726***
Recommending Person=Professor  ‐/‐ 1.076*** 1.089*** 1.261***  1.353*** 1.582***
Good Relation to Recommender  ‐/‐ 1.641*** 1.718*** 1.783***  1.835*** 1.755***
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.300  0.201  0.188
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.323  0.363  0.366
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 1.655**  1.768*** 1.719***
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.358**  ‐0.403** ‐0.399**
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.677*  ‐0.846** ‐0.894**
Rater  
Characteristics 
Evaluator Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  1.435*** 1.600***
Evaluator Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.043** 0.039*
Control 
Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Part. in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     0.346** ‐3.611*** ‐3.780*** ‐5.485***  ‐6.259*** ‐6.911***
Observations    423  423  423  423  423  423 
Pseudo R²    0.226 0.425 0.430 0.463  0.481  0.497
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
Table 7-4  Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimations IV-VIIb 
7 Econometric Analysis of Selection Success  
141 
 
Goodness of Fit and  
Model Comparison 
Estimation Number123
IV  Va Vb VI VIIa  VIIb
Cases correctly classified  72.01%  82.27%  82.51%  84.87%  85.58%  85.11% 
Log‐Likelihood Full Model  ‐223.530  ‐165.935  ‐164.535  ‐155.144  ‐149.989  ‐145.210 
LR 
(Prob>LR) 
130.515 
(0.000) 
245.706  
(0.000) 
248.506 
(0.000) 
267.287 
(0.000) 
277.597 
(0.000) 
287.155 
(0.000) 
Mc Fadden’s (Adjusted) R²  0.226  
(0.216) 
0.425 
(0.325) 
0.430 
(0.330) 
0.463 
(0.345) 
0.481 
(0.356) 
0.497 
(0.359) 
Cox‐Snell R²  0.265  0.441  0.444  0.468  0.481  0.493 
Nagelkerke R²  0.356  0.592  0.597  0.629  0.646  0.662 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²  0.371  0.656  0.671  0.710  0.737  0.756 
(Adjusted) Count R²  0.721  
(0.348) 
0.823 
(0.586) 
0.825 
(0.591) 
0.849 
(0.646) 
0.856 
 (0.663) 
0.851 
(0.652) 
AIC  1.071  0.922  0.915  0.894  0.879  0.876 
AIC*n  453.060  389.869  387.069  378.288  371.978  370.420 
Table 7-5  Goodness-of-Fit Measures Estimations IV-VIIb 
Again, all presented models explain invitation decisions better than the intercept (or 
null) model, as all Likelihood-Ratio (LR) tests lead to the rejection of the null-hypothesis. 
Additionally, the pseudo R² values are extraordinarily high not only for logit models in 
general, but also in comparison to the values obtained in Estimations I to III. Following 
Estimation VIIa, one would correctly classify 85.58% of all cases. Adjusted for the 
baseline correct classification rate (adjusted Count R²), 66.3% of cases would be correctly 
classified. Here, Estimation VIIb has the highest values in most of the R², except for the 
(adjusted) Count R². Additionally, the AIC value is minimal in Estimation VIIb which 
would prompt the reader to prefer this estimation to all other models. However, taking a 
look back at the different empirical specifications, it becomes obvious that Estimation 
VIIb exceptionally models the field of study. As logistic regression coefficients do not only 
depend on the respective value of the independent variable at stake, but also differ 
according to the values the other independent variables attain, one needs to consider 
that Estimation VIIb only models the respective influences for an applicant studying 
Law, Economics or Social Sciences (reference category). Consequently, all Estimation 
VIIb coefficients model the influence for this specific group of students only. In order to 
avoid such a sample restriction, the coefficients obtained from Estimation VIIa — the 
second best choice in all of the other GoF measures — will be discussed instead. 
                                                
123  Please note that Estimation Va is not nested in Estimation VIIb. 
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Marginal Effects after Estimation VIIa  dy/dx  Value of X 
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average ‐.2516** 1.76 
University Grade Average ‐.2770** 1.89 
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University  
University of Applied Sciencesi ‐.1676 0 
Technical Universityi ‐.0261 0 
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills .0081* 88.76 
TOEFLi  .1128* 1 
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job  
at Universityi ‐.0462 0 
both at University & outside Universityi .1464* 0 
outside University i ‐.0539 1 
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’i  ‐.1109  0 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ i   .1943**  0 
Applied for other Scholarshipsi  ‐.0116  0 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US) .0026 14.652 
Private Guest Institutioni ‐.1954 0 
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐.1502 0 
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West  
Canadai  .0335 0 
US‐Midwesti .0524 0 
US‐Northeasti .1461* 0 
US‐Southi  .0854 0 
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity  
One Type of ECAsi .1302* 0 
More Types of ECAsi .2923** 1 
Letter of Reference 
Recommendation .1224* 9.27 
Recommending Person=Professori .3049*** 1 
Good Relation to Recommending Personi .4209*** 1 
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Genderi  .0333 0 
Glassesi  .0574 0 
Born in Germanyi .4054*** 1 
Age  ‐.0707* 21.85 
Parents=Academicsi ‐.1792* 0 
Evaluator 
Characteristics 
Evaluator Genderi .1616* 0 
Evaluator Age .0075 53.61 
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad Program 
Selection Year 
incl.
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
4.39 
0 
0 
1 
i dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
 Table 7-6  Marginal Effects for Standard Applicant after Estimation VIIa 
As can be derived from the GoF-comparison, the amount of explained variance is greater 
in pre- than in overall selection success. Many of the theoretically expected signals have 
a statistically significant impact on pre-selection success. For a standard applicant, the 
most effective among these are high school and university grades, previous part-time 
jobs both at the university and with an external employer, LORs from a professor who 
indicates to know the applicant well and mentioning more than one type of ECAs.  
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In pre-selection, poor grades (both in university and high school) are penalized severely. 
A standard applicant has a 27.7 (25.2) pps higher probability of being invited to a 
selection interview than an applicant who has only achieved university (high school) 
grades averaging 2.89 (2.76). When it comes to language proficiency, an additional point 
on the language-skills scale leads to a 0.8 pps increase in invitation probability. Again, 
applicants handing in a TOEFL have an increased chance of being invited to a final 
selection interview (+0.113). In terms of previous (part-time) work experience, applicants 
indicating they already had part-time jobs both at the university and with an external 
employer have a 14.6 pps higher probability of being invited than an applicant without 
any part-time job. Applicants who have already been awarded one of the most renowned 
German stipends and are hence sponsored by the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ 
c.p. have an increased probability of ‘surviving’ the pre-selection round (+0.194). 
Receiving a means-tested scholarship however has no significant (positive or negative) 
impact on pre-selection success. Again, indicating to be active in one or more ECAs 
increases invitation probabilities. In paper-based pre-selection, however, it appears to be 
especially advantageous to state more than one type of ECAs. This leads to a 0.292 
increase in invitation probabilities whereas stating to be active in only one type of ECAs 
‘only’ increases the probability of pre-selection success by 0.13. In line with the 
expectations, LORs are mainly effective in paper-based pre-selection. For a standard 
applicant, an increase of one unit on the recommendation scale leads to a 12.2 pps 
increase in invitation probability. However, it is again more important who issued the 
LOR: Whenever the recommendation is made by a full professor, pre-selection success 
probabilities increase by 0.305. Moreover, if the recommender states to know the 
applicant well, the applicant has an increased chance of being invited to an interview 
(+0.42) compared to someone whose recommender does not confirm a good relation to the 
applicant. Assuming a rational decision process, individual difference factors were not 
hypothesized to influence evaluator decisions. However, several of these indices do have 
an impact on invitation probabilities. Whereas neither applicants of a specific gender nor 
those wearing glasses are discriminated against, other individual difference factors 
influence pre-selection outcomes. Applicants born in Germany have a 40.5 pps higher 
probability of being invited to an interview than those born outside of Germany. Younger 
applicants and applicants not stating their parents as being academics are preferred 
over older ones (-0.071) and those indicating their academic background (-0.179). Finally, 
also evaluator individual difference factors have been found to influence pre-selection 
success: Whenever standard applicants are assessed by a female evaluator, their pre-
selection success probability increases by 0.162.  
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7.2.2.2 Final Selection Success 
Whenever applicants have managed to ‘survive’ the first selection round, they are 
interviewed by a selection committee. Final selection success then can be measured as 
the probability of being awarded the scholarship, conditional on being invited to an 
interview (and actually showing up)124.  
Estimations VIII-Xb model this conditional probability of ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1| ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1 by using the 
same independent variables that have already been included in the estimations of 
overall and pre-selection success.  
ܮ௏ூூூ௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1| ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
ܮூ௑௔௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1| ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌݉݁ݎ݅ݐܾܽݏ݁݀௜
൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜
൅ ߚଵସܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵହܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
ܮூ௑௕௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1| ூܻ௡௩ ൌ 1ሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10௜ ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ௜ ൅ ߚଵସܮܱܴ௜ ൅ ߚଵହܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
	
                                                
124  Please remember that only 254 of the 272 invited applicants attended the interview. 
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ሻ1 ൌ ௩௡ூܻ |1 ൌ ௪஺ܻ ሺ௜௔௑ܮ
௜2ݐ݊݁݉݁ݒ݄݁݅ܿܣܿ݅݉݁݀ܽܿܣଶߚ ൅ ௜1ݐ݊݁݉݁ݒ݄݁݅ܿܣܿ݅݉݁݀ܽܿܣଵߚ ൅ ଴ߚ ൌ
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ሻ1 ൌ ௩௡ூܻ |1 ൌ ௪஺ܻ ሺ௜௕௑ܮ
௜2ݐ݊݁݉݁ݒ݄݁݅ܿܣܿ݅݉݁݀ܽܿܣଶߚ ൅ ௜1ݐ݊݁݉݁ݒ݄݁݅ܿܣܿ݅݉݁݀ܽܿܣଵߚ ൅ ଴ߚ ൌ
௜ܮܨܧܱܶହߚ ൅ ௜ݏ݈݈݅݇ܵ݁݃ܽݑ݃݊ܽܮସߚ ൅ ௜ݎ݄ܽܥ݊݋݅ݐݑݐ݅ݐݏ݊ܫ݁݉݋ܪଷߚ ൅
௜ܩö݂ܽܤ݌݄݅ݏݎ݋ݏ݊݋݌ܵ଻ߚ ൅ ௜݁ܿ݊݁݅ݎ݁݌ݔܧ݇ݎ݋ܹ଺ߚ ൅
௜݊݋݅ݐ݅ݑܶ଴ଵߚ ൅ ௜݊݋݅ݐ݈ܽܿ݅݌݌ܽ݌݄݅ݏݎ݋ݏ݊݋݌ܵଽߚ ൅ ௜݃ ݊ݑݐ݂݅ݐݏ݊݁݅݀ݑݐܵ݌݄݅ݏݎ݋ݏ݊݋݌଼ܵߚ ൅
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Logistic Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  VIII IXa IXb Xa  Xb
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.733** ‐0.562 ‐0.466 ‐0.327  ‐0.272
University Grade Average  ‐1.066*** ‐1.529*** ‐1.499***  ‐1.487***  ‐1.656***
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐0.808 ‐0.586 ‐0.348  ‐0.181
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.013 ‐0.065 0.149  0.187
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.432
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.483 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.204
Other Fields of Study  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  2.607*
Language  
Proficiency 
Language Skills  ‐/‐ 0.020 0.018 0.017  0.025
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 0.003 0.169 0.109  0.041
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job
at University  ‐/‐ ‐0.463 0.445 0.445  0.686
both at University & outside University ‐/‐ ‐0.125 ‐0.056 0.001  0.117
Outside University   ‐/‐ 0.087 ‐0.188 0.154  0.270
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  0.176  0.158  0.067  0.179 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.064  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  1.574*  1.829*  1.961* 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  0.731*  0.742*  0.919**  0.979** 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ ‐0.018 ‐0.019 ‐0.020  ‐0.023*
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ 0.696 0.724 0.890  0.902
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐/‐ 0.609 0.485 0.624  0.597
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ ‐0.083 ‐0.008 0.217  0.112
US‐Midwest ‐/‐ 0.846 0.795 0.984  1.031
US‐Northeast ‐/‐ ‐0.893 ‐0.937 ‐0.837  ‐0.937
US‐South  ‐/‐ ‐0.215 ‐0.224 ‐0.204  ‐0.340
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 1.058* 0.994*  1.144**  1.165**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.858 0.723 0.835  0.960*
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ ‐0.272 ‐0.262 ‐0.317  ‐0.327
Recommending Person=Professor ‐/‐ 0.506 0.482 0.541  0.430
Good Relation to Recommending Person ‐/‐ ‐0.619 ‐0.678 ‐0.694  ‐0.794
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.377  0.416
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.439  0.305
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.234  0.305
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.313*  ‐0.302*
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.147  0.292
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     0.401*** ‐0.788 ‐0.859 ‐1.843  ‐1.916
Observations    226  226  226  226  226 
Pseudo R²    0.068 0.169 0.181 0.200  0.221
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
Table 7-7  Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimations VIII-Xb 
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Goodness of Fit and  
Model Comparison 
Estimation Number125
VIII IXa IXb Xa  Xb
Cases correctly classified  61.95%  69.91%  71.24%  71.24%  75.22% 
Log‐Likelihood Full Model  ‐142.303  ‐126.964  ‐125.079  ‐122.169  ‐118.900 
LR 
(Prob>LR) 
20.846 
(0.000) 
51.524  
(0.004) 
55.294 
(0.002) 
61.114 
(0.002) 
67.651 
(0.002) 
Mc Fadden’s (Adjusted) R²  0.068  
(0.049) 
0.169 
(‐0.021) 
0.181 
(‐0.009) 
0.200 
(‐0.023) 
0.221 
(‐0.027) 
Cox‐Snell R²  0.088  0.204  0.217  0.237  0.259 
Nagelkerke R²  0.119  0.275  0.293  0.320  0.349 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R² 0.115  0.303  0.357  0.397  0.444 
(Adjusted) Count R²  0.619  
(0.065) 
0.699 
(0.261) 
0.712 
(0.293) 
0.712 
(0.293) 
0.752 
(0.391) 
AIC  1.286  1.380  1.364  1.382  1.388 
AIC*n  290.606  311.928  308.158  312.337  313.800 
Table 7-8  Goodness-of-Fit Measures Estimations VIII-Xb 
Taking a look at table 7-8, the reader can identify that all of the presented models 
explain stipend awarding decisions better than the intercept (or null) model, as all 
Likelihood-Ratio (LR) tests lead to the rejection of the null-hypothesis. However, in 
comparison to the GoF measures of Estimations I to VIIb, all of the GoF measures 
presented here are quite disappointing. Even in the best model (Estimation Xb), the 
pseudo R² values are as low as 0.221 and most of the adjusted McFadden’s R² are even 
negative, indicating a poor model fit. Using Estimation Xb coefficients, one is able to 
correctly classify 75.22% of all cases, but the adjusted Count R² shows that a large part 
of this correct classification would have also been achieved by simple guessing. As none 
of the models VIII-Xb explains final selection decisions on a satisfactory level, no 
marginal effects will be discussed. Apparently, further empirical specifications are 
needed that better account for the peculiarities of final selection processes. 
Due to the relatively small number of observations in final selection (n=254), most non-
significant influences from Estimations VIII to XXb have been dropped and further final-
selection-specific regressors have been included in Estimation XI-XIII. These include 
interview panel characteristics (Est. XI-XIII), situational factors such as interview time 
(Est. XII & XIII) as well as possible evaluator expectations measured in terms of pre-
selection outcomes (Est. XIII). 
                                                
125  Note that Estimation IXa is not nested in Estimation Xb. 
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Logistic Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0) XI XII XIII 
Academic  
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.509  ‐0.483  ‐0.140 
University Grade Average  ‐1.624***  ‐1.821***  ‐1.817*** 
Language  
Proficiency  Language Skills  0.014  0.018  0.016 
Recipient of other  
Sponsorships 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   1.770**  2.045**  1.895** 
Applied for other Scholarships  0.786**  0.934**  0.840** 
Project‐Specific  
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐0.021*  ‐0.022*  ‐0.020 
Private Guest Institution  0.183  0.241  0.242 
Guest Institution=Top10 University   0.446  0.430  0.316 
Number of  
Extracurricular  
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity 
One Type of ECAs  0.969*  0.940*  1.046* 
More Types of ECAs  0.666  0.753  0.799 
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐0.310  ‐0.396  ‐0.551 
Recommending Person=Professor  0.480  0.308  0.257 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  ‐0.545  ‐0.489  ‐0.516 
Applicant  
Characteristics 
Gender  0.305  0.248  0.240 
Born in Germany  0.374  0.815  0.844 
Age  ‐0.295*  ‐0.289  ‐0.304 
Parents=Academics  0.203  0.350  0.262 
Evaluation Committee  
Characteristics 
Size  ‐0.020  ‐0.200  ‐0.208 
Fraction of Female Evaluators  1.602  1.212  1.077 
Mainly Male Evaluators  0.410  0.516  0.341 
Average Evaluator Age  ‐0.045  ‐0.043  ‐0.052 
Dispersion Evaluator Age  ‐0.012  0.007  ‐0.016 
Interview  
Framework 
Reference Category: Interview Time 10‐10:59 a.m. 
Interview Time: 09‐09:59 a.m.  ‐/‐  0.051  0.032 
Interview Time: 11‐11:59 a.m.  ‐/‐  ‐1.497**  ‐1.472** 
Interview Time: 12‐01:30 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.276  ‐0.323 
Interview Time: 02‐02:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  0.424  0.439 
Interview Time: 03‐03:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐1.054  ‐1.170 
Interview Time: 04‐04:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  0.303  0.337 
Interview Time: 05‐06:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.341  ‐0.343 
Pre‐selection  
Outcome  Pre‐Selection Score  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.126*** 
Year  Selection Year  ‐0.697**  ‐0.851**  ‐0.892** 
Control Variables  Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐1.559  ‐1.673  ‐1.356 
Observations    226  226  226 
Pseudo R²    0.184  0.228  0.263 
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
Table 7-9  Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimations XI-XIII 
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Goodness of Fit and Model Comparison  Estimation Number
XI XII XIII 
Cases correctly classified  74.34%  74.78%  73.89% 
Log‐Likelihood Full Model  ‐124.616  ‐117.842  ‐112.624 
LR 
(Prob>LR) 
56.220 
(0.000) 
69.768  
(0.000) 
80.203 
(0.000) 
Mc Fadden’s (Adjusted) R²  0.184  
(0.014) 
0.228 
(0.012) 
0.263 
(0.040) 
Cox‐Snell R²  0.220  0.266  0.299 
Nagelkerke R²  0.297  0.358  0.403 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²  0.352  0.417  0.482 
(Adjusted) Count R²  0.743  
(0.370) 
0.748 
(0.380) 
0.739 
(0.359) 
AIC  1.333  1.335  1.298 
AIC*n  301.231  301.684  293.249 
Table 7-10  Goodness-of-Fit Measures Estimations XI-XIII 
Comparing the GoF measures presented in table 7-10 with those derived from 
Estimations VIII to Xb (table 7-8), one can see that Estimations XI to XIII better reflect 
the dynamics of the final selection process. Not only does the LR-test show that all of 
these models are significantly better than the intercept model. Most pseudo R² measures 
as well as the AIC values also point at a better model fit of Estimations XI to XIII. 
However, most pseudo R² measures are still comparably low, especially in comparison to 
table 7-5 and a large part of the correctly classified cases can be attributed to the 
baseline correct classification rate. Lower pseudo R² and GoF values in final selection 
than in pre-selection lead to the conclusion that final selection success cannot be 
modeled as precisely as pre-selection success (as expected in Hypothesis 9). Using the 
available applicant information, one is better able to predict pre-selection than final 
selection success. Among the available empirical specifications however, Estimation XIII 
provides the best fit and will subsequently be discussed in more detail.  
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Marginal Effects after Estimation XIII  dy/dx  Value of X 
Academic  
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐.0287  1.55 
University Grade Average  ‐.3717***  1.68 
Language 
Proficiency  Language Skills  .0033  90.82 
Recipient of other  
Sponsorships 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ i   .2298**  0 
Applied for other Scholarshipsi  .1955**  1 
Project‐Specific  
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐.0042  16.081 
Private Guest Institutioni  .0468  0 
Guest Institution=Top10 University   .0601  0 
Number of  
Extracurricular Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity   
One Type of ECAsi  .1630*  0 
More Types of ECAsi  .1854  1 
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐.1128  9.26 
Recommending Person=Professori  .0553  1 
Good Relation to Recommending Personi  ‐.0932  1 
Applicant  
Characteristics 
Genderi  .0465  0 
Born in Germanyi  .1965  1 
Age  ‐.0621*  21.84 
Parents=Academicsi  .0505  0 
Evaluation Committee  
Characteristics 
Size  ‐.0426  4.36 
Fraction of Female Evaluators  .2203  0.26 
Mainly Male Evaluatorsi  .0744  1 
Average Evaluator Age  ‐.0107  52.41 
Dispersion evaluator age  .0033  15.96 
Interview  
Framework 
Reference Category: Interview Time 10‐10:59 a.m.   
Interview Time: 09‐09:59 a.m. i  ‐.0067  0 
Interview Time: 11‐11:59 a.m. i  ‐.3500**  0 
Interview Time: 12‐01:30 p.m. i  ‐.0702  0 
Interview Time: 02‐02:59 p.m. i  .0808  0 
Interview Time: 03‐03:59 p.m. i  ‐.2776*  0 
Interview Time: 04‐04:59 p.m. i  .0637  0 
Interview Time: 05‐06:59 p.m. i  ‐.0749  0 
Pre‐Selection Outcome  Pre‐Selection Score  .0258***  84.98 
Year  Selection Yeari  ‐.1453*  1 
Control Variables  Semester
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
incl.
incl. 
4.39 
0 
i dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Table 7-11  Marginal Effects for Standard Applicant after Estimation XIII 
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In final selection, only university — but not high school — grades do influence evaluator 
decisions significantly. Standard applicants have a 37.2 pps higher (conditional) 
probability of being awarded the scholarship than those with university grades 
averaging 2.68 (mean university grade (1.68) plus 1).126 Recipients of the ‘Studienstiftung 
des Deutschen Volkes’ scholarship have an increased probability of also being awarded 
the present stipend (+0.23). Moreover, the mere fact that an applicant has also applied 
for other scholarships is associated with increased selection success probabilities (+0.20). 
In which ways these two variables are able to act as effective signals will be discussed in 
detail below (Chapter 7.3). Linking final selection success to the number of 
extracurricular activities applicants have indicated in their written applications, only 
the indication of exactly one type of ECAs is associated with a significantly higher final 
selection probability (+0.163).  
While evaluation committee characteristics such as size, gender and age composition do 
not impact final selection outcomes, interview time partly does. Standard applicants 
being interviewed from 11 to 11:59 am (3 to 3:59 am) have a 35 (27.8) pps lower success 
probability than those interviewed from 10 to 10:59 am. A one-unit-increase in the 
assigned pre-selection score is associated with a 2.6 pps increase in final selection 
success probability. In contrast to pre-selection, the respective selection year also affects 
success probabilities. A standard applicant in 2008 has a 14.5 pps lower conditional 
probability of being awarded a stipend than the standard candidate in 2007. 
  
                                                
126  Note that a standard applicant in final selection possesses characteristics that differ from the 
ones of a standard applicant in pre-selection. For a comparison of these two standard 
applicants, see Appendices 4 and 5. 
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7.2.3 Combined Estimation 
Another way of empirically dealing with both selection stages is one single, i.e. 
combined, estimation of pre- and final selection success. As it is possible to rank all three 
possible outcomes  
1. rejection after pre-selection (assigned value of e.g. m=1), 
2. invitation to interview, but rejection after interview (e.g. m=2) and 
3. invitation to interview and stipend (e.g. m=3) 
in ascending order, an ordered logistic model (OLM) of the following form is feasible: 
ܲݎሺݕ ൑ ݉|ݔሻ ൌ ܨሺ߬௠ െ ܺߚ௜ሻ for ݉ ൌ 1 to ܬ െ 1. 
However, for ordered regression models — both ordered logit and ordered probit — the 
parallel regression assumption127 needs to be satisfied. This assumption states that the 
ߚs are equal for each value of m, i.e. the probability curves only differ in being shifted to 
the right or left, but do not differ in their slope (Long and Freese 2006). This assumption 
implies that the influence of any individual variable is the same for each category of ܻ∗. 
As the previous analyses have shown, various independent variables do not have the 
same impact in pre- as in final selection. Testing the proportional odds assumption 
confirms the violation of this prerequisite and hence ordered logit (and probit) models 
should not be estimated in this context. Nevertheless, in order to be able to estimate 
both pre- and final selection success simultaneously, Estimation XIV was conducted 
using logistic regression again. This estimation includes all regressors from Estimation 
III, but additionally models the influence of the individual’s predicted probability of 
being invited to an interview ( ෠ܲூ௡௩௜: calculated from Estimation VIIa) on the final stipend 
awarding decision. 
ܮ௑ூ௏௜ሺ ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ1௜ ൅ ߚଶܣܿܽ݀݁݉݅ܿܣ݄ܿ݅݁ݒ݁݉݁݊ݐ2௜
൅ ߚଷܪ݋݉݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ܥ݄ܽݎ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܽ݊݃ݑ݈݈ܽ݃݁ܵ݇݅ݏ௜ ൅ ߚହܱܶܧܨܮ௜
൅ ߚ଺ܹ݋ݎ݇ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܤ݂ܽöܩ௜
൅ ߚ଼ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܵݐݑ݀݅݁݊ݏݐ݂݅ݐݑ݊ ௜݃ ൅ ߚଽܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎݏ݄݅݌ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௜
൅ ߚଵଵܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ ൅ ߚଵଶܶܪܧܶ݋݌10 ൅ ߚଵଷܩݑ݁ݏݐܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋ܴ݊݁݃݅݋݊
൅ ߚଵସܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ܧܥܣ ൅ ߚଵହܮܱܴ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܩ݁݊݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩ݈ܽݏݏ݁ݏ௜
൅ ߚଵ଼݈ܲܽܿ݁݋݂ܤ݅ݎݐ݄ ൅ ߚଵଽܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶଵ ෠ܲூ௡௩௜ ൅ ߚଶଶܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
                                                
127  In logistic regression models, this assumption is also called the proportional odds assumption. 
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Logistic Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  III  XIV 
Academic  
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.908***  ‐0.410 
University Grade Average  ‐1.592***  ‐1.046** 
Home Institution  
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐0.673  ‐0.281 
Technical University  ‐0.507  ‐0.283 
Language  
Proficiency 
Language Skills  0.029  0.012 
TOEFL  0.859***  0.242 
Work Experience  
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job 
at University   0.186  0.251 
both at University & outside University  0.147  ‐0.140 
Outside University   ‐0.009  0.023 
Recipient of other  
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  0.118  0.254 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   1.164*  0.597 
Applied for other Scholarships  0.407  0.538* 
Project‐Specific  
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐0.004  ‐0.014 
Private Guest Institution  0.317  0.635 
Guest Institution=Top10 University   0.014  0.258 
Guest Institution  
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West 
Canada  0.235  0.168 
US‐Midwest  0.513  0.518 
US‐Northeast  ‐0.285  ‐0.585 
US‐South  0.146  ‐0.022 
Number of  
Extracurricular Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity 
One Type of ECAs  1.004**  0.647 
More Types of ECAs  0.952**  0.524 
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  0.231  ‐0.024 
Recommending Person=Professor  1.014***  0.696* 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  0.698  0.074 
Applicant  
Characteristics 
Gender  0.072  0.133 
Glasses  0.308  0.221 
Born in Germany  0.849  0.552 
Age  ‐0.272*  ‐0.161 
Parents=Academics  ‐0.163  0.163 
Pre‐selection Success  Individual Invitation Probability  ‐/‐  2.789** 
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad Program 
Selection Year 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐5.151***  ‐5.574*** 
Observations    429  423 
Pseudo R²    0.306  0.320 
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
Table 7-12  Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimations III and XIV 
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 Goodness of Fit and Model Comparison  Estimation Number
III XIV
Cases correctly classified  77.86%  79.91% 
Log‐Likelihood Full Model  ‐184.844  ‐179.061 
LR 
(Prob>LR) 
163.106  
(0.000) 
168.592 
(0.000) 
Mc Fadden’s (Adjusted) R²  0.306 
(0.179) 
0.320 
(0.187) 
Cox‐Snell R²  0.316  0.329 
Nagelkerke R²  0.445  0.462 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R²  0.542  0.542 
(Adjusted) Count R²  0.786  
(0.313) 
0.799 
(0.361) 
AIC  1.020  1.012 
AIC*n  437.688  428.121 
Table 7-13  Goodness-of-Fit Measures Estimations III and XIV 
Indeed, Estimation XIV is superior to Estimation III in terms of almost all GoF 
measures (see table 7-13). As expected, pre-selection success in terms of the individual 
predicted probability of being invited to an interview is highly correlated with overall 
success. Most other significant influences found in Estimation III are no longer of 
importance as soon as pre-selection success is included in the model. Only university 
grades, having also applied for other scholarships and providing an LOR issued by a full 
professor still significantly influence selection success over and above pre-selection 
success. Hence, Estimation XIV presents the ultimate robustness check for all the 
aforementioned estimations and provides strong support for the decision to separately 
investigate each selection stage.  
Consequently, both pre- and final selection success determinants will be discussed and 
compared in detail in the following section. 
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7.3 DISCUSSION 
Analogous to the literature review, the discussion section is structured according to the 
respective influence factors and will first address the influence of diverse ability signals 
on scholarship awarding decisions (7.3.1), then discuss the impact of individual 
difference factors (7.3.2) as well as social (7.3.3) and situational or extraneous factors 
(7.3.4). 
7.3.1 The Influence of Ability Signals 
7.3.1.1 Educational Attainment  
As anticipated, educational attainment and especially grades have a statistically 
significant impact on the awarding decision. This is not at all surprising as grades are 
designed to mirror a student’s academic performance and/or potential. They represent a 
generally accepted standardized means of assessing performance. This facilitates signal 
interpretation. Evaluators are professors themselves and are familiar with the grading 
system and the grade average in their respective field of study (which is very similar to 
the field of study their applicants are in). The influence of high school grade averages 
might be explained analogously, as high school performance measures are the same all 
over Germany, and professors, i.e. the evaluators, can easily assess the student’s 
intellectual ability and/or motivation to learn in school. All in all, grades reveal to be a 
very effective signal in scholarship selection processes. 
As a consequence of the German grading system, the influence identified in the 
previously presented estimations is consistently negative: As higher values in the 
German grading system are associated with poorer grades, scholarship awarding 
probability decreases with increasing values of high school or university grades. Overall, 
a one-unit increase (i.e. from 1.76 to 2.76) in the high school grade average c.p. reduces 
the chance of this applicant to be awarded the scholarship to only 0.4 times (݁ି଴.ଽ଴଼)128 
the chance of an average applicant. For worse university grade averages, the impact is 
even more severe: Having achieved university grades averaging ‘only’ 2.89 instead of 
1.89 (average applicant), reduces the odds of being awarded to be as low as 0.2. In line 
with expectations, grades have a stronger influence on pre-selection decisions than on 
final selection decisions. As outlined before, pre-selection decisions aim at selecting all 
theoretically suitable candidates on the one hand and eliminating inappropriate ones on 
the other hand. In final selection, however, all remaining candidates are expected to 
                                                
128  As mentioned before, logistic regression coefficients can be transformed into odds ratios by 
taking ݁ఉ. 
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have achieved a minimum grade and hence suitability level, and other factors such as 
personality, demeanor or eloquence influence an evaluator’s decision more strongly 
during final selection. In the present case, both high school and university grades have 
an impact on pre-selection success, but only university grades — being more specific and 
relevant to a study-abroad purpose — affect final selection decisions. In comparison, a 
standard applicant’s predicted probability of being successful changes as follows in a) 
pre- and b) final selection as a function of high school and university grades. 
High School Grade Average  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
1.0 (excellent)  0.91  0.73  0.36 
1.5  0.83  0.71  0.26 
2.0 (good)  0.71  0.70  0.18 
2.5  0.54  0.69  0.13 
3.0 (satisfactory)  0.36  0.67  0.08 
3.5  0.20  ‐  0.06 
University Grade Average  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
1.0 (excellent)  0.93  0.90  0.54 
1.5  0.86  0.77  0.35 
2.0 (good)  0.74  0.58  0.19 
2.5  0.56  0.36  0.10 
3.0 (satisfactory)  0.37  0.18  0.05 
3.5  0.22  ‐  0.02 
Table 7-14  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on Grades 
For a standard applicant, the probability of a) being invited to an interview and b) 
awarded the scholarship changes as a function of high school and university grades as 
presented in the following conditional effect plots (figures 7-3 and 7-4). 
 
Figure 7-3  Conditional Effect Plots: High School Grades 
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Figure 7-4  Conditional Effect Plots: University Grades 
It is obvious from figure 7-3 that high school grades only affect pre-selection success 
significantly, whereas university grade averages (figure 7-4) are decisive in both, pre- 
and final selection. Overall, students with university grades worse than 2.0 (good) c.p. 
only have a probability of being awarded a stipend of 19% whereas students with 
outstanding grades will be awarded a stipend with a probability of 54%.129 Hence, very 
good grades seem to be a necessary condition to be awarded a stipend.  
In comparison to personnel selection research, grades consistently do play a more 
important role in stipend awarding decisions. This might be due to the fact that in 
education settings, grades are not only a productivity signal — as in recruitment — , but a 
direct productivity measure. All of the applicants wish to continue studying (both abroad 
and at home). Consequently, only the most ‘productive’ students are rewarded and 
productivity in this case is measured in terms of previous achievement, i.e. grades.  
In derogation from the expectations, university grades are not only used as an initial 
screening method, but also affect final selection success. This might be caused by a 
relatively low variance in terms of other final applicant characteristics (such as ECAs, 
LORs or language skills) so that grades also serve as a means of comparison in final 
selection. In terms of other ability signals related to educational attainment, numerous 
other possible ability signals have been tested, but most have been demonstrated to not 
significantly influence either pre- or final selection outcomes. Among these are e.g. type 
                                                
129  Note that predicted probabilities as well as conditional effect plots are always calculated for a 
standard applicant whereas Odds Ratios are calculated from the aforementioned estimations, 
i.e. while fixing everything else at the mean. Consequently, results may at times seem 
inconsistent to the reader, but it needs to be noted that these differences result from the 
different computations. 
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and region of home institution, home institution reputation130, desired degree (Bachelor 
vs. Diploma), length of study and number of institutions previously attended.131 
Differentiating between varying fields of study however reveals differing invitation 
probabilities as can be derived from Estimation VIIb. Both ‘Engineering’ and ‘Linguistic 
and Cultural Science’ students have significantly better chances (3.3 times and 2.6 times 
respectively) of being invited to an interview than ‘Law, Economics or Social Sciences’ 
students. This imbalance might be due to the fact that ‘Engineering’ is perceived as a 
difficult, yet desired field of study and pre-selection evaluators tend to invite more of 
these students to an interview. Additionally, as the overall grade average is worse in 
‘Engineering’ (Wissenschaftsrat 2007), applicants with university grades averaging 1.89 
(the mean university grade of all applicants) from this field of study are perceived to be 
better than applicants who have achieved the same grade average in other (less difficult) 
fields of studies. ‘Linguistic and Cultural Science’ students on the other hand might on 
paper seem especially suited for a study-abroad year as a result of their preparation in 
terms of content and language for instance. However, this effect only occurs in pre-
selection. In final selection, students from all fields of study have comparable chances of 
being awarded a stipend (see Est. III).132  
7.3.1.2 Extracurricular Activities 
Extracurricular activities in general are positively associated with stipend awarding 
success. As almost all (84.3%) applicants state to be active in at least one area, further 
disaggregation is required. Consequently, the specific type of activity (political, clerical, 
social etc.) was measured as well as the number of different ECA types an applicant 
indicated to pursue. Additionally, the intensity of these activities was estimated from the 
available ECA information: The effort an applicant had with the indicated ECA was 
estimated based on a combination of (leadership) positions and assumed expenditure of 
time. This estimation led to the following categorization of ECA strength: high, medium 
and low strength (versus no ECA at all).  
                                                
130  Measured in terms of the CHE-ranking 2011 (research reputation as perceived by colleagues 
from related fields). Due to the inconsistent publication of CHE-results, this information was 
missing for approximately 50% of home institutions. Therefore, this regressor is not included 
in the aforementioned estimations and has only been used in several robustness checks. 
Results of all robustness checks are available on request. 
131  Furthermore, students from specific universities may be treated either more or less favorably 
than others. However, due to the limited sample size and the high number of different 
institutions (>60), further disaggregation was not possible and instead of testing for specific 
universities, institutions were only clustered and tested according to different characteristics, 
such as CHE reputation or type of institution.  
132  As the selection process in the investigated organization is structured according to fields of 
studies (of both applicants and evaluators), this is not surprising as the organization 
exogenously defines selection ratios which need to be complied with by each committee. 
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The number of ECA types indicated has a different effect in pre- and final selection. In 
pre-selection, the invitation chances of a candidate who is active in only one of the above 
mentioned ECA types are 2.7 times the chances of an applicant without any ECA 
mentioned in his or her CV. Mentioning more than one type of ECAs however multiplies 
this chance by 3.8. In final selection, however, the picture is reversed: Here, only those 
applicants who pursue exactly one (and no more) ECA have a significantly better chance 
of being awarded a stipend (2.8 times the chance of an applicant without any ECA). The 
differential effect of the number of ECAs pursued is also apparent when looking at 
predicted probabilities or conditional effect plots for both pre- and final selection. 
Number of ECAs pursued  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
More than One Type of ECAs  0.77  0.71  0.22 
Exactly One Type of ECAs  0.71  0.76  0.43 
No ECA mentioned  0.48  0.52  0.10 
Table 7-15  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on Types of ECAs pursued 
 
Figure 7-5  Conditional Effect Plots: Types of ECAs133 
An explanation for the differential effect is straightforward: Whereas in paper 
applications, evaluators might be more impressed by a person who is (or at least 
indicates to be) active in various fields, final selection evaluators might favor the person 
who is only involved in one activity, but puts a lot of effort into this single activity. 
Applicants having indicated more than one type of ECAs in their CV might not be as 
active in reality as they pretend to be on paper. As it is not costly for applicants to 
indicate more activities on paper than they actually pursue, applicants are likely to 
polish their ‘image’ in an application. In final selection, however, it becomes more 
difficult (and costly) to pretend to be as active as indicated on paper. Candidates 
                                                
133  Note that insignificant effects will be illustrated with the help of a dashed line in all 
subsequent conditional effect plots. 
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pursuing one single activity are supposedly more committed to this activity and 
consequently more credible. Repeating Estimations III and VIIa with the variable 
‘Strength of ECAs’ instead of ‘Number of ECAs’ confirms this impression: Whereas 
candidates with high, medium or low strength of ECAs all have significantly better (i.e. 
4.3 times, 3.6 times and 3.5 times) chances of being invited to an interview, only those 
with high ECA strength are significantly more frequently awarded the scholarship in the 
end (7 times the chances of somebody without any ECA). 
 
Figure 7-6  Conditonal Effect Plots: Strength of ECAs 
Overall, applicants with exactly one type of ECA are slightly preferred during the 
stipend awarding process: Their chances of being successful are 2.7 times the chances of 
an applicant without ECAs, whereas applicants with more than one type ‘only’ have 2.6 
times the chances of non-active applicants. In terms of strength of activity, the chances 
are as follows: highly active applicants have 5.8 times, medium active 3.2 and only 
slightly active candidates 3 times the chances of an inactive applicant. Taking a closer 
look at each type of activity independently reveals that only in pre-selection decisions the 
specific type of activity matters: Here, pursuing a clerical activity is associated with 
significantly lower (i.e. 0.5 times) chances of being invited to an interview, whereas 
applicants indicating to pursue extracurricular activities related to universities (student 
organizations and councils for instance) are invited more frequently (i.e. 2.2 times the 
chances of an applicant without this type of ECA). The rationale behind these two effects 
might be a slight similarity-attraction phenomenon as all evaluators are professors and 
consequently committed to university work. Hence, students supporting universities also 
during their ‘free-time’ might be favored due to a certain personal evaluator sympathy. A 
possible reason for treating applicants with clerical ECAs less favorably in pre-selection 
might be the independent nature of the investigated organization. Evaluators might be 
inclined to select applicants with clerical ECAs less frequently as these applicants might 
have access to other church-related stipends and are not as reliant on the current 
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scholarship as other candidates. However, neither in final selection nor in overall 
success, differential effects of any of the ECA types have been discovered. Thus, strength 
rather than type of activity seems to be rewarded by evaluators. 
7.3.1.3 Letters of Reference 
Standardized letters of reference (LORs) have some impact on success probabilities, but 
only in pre-selection decisions. In line with the expectations derived from personnel 
selection experience, LORs were in general very lenient. On the standardized scale from 
0 (absolutely not suitable) to 10 (perfectly suitable candidate), recommenders assigned 
on average a value of 9.25 (range: 5 to 10). Due to the relatively low variance in 
recommendation values, it is not surprising that this standardized recommendation 
scale does not significantly affect overall success rates. In pre-selection however, a one-
unit increase on this scale is associated with twice the chance of being invited to an 
interview. Consequently, variance in recommendation scores is reduced even more 
severely among final applicants and the recommendation itself does not influence final 
selection outcomes significantly. Presumably as a result of the low variance in 
recommendation scores, the recommending person per se as well as the indicated 
relationship between recommendee and recommender are associated with varying pre-
selection outcomes. As depicted in figure 7-7, applicants who manage to receive a 
recommendation letter from a full professor (instead of an assistant professor or research 
assistant) are preferred in pre-selection. In the same vein, applicants whose 
recommenders indicate to know the applicant well are favored in pre-selection, too. 
 
Figure 7-7  Conditional Effect Plots: LOR — Recommender Status and Relation to Recommender 
Being able to get in touch with professors already at an early stage of their studies (2nd to 
4th semester) seems to be interpreted as a credible ability signal. Evaluators supposedly 
know from their own experience as teaching professors how difficult it is for 
(undergraduate) students to contact full professors. Secondly, only very able students 
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will be recognized by professors in the classroom. Hence, persuading a professor to 
compose an LOR for him or her seems to be reserved for outstanding students. 
Consequently, this dummy variable is likely to measure some kind of unobservable 
heterogeneity. Applicants managing to have their recommendation letter written by a 
full professor seem to have at least some of the characteristics valued by evaluators. For 
whatever it exactly measures, the ‘recommendation-written-by-a-professor’ effect is so 
considerable that even in overall success rates applicants with letters of recommendation 
written by full professors have an increased stipend probability (2.8 times the chances of 
an applicant providing an LOR composed by assistant professors or research assistants). 
As anticipated, LORs do not affect final selection success. As soon as the interview panel 
gets to know the candidate in person, LORs are no longer consulted. Furthermore, 
variance in recommendation scores, recommending person and relationship to 
recommendee is drastically reduced in final selection: scores only range between 8 and 
10, 75.3% of all final selection applicants managed to get their LOR from a full professor 
and even 91.2% are well known by the recommender (according to the recommender’s 
statements). 
In comparison to personnel selection literature, stipend awarding evaluators tend to 
trust recommendation letters more than recruiters. A reason for this effect might be that 
professors (in related fields) do know each other better than recruiters in general know 
recommenders from other companies. Hence, evaluators in stipend selection processes 
rely more on the evaluation of their distinguished colleagues. Knowing the recommender 
well might then help ‘reading between the lines’ which is exactly the reason why LORs 
are usually not considered reliable in personnel settings.  
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7.3.1.4 Previous Awards 
Evaluators in stipend awarding decisions might also look for heuristics in differentiating 
between appropriate and inappropriate candidates. One of these heuristics might be to 
consider previous awards or sponsorships the applicant has managed to receive. In the 
current context, previous sponsorships are directly inquired in the standardized 
application form so that this information is readily available to evaluators. Among these 
sponsorships are means-tested (e.g. BAföG) as well as merit-based scholarships. Overall, 
applicants indicating to have already been sponsored by another merit-based stipend134 
do not have significantly higher probabilities of receiving a stipend. However, being 
supported by one of the most renowned independent scholarship granting organizations, 
the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’, is associated with extremely increased 
probabilities of being awarded the stipend at stake. This positive effect occurs both in 
pre- and in final selection, as can be derived from Estimations VIIa and XIII. Although 
stipend awardees from this institution are very likely to also have achieved excellent 
grades and strong ECAs, the previous-award effect occurs over and above the effect of 
these ability signals. Thus, recipients of the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ 
scholarship have 8.7 times the chance of being invited to an interview and 6.7 times the 
conditional chance of being subsequently awarded the stipend. Overall, these specific 
applicants have 3.2 times the chance of being awarded than applicants who have not 
been previously supported by the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’. Table 7-16 
shows the ‘Studienstiftung’ effect in terms of predicted probabilities and figure 7-8 
displays the distinct conditional effect plots for a) recipients of the ‘Studienstiftung des 
Deutschen Volkes’ and b) all other applicants as a function of university grades. 
 
Supported by  
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’? 
Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
Yes  0.97  0.94  0.47 
No  0.77  0.71  0.22 
Table 7-16  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on Previous Award (Studienstiftung) 
                                                
134  E.g. from one of the organizations mentioned in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 7-8  Conditional Effect Plots: ‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’ 
Several explanations might explain this substantial effect. Either evaluators in the 
current context search for heuristics in order to facilitate selection. One obvious heuristic 
would be to simply select these applicants who have managed to already receive another 
stipend. Assuming that the other stipend-granting organization will have selected the 
right applicants during their selection process, evaluators in this context might rely on 
previous judgments or might simply be impressed by the previous achievement of this 
applicant. Both explanations are compatible with the theoretical notion of a ‘Matthew-
Effect’ known from sociology: a cumulative advantage based on previous achievements 
(Merton 1968). On the other hand, the ‘Studienstiftung’ effect is likely to be the best 
proxy for a whole package of characteristics that all recipients of the ‘Studienstiftung des 
Deutschen Volkes’ possess. This combination of characteristics is likely to be desired by 
evaluators in the present context. In this case, the ‘Studienstiftung’ effect might be a 
very good measure of otherwise unobserved heterogeneity among applicants. Especially 
in final selection, the latter explanation is more likely. Applicants who have already 
managed to receive one of the most renowned stipends in Germany are very likely to be 
more self-confident and eloquent for instance — only two of the characteristics we are not 
able to observe during this research project. Hence, the ‘Studienstiftung’ effect is very 
likely to represent a combined measure of applicant quality. 
Having been previously awarded a means-tested scholarship, i.e. BAföG, does not 
significantly influence stipend awarding probabilities. This is not surprising, as means-
tested scholarships are usually not directly related to (previous) performance, but are 
assigned purely on the basis of an individual’s financial means. Consequently, receiving 
a means-tested scholarship — in contrast to merit-based stipends — cannot function as a 
consistent ability signal. 
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7.3.1.5 Other Ability Signals 
In addition to educational attainment, ECAs and LORs, previous work experience has 
been demonstrated to be one of the most important productivity signals in personnel 
selection. Assuming that past productivity is highly correlated with future productivity, 
recruiters infer the applicant’s productivity potential from past achievements. In the 
current context, however, undergraduate students with an average age of 21 years are 
investigated, so that work experience is usually limited.135 As a proxy for full-time work 
experience, both part-time work experience and the number and length of previously 
completed internships were tested. As usual, information was extracted from the 
applicants’ CVs. The mere fact of having listed any part-time job at all in their CV as 
well as the total number of part-time jobs pursued until the time of application do 
neither affect pre- nor final selection outcomes.136 Accordingly, evaluators do not seem to 
take into account the (financial) neediness when selecting appropriate candidates which 
is a considerable contrast to means-tested sponsorships. However, when differentiating 
between the type of part-time job employer, a significant positive effect for students 
having already worked part-time both at the university and for an external employer has 
been found in pre-selection: This applicant c.p. has 3.4 times the chance of being invited 
to an interview than an applicant who has not had any part-time job at all. Having 
worked either at university or for an external employer, does not change invitation 
probabilities significantly (see figure 7-9). 
 
Figure 7-9  Conditional Effect Plot: Type of Part-Time Employer 
                                                
135  Very few students in the sample had indeed accomplished an apprenticeship prior to their 
studies — which can be understood as full-time work experience —, but when testing for the 
effect of apprenticeship (yes/no), no significant effects were found. 
136  Note that the measure of part-time jobs is a cumulative one and measures the total number of 
part-time jobs applicants have ever had in their lives. Whether or not several part-time jobs 
have been pursued simultaneously cannot be extracted from the available data. 
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In final and overall selection, however, this effect does not occur as can be derived from 
Estimations III and Xa. As the total number of part-time jobs pursued has no significant 
effect on selection outcomes, financial need per se does not serve as an explanation for 
the increased chance of an applicant with part-time occupations both at and outside the 
university. Instead, students who have already had diverse part-time jobs and still 
manage to achieve good grades might be perceived by evaluators as being more able to 
withstand stress and hence more suited for becoming an elite member in the future. As 
soon as evaluators however meet the ‘paper’ person face-to-face in final selection during 
the interview, other measures of resilience can be consulted and the part-time job proxy 
for the ability to handle stress is no longer important. 
Another ability signal provided during this application process is foreign language 
proficiency. In the current context, language skills are measured in terms of a 
standardized scale from 0 to 100. This measure has been developed in retrospect using a 
combination of different proofs of language competence handed in by the applicants. As 
the current stipend is bound to a study-abroad period of at least nine months, language 
skills are expected to have a substantial influence on application success. However, only 
in pre-selection, the certified language skills have a significant effect on success: A one-
unit increase on the language-skills scale is associated with a multiplication of invitation 
chances by 1.05. In final (and overall) selection, language proficiency as measured by a 
certificate or test does not impact success probabilities at all. Either written language 
certificates do not correlate substantially with real language skills (which might be 
tested during interviews) or variance in language skills is too low in final selection to 
have a substantial effect on awarding decisions. However, one effect which is related to 
language certificates is indeed apparent also in overall selection. Applicants handing in a 
TOEFL do have 2.4 times the chance of being awarded a scholarship than applicants 
handing in other language certificates. In pre-selection only, this effect is even more 
pronounced as can be derived from the predicted success probabilities of a standard 
applicant who either handed in a TOEFL or another certificate summarized in table 7-
17. 
Handed in TOEFL?  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
Yes  0.77  0.43  0.22 
No  0.44  0.40  0.11 
Table 7-17  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on TOEFL 
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Again, several explanations are feasible for this effect. Either evaluators actually prefer 
applicants’ handing in a standardized and objective test over applicants who provide 
only language certificates that have been issued by their own university. The rationale 
behind this reaction is that evaluators can more easily interpret the standardized 
results. On the other hand, applicants having already completed a TOEFL more than 
one year in advance of their stay abroad, might simply be perceived as more motivated 
and committed to the study-abroad project — characteristics that elite members should 
possess. Thirdly, a similar effect as discussed for all scholarship recipients of the 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’ in the applicant pool might be the actual driver 
of an increased invitation and awarding probability: Applicants who do neither spare the 
effort nor the cost of providing such a credible language-skill signal as the TOEFL might 
also have other characteristics that cannot be observed in the present context, but which 
positively affect selection success (unobserved heterogeneity). These applicants might for 
instance be more thorough in writing their motivation letter or describing their project. 
Without access to more applicant information, it cannot be concluded with certainty 
what drives the TOEFL effect, but it can be stated that applicants handing in such a test 
instead of another proof of language competence have increased chances of being 
awarded the stipend. 
In addition to work experience and language skills, also facts and statements concerning 
the specific study-abroad project might act as ability signals. Evaluators might infer a 
student’s ability and academic potential not only from past performance indicators, but 
also from a student’s (study-abroad) intention and ambition. Therefore, it has also been 
tested whether or not the choice of the respective guest institution is likely to influence 
selection success. Again, due to the large number of different universities applicants 
plan to attend, guest institutions were clustered according to the following 
characteristics: guest institution region, reputation137, funding138, elite status139 as well 
as the amount of tuition the student expects to pay for the entire year abroad. Among 
these, none of the project specifics significantly impacts overall success. In pre-selection 
however, applicants wanting to spend their year abroad at a public university are invited 
to an interview more frequently than those aiming at attending a private university 
(odds ratio: 0.4). The same applies to highly-ranked institutions: Indicating to plan 
studying at a university which is ranked among the top 10 of all North American 
institutions in the respective field, is associated with a decreased invitation probability 
                                                
137  Measured as the subject-specific THE-ranking 2010/11 (in terms of both points and rank). For 
more information, visit http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/.  
138  Privately or publicly funded. 
139  Ivy League institution versus all others. 
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(odds ratio: 0.5). The amount of expected tuition has a positive impact in pre-selection 
which is, however, not significant in Estimation VIIa. The slight positive tendency of 
increased tuition fees is likely to be caused by some outliers. Taking the natural 
logarithm of tuition fees instead or simply running the estimation without the top 
percentile leads to a non-significant impact in all of the above mentioned estimations. 
Applicants indicating their wish to study at an institution located in the Northeast of the 
United States are invited significantly more frequently than applicants planning to 
spend a study-abroad year at the West Coast. This effect persists although guest 
institution ‘quality’ in terms of reputation is controlled for.140 Hence, the only plausible 
explanation for this differential effect is an evaluator’s scepticism towards applicants 
wanting to spend nine months at the US-West coast. Serious study intentions are more 
likely to be expected from someone choosing a university in the Northeast than from 
someone planning to go to Hawaii or California for instance. The following conditional 
effect plots illustrate the differential pre-selection success rates dependent on guest 
institution region. It can indeed be derived from figure 7-10 that applicants planning to 
go to the US-West have the lowest selection probability.  
 
Figure 7-10  Conditional Effect Plot: Guest Institution Region 
In final selection however, none of the above mentioned variables has a statistically 
significant impact on success rates. Hence, most project specifics rather seem to be taken 
into account during paper pre-selection, but do not influence awarding decisions in the 
end.  
                                                
140  As the most prestigious universities are traditionally located in the US-Northeast, one could 
assume that the region dummy instead measures prestige. 
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7.3.1.6 Interaction Effects: The Additive Effect of Ability Signals  
As explained above, ability signals are not only likely to have a discrete main effect on 
selection success, but are also supposed to have a combined additive effect, i.e. these 
signals are supposed to be complements rather than substitutes. Hence, several 
interactions of ability signals that have been revealed in the preceding analysis to 
influence selection outcomes independently have been tested jointly.141 As interaction 
effects in non-linear models vary as a function of all other independent variables, i.e. 
their value and significance is conditional on the values of other regressors, they cannot 
be interpreted globally as one would do in linear models (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, 
Wang and Ai 2004). Consequently, marginal effects cannot be used, as they also vary 
according to the respective position and slope of the distribution in non-linear models. 
Hence, interaction effects derived from logit models have to be interpreted using graphs 
depicting the interaction effect for each observation, i.e. each combination of independent 
variables, independently. In other words, for each probability of being awarded the 
stipend (as predicted by all other independent variables) there is a specific interaction 
effect.142 For the sake of brevity, only the graphs depicting at least some significant 
interaction effects will be presented subsequently.143  
The interaction effect of number of ECAs pursued and university grade averages is non-
significant. Replacing number of ECAs with ECA strength yields at least some 
significant positive interaction terms for applicants having an otherwise predicted 
probability around 0.6 to 0.8 and negative interaction effects for applicants with a very 
low probability of being awarded, as can be derived from figures 7-11 to 7-13. 
 
Figure 7-11  Interaction between University Grade Average and High Strength of ECAs 
                                                
141  For the sake of brevity, only results of interactions tested in Est. III, i.e. the overall success, 
will be presented. Results of interaction effects for other estimations are available on request. 
142  Graphs have been created using the inteff command suggested by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). 
143  The results for non-significant interactions are however also available on request. 
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Figure 7-12  Interaction between University Grade Average and Medium Strength of ECAs 
 
Figure 7-13  Interaction between University Grade Average and Low Strength of ECAs 
When interacting the fact that someone is supported by the ‘Studienstiftung des 
Deutschen Volkes’ with university grade averages, the following result is obtained. 
 
Figure 7-14  Interaction between University Grade Average and ‘Studienstiftung’ 
Only for some of the applicants having a predicted probability ranging between 0.3 and 
0.7, the interaction effect of Studienstiftung*University Grades reveals to be 
significantly positive. Recommendation interacted with university grades does not yield 
any significant interaction term.  
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Trying to find out whether the influence of university grades varies by type of 
institution, university grades were interacted with home institution type. No significant 
effect was found for technical university students, but for university of applied sciences 
students having an otherwise low probability of being selected (0.1 ൏ ܲ ൏ 0.4) the 
interaction effect is significantly positive as figure 7-15 shows. 
 
Figure 7-15  Interaction between University Grade Average and University of Applied Science 
Examining the interaction between university grades and field of study, one might 
expect significant results, as university grades are traditionally better in some fields of 
study than in others. However, the only significant interaction which can be found in 
this context is the interaction between ‘Linguistic/Cultural Sciences’ and university 
grades. As depicted in figure 7-16, this effect is significantly positive for most of the 
applicants whose predicted probability is between 0.2 and 0.8. 
 
Figure 7-16  Interaction between University Grade Average and Field=Linguistic/Cultural Sciences 
In summary and contrary to the expectations, most ability signals do not interact with 
each other. Each ability signal influences the success per se (main effect), but this 
influence is not reinforced or mitigated by changes in another ability signal (interaction 
effect). Thus, the complementary effect of ability signals cannot be supported. 
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7.3.2 The Influence of Individual Difference Factors 
As anticipated in the conceptual model, individual difference factors should not affect 
rational decision making. Neither applicant characteristics that are unrelated to 
productivity — indices in Spence’s (1973) terminology — nor rater characteristics should 
lead to different selection outcomes. However, in order to avoid omitted variable biases, 
several applicant and rater characteristics were included in the empirical estimation of 
(pre-)selection success (compare Hypothesis 5 and 6).  
7.3.2.1 Applicant Characteristics 
Applicant gender, ethnicity, age and physical attractiveness have been revealed to be the 
most important sources of discrimination in personnel selection.144 Consequently, their 
influence was tested in the present empirical analysis. Applicant physical attractiveness 
could not be measured due to applicant data protection rights. Hence, only the influence 
of whether or not an applicant was wearing glasses on the picture attached to the CV 
could be tested empirically. Nevertheless, both pre- and final selection evaluators were 
exposed to photos and saw the candidate in person respectively. Accordingly, physical 
attractiveness might have an impact on awarding decisions, but it was not possible to 
measure this effect with the available data. 
As anticipated, no applicant was discriminated due to gender. Neither in pre- nor in final 
selection, applicants of a specific gender were treated significantly more or less 
favorably, as can be derived from the very similar conditional effect plots in figure 7-17. 
 
Figure 7-17  Conditional Effect Plot: Applicant Gender 
The same applies to applicants with or without glasses. In line with the expectations, 
wearing glasses does not affect invitation or final selection probabilities. 
                                                
144  See Chapter 3.3.2.1 for a literature review. 
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Ethnicity could only be tested with the use of several proxies. Among these are the place 
of birth (in Germany or elsewhere), an applicant’s last name (German-sounding, yes or 
no) as well as the candidate’s citizenship (German, other or dual citizenship). Whereas 
the influence of the name itself and the citizenship revealed to be non-significant in all 
estimations, the country of birth did have a significant effect on invitation probabilities. 
Everything else equal, applicants born in Germany have 5.9 times the chance of 
‘surviving’ pre-selection and being invited to an interview than a candidate who was 
born outside of Germany. The conditional effect plot as well as the predicted success 
probabilities vary substantially according to the country of birth as presented in figure 7-
18 and table 7-18. 
 
Figure 7-18  Conditional Effect Plot: Country of Birth 
 
Born in Germany?  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
Yes  0.77  0.52  0.22 
No  0.37  0.71  0.11 
Table 7-18  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on Country of Birth 
The reader however needs to be reminded that only Germans or educational residents in 
Germany are entitled to apply for this specific program. Hence, the share of applicants 
who were not born in Germany is fairly low: Only 41 of all 504 applicants, i.e. 8.1%, were 
born in another country. Still, the effect is substantial for these 41 applicants. Standard 
applicants who were not born in Germany c.p. have a 40 pps lower probability of being 
invited to an interview. This difference in treatment does not occur in final selection and 
is not statistically significant in overall selection. Nevertheless, it needs to be analyzed 
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in more detail whether these applicants are in fact discriminated against (at least in pre-
selection) or whether this group of applicants exhibits other, previously not considered 
attributes that reduce invitation probabilities. Therefore, a comparison of a series of 
other variables was conducted for the two groups of applicants who were a) born in 
Germany and b) not born in Germany. This comparison is presented below in table 7-19. 
Variable  All Applicants  a)  b)  Difference (sign.) 
Pre‐Selection Score  75.42  75.78  71.37  4.41 (**) 
High School Grade Average  1.80  1.80  1.85  ‐0.05 (+) 
University Grade Average  1.94  1.93  2.00  ‐0.07 (+) 
Semester  4.39  4.41  4.15  0.26 (+) 
Home Institution in New Eastern State  5.20%  5.00%  7.30%  ‐2.3 Perc.pts. (+) 
Recipient of ‘BAföG’  22.60%  20.30%  48.80%  ‐28.5 Perc.pts. (***) 
Previous Merit‐Based Sponsorship  14.70%  14.70%  14.60%  0.1Perc.pts. (+) 
Recipient ‘Studienstiftung’  6.00%  6.00%  4.90%  1.1Perc.pts. (+) 
Has Applied for Other Sponsorships  42.00%  41.90%  43.90%  ‐2Perc.pts. (+) 
Private Guest Institution  27.60%  27.60%  26.80%  0.8Perc.pts. (+) 
Tuition Fees at Guest Inst. (in Th. US$)  14.20  14.40  11.70  2.8 (+) 
Participant in Study‐Abroad‐Program  27.80%  27.00%  36.60%  ‐9.6 Perc.pts. (*) 
Guest Institution at US‐Westcoast  21.23%  21.17%  21.95%  ‐0.8 Perc.pts. (+) 
Female Applicants  48.60%  48.20%  53.70%  ‐5.5 Perc.pts. (+) 
Professional Aim: Science/Research  19.80%  19.70%  22.00%  ‐2.3 Perc.pts. (+) 
Age  21.90  21.90  21.50  0.4 (**) 
Has Mentioned Parents in CV  33.50%  35.00%  17.10%  17.9 Perc.pts. (***) 
Previous Stays Abroad  1.70  1.77  0.90  0.87 (***) 
# of Completed Interships  1.50  1.52  1.20  0.32 (*) 
# of Part‐Time Jobs  1.92  1.92  1.95  ‐0.03 (+) 
Total Length of Part‐Time Jobs  28.60  28.40  31.20  ‐2.8 (+) 
Extracurricular Activities (any)  84.30%  85.70%  68.30%  17.4 Perc.pts. (***) 
# of LORs  1.27  1.27  1.29  ‐0.02 (+) 
Recommendation in LOR  9.25  9.26  9.16  0.1 (+) 
Recommender Knows Applicant Well  83.40%  83.30%  83.80%  ‐0.5 Perc.pts. (+) 
Length of LOR  1.22  1.23  1.13  0.1 (+) 
Recommender=Professor  68.10%  67.40%  75.60%  ‐8.2 Perc.pts. (+) 
Certified Language Skills  88.60  88.60  88.80  ‐0.2 (+) 
Has Handed in TOEFL  56.20%  57.50%  41.50%  16 Perc.pts.(**) 
# of Additional Foreign Languages  1.86  1.82  2.32  ‐0.5 (***) 
Differences significant on (*) 10%‐Level; (**) 5%‐Level; (***) 1%‐Level; (+) not significant 
Table 7-19  Comparison of Characteristics according to Country of Birth 
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It is apparent that there are some significant differences between these two groups of 
applicants in terms of other variables that might affect (pre-) selection success. 
Applicants not born in Germany receive the most important means-tested scholarship in 
Germany (BAföG) significantly more often, indicating a lower socio-economic status of 
their parents. Hence, it is feasible that evaluators might have expected these students to 
receive a means-tested scholarship for their study-abroad project as well and did not 
invite them as a consequence of this assumption. Applicants not born in Germany also 
take part in organized study-abroad programs more frequently than applicants born in 
Germany. Furthermore, it is salient that these applicants less frequently mention their 
parents in the CV — something more than one third of applicants born in Germany do. In 
terms of ECAs, ‘only’ 68.3% of all applicants born in another country do indicate to 
pursue any of these activities. Moreover, they demonstrate their language skills less 
frequently with the help of a TOEFL than German-born applicants do. Not surprisingly, 
applicants born in another country do speak significantly more foreign languages than 
German-born applicants. This difference would rather explain an increased invitation 
probability for this group of applicants though.  
Trying to answer the question whether these differences might drive the observable 
difference in treatment, it is obvious that most of them have already been included in the 
empirical estimations and are hence controlled for. Nonetheless, in order to empirically 
test whether actually these differences are driving the ‘not-born-in-Germany’ effect, 
several interactions were tested.145 They all revealed to be either not significant or in the 
case of ECAs, only significant for applicants with a very high probability of being invited 
(based on other independent variables). Consequently, over and above the already 
mentioned differences, applicants who were not born in Germany are treated less 
favorably in pre-selection. It might however be that the applications from these 
candidates do contain something we were not able to measure in this research project, 
but which has an impact on pre-selection success. Thus, the dummy variable ‘Born in 
Germany — yes or no’ could simply capture otherwise unobserved heterogeneity (such as 
limited expressive powers both in speech and writing). As a result, we cannot for sure 
attribute the less favorable invitation probabilities of applicants who were not born in 
Germany to any kind of discrimination. On the other hand though, a convincing 
explanation has yet to be provided. 
  
                                                
145  Interactions tested: BAföG*Born in Germany, ECAs*Born in Germany, Study-Abroad 
Program*Born in Germany and TOEFL*born in Germany. 
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Age discrimination was also empirically tested: When holding the length of study (in 
terms of the number of semesters already completed) constant, younger applicants are 
consistently, i.e. both in pre- and in overall selection, favored. A student aged 22.8 
instead of 21.8 years has 0.8 times the chance of being awarded the scholarship. This 
differential treatment is rooted in pre-selection, as the ‘older’ applicant has only 0.7 
times the chance of being invited to an interview.146 The decreasing invitation and 
overall selection probabilities as a function of applicant age are illustrated in figure 7-19. 
 
Figure 7-19  Conditional Effect Plots: Applicant Age 
In the final selection however, applicant age does not significantly impact selection 
success. In my opinion, the preferred invitation of young(er) applicants can nonetheless 
not be understood as discriminatory practice in the same way it occurs (and has been 
empirically demonstrated) in personnel selection. As a consequence of their increased 
human capital in terms of work experience older job applicants are more suitable than 
young ones in most occupations. Younger students however having achieved the same as 
(slightly) older ones can be perceived as being more motivated and as possessing a high 
academic and non-academic potential. Thus, favoring younger applicants is likely to be 
based on other factors such as motivation and determination which are simply reflected 
in age and should not be labeled age discrimination per se. 
  
                                                
146  It has also been tested whether applicant age has a quadratic influence on pre-selection/ 
overall selection success. However, including Age² in the estimation resulted in a non-
significant coefficient. It is indeed best for an applicant to be as young as possible (linear 
influence only). 
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The last applicant characteristic whose influence on selection success needs to be tested, 
is an applicant’s socio-economic status. The goal here is to find out whether or not 
applicants coming from upper (middle) class families are preferred by evaluators.147 
Unfortunatly, information on an applicant’s background was not consistently available. 
Only when applicants decided to mention their parents voluntarily in their CV,148 
information on the (presumable) socio-economic background could be gathered. As only 
one third of all applicants did mention their parents, it cannot be assumed that the 
variable ‘Parents mentioned as Academics’ precisely captures all applicants having an 
academic background, i.e. coming from families where at least one parent has graduated 
from a higher education institution. Nevertheless, this dummy was tested as a proxy for 
the academic-background effect. As can be read from table 7-20, mentioning academic 
parents in the CV has a significantly negative effect on pre-selection success, but not on 
final or overall success.  
Mentioned Parents as Academics in CV?  Predicted Success Probability 
Pre‐Selection Final Selection Overall Success 
Yes  0.59  0.71  0.19 
No  0.77  0.76  0.22 
Table 7-20  Predicted Success Probabilities dependent on Academic Background 
Indeed, applicants who reveal themselves as coming from academic families have 
significantly lower chances of being invited to an interview. Consequently, evaluators 
might be prompted to favor an applicant from a non-academic background over an 
applicant whose background is known to be academic whenever these two applicants are 
otherwise equally suited (c.p.). The rationale behind this favoritism might be the lower 
anticipated socio-economic status of these applicants. Alternatively, evaluators could 
generally treat applicants less favorably who mention their parents in their CV as these 
might be perceived as immature and parent-focused. This impression is confirmed as 
replacing the variable ‘Parents mentioned as Academic in CV’ with the more general one 
‘Parents mentioned in CV’ leads to similar negative results.149 Whichever explanation is 
preferred by the reader, the assumption that applicants from academic backgrounds are 
treated more favorably by stipend granting evaluators has to be explicitly rejected 
following the empirical analysis. Thus, we can safely conclude that the results of 
Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) were mainly driven by self-selection. 
                                                
147  This assumption was based on the findings of Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) 
presented in Chapter 3. 
148  A practice that used to be quite common in German applications some decades ago. 
149  However, these two effects cannot be distinguished clearly, as more than 70% of all applicants 
mentioning their parents in the CV do have an academic background. 
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7.3.2.2 Rater Characteristics 
Analogous to applicant characteristics, rater characteristics are not expected to influence 
rational decision processes. However, the literature review showed that e.g. rater gender 
may eventually have an effect on evaluations and sometimes even decision outcomes. 
Hence, rater characteristics were also included in the aforementioned estimations. In 
pre-selection situations, only one single evaluator decided on a paper application and 
hence his or her gender and age could be exactly measured. In line with previous 
empirical findings, female pre-selection evaluators revealed to be more lenient with the 
applicants they were assigned (table 7-21). 
Evaluator Gender (Pre‐Selection) Predicted Pre‐selection Success Probability  
Female  0.93 
Male  0.77 
Table 7-21 Predicted Success Probability dependent on Evaluator Gender 
Consequently, the six female pre-selection evaluators did not abide by the agreement of 
inviting only 50% of all applicants, but indeed invited 60% of all candidates they were 
asked to evaluate. This effect is global, i.e. unconditional on the applicant’s gender.150 In 
line with previous research findings in personnel selection, female evaluators tend to be 
not as rigorous with applicants as male evaluators are and want to give ‘borderline’ 
candidates a chance to present themselves in front of a committee. In final selection 
however, selection committees with a higher share of females did not award significantly 
more stipends than panels with less or even no female evaluators.151 
In terms of pre-selection evaluator age, another significant effect was found. Older 
evaluators c.p. tend to be slightly more lenient with applicants as the conditional effect 
plot for a standard applicant as a function of evaluator age in figure 7-20 shows.152 In 
final selection however, neither the average evaluator age nor the age disparity in a 
given panel leads to significantly different selection outcomes. 
 
                                                
150  An interaction between pre-selection evaluator and applicant gender was also tested, but will 
be discussed in section 7.3.3 (Social Factors). 
151  Again, interactions between share of female evaluators and applicant gender were included in 
the above mentioned estimations and will be discussed in section 7.3.3. 
152  Again, a quadratic influence of evaluator age was additionally tested, but did not have any 
influence on pre-selection success. The influence of (Evaluator Age)² was not significant.  
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Figure 7-20 Conditional Effect Plot: Evaluator Age 
7.3.3 The Influence of Social Factors 
From the list of social factors addressed in section 3.3.3, only (demographic) applicant-
rater similarity could be empirically tested with the available data. Although applicant 
fit and impression management tactics might have had a substantial influence on final 
evaluator decisions, they were simply not measured during interviews and could hence 
not be gathered in retrospect. Applicant-rater similarity could not be captured in terms 
of attitudinal similarity — as the original similarity-attraction paradigm hypothesizes — 
but had to be measured in different ways: gender, regional and institutional similarity. 
Gender similarity was modeled as an interaction term between applicant and rater 
gender as well as applicant gender and share of female evaluators in final selection 
panels, respectively. Regional similarity was modeled (for pre-selection only) as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 whenever the pre-selection evaluator teaches in the same 
federal state the applicant’s home institution is located in. Institutional similarity refers 
to the type of higher education institution153 the evaluator teaches at and the applicant 
attends, respectively. This type of similarity was also modeled as a dummy variable 
which equals one whenever the evaluator’s and the applicant’s institution were of the 
same type. Finally, a measure of overall applicant and evaluator similarity was 
introduced: As all evaluators are professors, it might be feasible that they perceive an 
applicant as more similar to them whenever he or she indicates to have a professional 
aim related to research or science. Such an aim has been indicated by 14.3% of all 
applicants.154  
                                                
153  University versus technical university versus university of applied sciences. 
154  The reader might be tempted to think about more similarity parameters, such as field of study 
and field of research, respectively. However, this similarity is given for all applicants, as the 
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Neither regional nor institutional similarity affected pre-selection outcomes 
significantly. Neither did the fact that an applicant stated to have a professional aim in 
research. Including the interaction effect between applicant and pre-selection evaluator 
gender into Estimation VIIa, yields the interaction effects depicted in figure 7-21. The z-
statistic on the right hand side of figure 7-21 however shows that this interaction effect 
is not significant at any position in the distribution.155 Hence, pre-selection evaluators do 
neither prefer candidates of their own gender over candidates of the opposite gender nor 
do they treat them less favorably. 
 
Figure 7-21  Interaction between Applicant and Evaluator Gender 
Analogous to this pre-selection interaction effect, the interaction between the share of 
female evaluators and applicant gender in final selection was tested. The results of this 
interaction effect as well as the z-statistic are displayed in figure 7-22. 
 
Figure 7-22  Interaction between Applicant Gender and Fraction of Female Panel Members 
                                                                                                                                                     
scholarship granting organization assigns applications to specific evaluators on the basis of the 
particular subject. Hence, all evaluators assess applications from students who are in the same 
field they work in. 
155  Both graphs have been created using the inteff command suggested by Norton, Wang and Ai 
(2004). This procedure is necessary as in non-linear models, the interaction effect varies 
according to the respective values of all other independent variables and can thus not be 
interpreted globally by simply looking at the marginal effect and its z-statistic created by 
including the interaction term in the estimation. 
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As can be derived from the z-statistic on the right hand side of figure 7-22, this 
interaction effect is not significant either. Hence, committees with higher shares of 
female evaluators do not treat female applicants more or less favorably than male 
applicants (and vice versa). Similarity-attraction in terms of gender was therefore 
detected neither in pre- nor in final selection.  
All in all, evaluators were not susceptive to the similarity-attraction phenomenon at 
least as measured in the current context and therefore did not favor applicants who 
appeared similar to them in terms of gender, regional, institutional and biographical 
characteristics. 
7.3.4 The Influence of Situational and Extraneous Factors 
Similar to individual difference and social factors, situational or extraneous factors are 
not expected to influence rational decision processes. Among the available (and testable) 
situational factors are interview panel size and composition156 as well as contrast 
effects157 and the interview time for final selection. Furthermore, the provision of pre-
selection scores can be understood as a situational factor as well, as it influences 
interviewer expectations. In pre-selection, the only extraneous factors that could be 
captured were evaluator gender and age — which have already been discussed in section 
7.3.2.2 — and the number of applications which were allocated to this specific evaluator. 
The number of direct competitors did not affect pre-selection success significantly 
though. 
As can be derived from Estimation XIII, panel size, i.e. the number of evaluators in the 
specific committee, did not influence final selection outcomes. Contrast effects did not 
occur either. However, the respective time of the day an interview is scheduled indeed 
affects selection success. An applicant being interviewed between 11 and 11:59 am, c.p. 
has only 0.23 times the chance of somebody being interviewed between 10 and 10:59 am 
(reference category). The differential success rates dependent on interview time are 
depicted in figure 7-23. 
                                                
156  Interview panel composition in terms of gender has already been discussed in sections 7.3.2.2 
and 7.3.3. 
157  Contrast effects describe the influence of the immediately preceding candidate’s performance 
on the success probability of the currently interviewed applicant. For more details on previous 
contrast effect research, see Chapter 3.3.4. 
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Figure 7-23 Conditional Effect Plot: Interview Time 
In order to eliminate the possibility of a differential circadian distribution of applicant 
quality, several objective ability signals were compared for applicants being interviewed 
at different times of the day, but no significant differences in any of these quality 
dimensions were found. Hence, it indeed seems to be the extraneous influence of 
interview time158 that decreases selection probabilities. Analogous to the findings by 
Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso (2011), this effect might be a symptom of evaluator 
fatigue and/or hunger after a long, uninterrupted duration of the meeting.  
Although most of the factors associated with pre-selection success did not reveal to be 
significant in final selection, the pre-selection score itself does have a significant positive 
effect on final selection success as figure 7-24 shows.  
 
Figure 7-24  Conditional Effect Plot: Pre-Selection Score 
                                                
158  Or some other hitherto unobservable characteristics of applicants being invited at this time. 
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Accordingly, either applicants with a high pre-selection score do also possess 
characteristics that are related to final selection success, but could not be measured with 
the available data, or final selection evaluators do build expectations on the basis of pre-
selection scores and consequently use this metric as decision support. 
7.4 SUPPLEMENT - CONFIGURATIONS TO SUCCESS: BOOLEAN LOGIT REGRESSION 
As anticipated in the conceptual model and revealed in the previous sections, not one 
single applicant characteristic is likely to be decisive for success or failure in a 
scholarship selection process. Several ability signals have been demonstrated to affect 
selection outcomes significantly, e.g. high school and university grades, recommendation 
and ECAs. However, most interactions between these different kinds of signals have not 
yielded significant results and reinforcing effects were not found. One reason for this 
might be the model specification. Simple logit regression is not able to model interaction 
effects that are neither linear nor additive in nature. Nevertheless, it is very likely that 
scholarship applicants need to possess a certain set of characteristics to be successful. 
For instance, it might be necessary, but not sufficient to have excellent grades in 
university. A high intensity of ECAs might be advantageous for candidates with 
particularly good grades, but this signal might per se not be strong enough for applicants 
with rather poor grades to differentiate from the rest of the applicant pool. 
Consequently, each single characteristic does not determine selection success, but 
certain configurations of several attributes and characteristics may be likely to lead to a 
positive outcome. This kind of causal complexity however needs to be examined using 
research methods other than simple logistic regression. 
One approach to measuring the impact of different causal mechanisms on a given 
outcome is to apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Using configurational 
comparative methods such as crisp set or fuzzy set QCA, the researcher is able to explore 
causal substitutability and can discover multiple paths to a given outcome (Ragin 1987). 
However, this approach is rather case-study oriented and qualitative in nature and 
hence better suited for a low number of observations (Buche and Carstensen 2009). On 
the other hand, conventional statistical, i.e. variable oriented, methods such as logistic 
regression are only able to identify the net effect of one variable (and some simple 
interactions of these variables) while holding everything else constant, i.e. in isolation, 
but provide robust results of the probable validity of postulated hypotheses. Whenever 
enough cases and enough variation within these observations exist, such correlational 
analysis can be conducted (Hellström 2011; Porcu, Puggioni and Tedesco 2007).  
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A method that combines the advantages of both statistical and configurational analyses 
is Boolean logit as suggested by Braumoeller (2003). It is a quantitative, i.e. variable 
oriented, method that is “designed to evaluate conditional or asymmetric causal claims” 
(Hellström 2011, 73) by the use of Boolean logic. In this analysis, the impact of various 
‘causal paths’, i.e. configurations of variables, which together make the dependent 
variable occur, can be modeled with the help of the Boolean operators and and or. The 
impact of each causal path is in turn determined by some vector of independent 
variables. Therefore, it can be measured how “multiple causes interact with one another 
[…], and the manner in which they interact is described by the logical operators ‘and’ 
and ‘or’ ” (Braumoeller 2003, 210). With the help of Maximum-Likelihood techniques, the 
impact of each causal mechanism (i.e. the vector of several independent variables) can 
then be tested. In other words, “[p]redictors influence the response variable singularly, 
and in combination with each other” (Porcu, Puggioni and Tedesco 2007, 196). This again 
shows the (non-additive) causal complexity that can be measured with the help of 
Boolean logit. 
More formally, for each condition (or configuration/causal mechanism) ܣ௞, a distinct 
latent dependent variable is assumed. Boolean logit then models the probabilities of each 
of these unobserved, i.e. latent, variables in a Boolean fashion as indicated in the model 
(either and or or). These conditions (ܣ௞) then together or separately lead to the occurance 
of ܻ. Each of the conditions is determined by some vector of independent variables. The 
same independent variable may be included in different conditions ܣ௞ without any 
multicollinearity constraints (Porcu, Puggioni and Tedesco 2007). 
One of the shortcomings of Boolean logit however is that the researcher needs to 
preliminarily posit a model (probability statements) and anticipate theoretically and 
subjectively how the conditions (ܣ௞) are combined to lead to the occurance of ܻ 
(Braumoeller 2003; Hellström 2011). But with the help of previously run standard logit 
regressions and some descriptive statistics, hypotheses on the respective type(s) of 
causal complexity can be developed. Hence, Boolean logit is  
“neither an alternative nor a method better than the standard logistic one, but it 
does offer an advantage: it allows the researcher to consider models that consider 
causal complexity. […] [Hence,] … Boolean logit is a useful tool for implementing 
sensitivity analyses of other models and re-enforcing the evidence that emerges 
regarding the meaning of the predictors studied” (Porcu, Puggioni and Tedesco 
2007, 205). 
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As such, Boolean logit results in the current stipend awarding context will be presented 
only in addition to the previously discussed standard logistic results.  
Assumptions about multiple paths leading to selection success are derived from the 
results of Estimations I-XIII and will be discussed subsequently. Building on the 
previous results, it seems quite feasible that success is mainly dependent on previous 
academic performance measured in terms of high school and university grades. 
Applicants with poor grades are basically not awarded the stipend whereas better grades 
significantly increase selection probabilities. Consequently, a minimum academic 
performance seems necessary for selection success and a first condition or causal 
mechanism (ܣଵ) leading to ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1 can be defined as ‘academic performance’.  
However, not everybody with grades better than ܺ is subsequently awarded the stipend. 
This leads to the assumption that academic performance is only effective in combination 
with other signals. As has been shown in the (standard) logistic regressions, candidates 
who intensively pursued an ECA (high strength of ECAs) did have better chances to be 
awarded the scholarship than those who did not pursue any ECA at all. Thus, a second 
condition leading to selection success (ܣଶ) can be defined as ‘extracurricular activities’. 
But ECAs alone are not likely to explain somebody’s success in selection either. Hence, 
pursuing an ECA intensively will only be a sufficient, but not a necessary condition and 
will only be effective in combination with sufficient academic performance (ܣଵ). 
Another way of (additionally) differentiating from the applicant pool is to be strongly 
recommended by somebody credible, for instance a professor. The corresponding causal 
mechanism or configuration (ܣଷ) could be named ‘recommendation’. This again will also 
not be promising per se, but is likely to only impact selection success in combination with 
sufficient academic performance. 
Finally, it has been discovered that previous awards positively affect selection 
probabilities. Irrespective of the effects that drive the evaluator’s preference for previous 
recipients of other (merit-based) sponsorships,159 the mere fact of being previously 
awarded by another institution might be captured in a fourth configuration (ܣସ) named 
‘previous awards’. Similar to ܣଶ and ܣଷ, this causal mechanism is anticipated to impact 
selection success only in combination with sufficient academic performance.  
                                                
159  As has been discussed in Chapter 7.3.1.4, the preferential treatment might either be explained 
by a mere Matthew Effect or by unobserved heterogeneity which is captured in the dummy 
variable ‘Sponsored by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’. 
7 Econometric Analysis of Selection Success  
187 
 
Consequently, a complex combination of the following form is likely to lead to selection 
success: 
ܣଵ ∩ ሺܣଶ ∪ ܣଷ ∪ ܣସሻ 
Having excellent grades in this combination is a necessary condition for selection 
success, but not sufficient. Only in combination with either a high level of ECAs (ܣଶ) or 
outstanding recommendations (ܣଷ) or previous awards (ܣସ) ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1 is predicted to occur. 
The results of the Boolean logit modeling exactly this kind of complex combination are 
shown in table 7-22. 
Boolean Logit Estimates         
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Path 1: 
Academic Performance (ܣଵ) 
High School Grade Average ‐1.144 0.302  ‐3.79  0.000
University Grade Average ‐1.752 0.355  ‐4.94  0.000
Constant  ‐0.603 0.293  ‐2.06  0.039
Path 2:  
Academic Performance and ECAs 
(ܣଵ ∩ ܣଶ) 
One Type of ECAs  13.800  1204.86  0.01  0.991 
Constant  ‐14.374  1204.86  ‐0.01  0.990 
Path 3:  
Academic Performance and 
Recommendation 
 (ܣଵ ∩ ܣଷ) 
Recommendation  1.625  0.952  1.71  0.008 
Recommender= Professor  0.959  0.855  1.12  0.262 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  0.665  0.982  0.68  0.498 
Constant  ‐0.918  1.155  ‐0.80  0.427 
Path 4:  
Academic Performance and 
Previous Awards 
 (ܣଵ ∩ ܣସ) 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   128.158  .  .  . 
Applied for other Scholarships  13.697  714.177  0.02  0.985 
Constant   ‐13.330  714.178  ‐0.02  0.985 
n 
Log‐Likelihood 
Wald Chi² (Prob> Chi²) 
450 
‐214.06 
48.98 (0.000) 
(54 missing values generated) 
Correctly predicted 343 of 450 cases, or 76.22% 
Table 7-22  Boolean Logit Estimates Causal Complexity I 
It appears from the Boolean logit estimates that the predicted causal complexity does not 
exist in the current case. Only academic performance as measured in terms of university 
and high school grades independently affects selection outcomes, but a joint influence of 
academic performance and ECAs (path 2) or academic performance and previous awards 
(path 4) could not be confirmed. Among the variables forming path 3, only the 
standardized recommendation (on a scale from 0 to 10) affects success in combination 
with academic performance significantly. All other influences disappear when combined 
with academic performance. 
For the sake of completeness, other plausible causal connections of the above mentioned 
four conditions have also been tested and their results will be displayed below. It is 
possible, that all of the above mentioned conditions jointly make ஺ܻ௪ ൌ 1 occur. This 
causal connection is represented as follows 
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ܣଵ ∩ ܣଶ ∩ ܣଷ ∩ ܣସ 
Results of this Boolean logit Model are shown in table 7-23. Again, this causal 
complexity cannot explain selection success sufficiently and only academic performance 
seems to drive selection outcomes. 
Boolean Logit Estimates         
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Path 1: 
Academic Performance (ܣଵ) 
High School Grade Average ‐1.172 0.419  ‐3.51  0.000
University Grade Average ‐2.162 0.485  ‐4.46  0.000
Constant  ‐0.163 0.410  ‐0.40  0.691
Path 2:  
Academic Performance and 
ECAs (ܣଵ ∩ ܣଶ) 
One Type of ECAs  ‐15.545  1807.63  ‐0.01  0.993 
Constant  17.331  1807.63  0.01  0.992 
Path 3:  
Academic Performance, ECAs 
and Recommendation 
 (ܣଵ ∩ ܣଶ ∩ ܣଷ) 
Recommendation  1.051  0.724  1.45  0.147 
Recommender= Professor  15.646  1647.16  0.01  0.992 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  16.357  1647.16  0.01  0.922 
Constant  ‐15.086  1647.16  ‐0.01  0.993 
Path 4:  
Academic Performance, ECAs, 
Recommendation and  
Previous Awards 
 (ܣଵ ∩ ܣଶ ∩ ܣଷ ∩ ܣସ) 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   17.889  3869.94  0.00  0.996 
Applied for other Scholarships  0.621  0.539  1.15  0.250 
Constant   0.662  0.572  1.16  0.247 
n 
Log‐Likelihood 
Wald Chi² (Prob> Chi²) 
450 
‐212.71 
28.77 (0.000) 
(54 missing values generated) 
Correctly predicted 352 of 450 cases, or 78.22% 
Table 7-23  Boolean Logit Estimates Causal Complexity II 
Finally, it is conceivable that applicants having achieved ‘only’ poor or average grades, 
could increase their chances to be selected by exhibiting a combination of strong ECA(s), 
excellent recommendation and previous awards. Hence, the Boolean logic behind this 
scenario would be  
ܣଵ ∪ ሺܣଶ ∩ ܣଷ ∩ ܣସሻ 
The corresponding results for this model however once again show that only path 1, i.e. 
academic performance, influences selection outcomes significantly and consequently the 
results are not displayed here. In summary, only one of the anticipated multiple causal 
paths leading to selection success indeed affects selection outcomes, i.e. academic 
performance. Either academic performance in terms of grades is really the most 
important predictor of selection success, or more complex causal connections occur which 
cannot be modeled by Boolean logit.160 Consequently, the Boolean logit results confirm 
the inconsistent interaction effects found in section 7.3.1.6 (the additive effect of 
different ability signals). 
                                                
160  The maximum number of causal paths which can be included in the Stata command mlboolean 
is four (Braumoeller 2004). 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The present thesis is the first to systematically address scholarship selection processes 
in Germany. Previous research in this area is fragmentary at best and rather descriptive 
than analytical. Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) for instance were the only 
researchers trying to find out how the ‘average’ stipend awardee looks like. With the 
help of a survey among actual scholarship holders, they adopted a questionnaire 
approach and e.g. found out that the proportion of upper class students is 
disproportionately high among awardees. This result corroborates the assertion that 
mainly already-privileged students benefit from merit-based scholarships. However, 
Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla (2009) were only able to observe stipend awardee 
characteristics, but could not differentiate between supply- and demand-side effects. As a 
consequence, they could not deduce from their results whether e.g. upper class students 
do apply more frequently for such a scholarship (self-selection effects) or whether 
evaluators preferentially select these applicants (screening effects). In contrast to 
previous investigations, the present study aimed at clearly separating self-selection and 
screening effects. It is a first attempt to shed some light on factors of success of both 
written scholarship applications and face-to-face stipend awarding interviews. Using 
actual applications for a study-abroad scholarship offered by the DAAD, it was 
empirically tested which signals and indices influence evaluator decisions and selection 
outcomes. 
Summary of Results 
The empirical analysis of stipend selection processes has initially revealed that 
undergraduate students applying for a study-abroad scholarship do form a specific sub-
group of all (undergraduate) students (who want to go abroad). To mention only a few 
differences, applicants do achieve significantly better grades — both in high school and 
university — and do engage more actively in extracurricular activities than the entire 
student body. Additionally, applicants attending higher education institutions in some 
specific German regions do apply more frequently than students from other German 
regions. Accordingly, applicants represent a positively self-selected group of all students 
in Germany. The decision to apply seems to be the result of an unobservable decision 
process made by every potential applicant. Presumably, potential applicants try to 
anticipate selection criteria that might be utilized by evaluators and do choose to apply 
only when they perceive their individual probability to be awarded the stipend to be 
sufficiently high. 
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Whenever an applicant decided to apply, the institutional decision process resulting in 
either success or failure could be examined. In the present investigation, it was found 
that the decisions are mainly based on rational considerations and consequently, 
applicants’ ability signals predominantly affect selection outcomes. Ability signals that 
have been identified to be particularly influential are aspects connected with past 
performance (biodata) such as grades, recommendations and extracurricular activities. 
Intentions and expectations, e.g. in terms of desired guest institution type and quality, 
do only play a minor role.  
It has also been found that signaling in the scholarship ‘market’ also works partly 
different than in the job market. Whereas grades are considered to have only a low 
validity to predict future job market success, they seem to be a valid and readily used 
signal in scholarship application processes.  
Additionally, letters of reference — a selection tool which is undervalued in hiring 
decisions — play an important role in scholarship applications. Especially, the status of 
the recommending person (professor) helps the applicant to pass the first hurdle in a 
selection process: Evaluators might be impressed by the student’s ability to have already 
established a good reputation at the very beginning of their studies. An undergraduate 
student already staying in close contact with a professor might be instantly perceived as 
being an excellent student.  
The consideration of family background and/or part-time employment in pre-selection 
indicates a certain social aspect (or: positive discrimination) to scholarship awarding: not 
only the best in terms of academic achievement, but also those who seem to be more in 
(financial) need are preferentially selected as applicants indicating their parents to have 
an academic background are less frequently invited to an interview. Consequently, the 
assumption that stipends are predominantly awarded to students with upper class 
background was not supported and the results of Middendorff, Isserstedt and Kandulla 
(2009) seem to represent supply-side effects (self-selection) only. Hence, upper class 
students might be more inclined to apply for a merit-based scholarship than (otherwise 
similar) middle or working class students, but upon condition that both decided to apply, 
evaluators c.p. do not choose the upper class applicant over the working class applicant, 
but the other way round. 
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A positive effect of being previously elected by another scholarship granting institution 
(especially the ‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’) could be found in both pre- and 
final selection: Those already being supported by another institution seem to benefit 
both in paper applications and during selection interviews. Whether their specific 
advantage arises from a mere Matthew Effect, their general conversance with selection 
interviews or whether they possess some other qualifications (e.g. eloquence or 
personality) that could not be considered in this study (unobserved heterogeneity), could 
not be determined in this study and still needs to be investigated in future research.  
Evidence for discriminatory behavior based on applicant individual difference factors 
was only found during pre-selection. Everything else being equal, applicants who were 
born outside of Germany face an inherent disadvantage. Although only 41 of all 504 
applicants were not born in Germany, the reasons for their ‘discrimination’ still need to 
be examined. As having a German high school diploma and studying at a German higher 
education institution are prerequisites for applying in the investigated program, there 
should be no doubt about the appropriateness of these applicants’ academic qualification. 
As diverse qualified information is made available in the application, information 
asymmetries should usually be small and statistical discrimination is not likely to occur. 
Therefore, only taste-based discrimination might be the rationale behind placing these 
applicants at a competitive disadvantage. Alternatively, unobserved heterogeneity could 
serve as an explanation for the less favorable pre-selection treatment of applicants who 
were not born in Germany: It is possible that this group of applicants accidentally differs 
from all other applicants in some characteristics that we were not able to observe or 
measure in the current project. The assumption that other unobserved variables than 
pure discrimination drive the ‘Not-born-in-Germany’ effect is reinforced by the fact that 
neither having a foreign-sounding name nor having a foreign citizenship is associated 
with significantly worse awarding probabilities, but solely an applicant’s country of birth 
has a significant negative impact on awarding probabilities.  
In addition to applicant individual difference factors, also some evaluator characteristics 
have been shown to lead to different selection outcomes. In line with previous findings 
from personnel selection, female pre-selection evaluators proved to be more lenient when 
it comes to interview invitations (regardless of applicant gender). In panel interview 
situations however, the fraction of female evaluators in the panel does not affect 
selection outcomes (neither for female nor for male applicants). 
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During final selection interviews, one of the few significant (and testable) factors of 
influence was interview time. Applicants being interviewed between 11:00 and 11:59 am 
do have significantly lower chances of being awarded the stipend (everything else being 
equal). This competitive disadvantage might be explained by a combination of evaluator 
behavior and the structural framework of decision making. Listening to interviews from 
9 a.m. until 7 p.m. with only a short lunch break from 1 to 2 pm might be an exhausting 
task leading to especially rigorous decisions during certain spots in the middle of the 
day. If indeed evaluator fatigue is the explanation for differential success probabilities, 
an increased interview structure as presented in the literature review might serve as a 
remedy for this extraneous (and unsolicited) effect. Reliable statements about the 
rationale behind this factor of influence however can only be made after altering (i.e. 
restructuring) the final selection process and replicating the present investigation. 
To sum up, success factors of applications differ widely in pre- and final selection. 
Whereas signals provided in written scholarship applications (e.g. grades, language tests 
and extracurricular activities) have been revealed to be extremely effective in 
scholarship pre-selection and are able to explain a high portion of variation in pre-
selection outcomes, most of these influences (except for university grades) become 
obsolete as soon as the applicant gets the opportunity to present herself in a face-to-face 
interview. This closely corresponds to the P-J and P-O fit constructs in personnel 
selection: Recruiters sift applications on the basis of applicants’ KSAs and do only invite 
candidates with sufficient P-J fit to an interview. Subsequently, final selection is based 
on the level of P-O fit, i.e. mainly on applicant characteristics that could not be revealed 
from paper applications, but are only observable in face-to-face interviews.  
In the present case of scholarship applications, interview success also seems to be driven 
by certain unobserved variables and an omitted variable bias is very likely to occur. Part 
of the unobserved heterogeneity may be explained by applicant impression management, 
eloquence, personality or presentation skills as these have been found to influence 
interview success in a series of other empirical studies. All of these factors however could 
not be tested with the available applicant information and would have entailed further 
complex (and expensive) data collection. Overall, social factors such as applicant-rater 
similarity (at least in terms of gender, regional and institutional similarity) do not seem 
to bias the selection outcome in scholarship applications, neither in pre- nor in final 
selection decisions. Unlike recruiters, stipend awarding evaluators do not treat 
applicants more favorably just on the basis of (demographic or attitudinal) similarity. 
This result illustrates vividly that recruiters and stipend awarding evaluators follow 
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distinct utility functions. The absence of any similarity-attraction effect in stipend 
awarding decisions might be explained by a certain emotional distance between rater 
and applicant. As future contact intensity between evaluator and stipend awardee is 
very low (if non-existent), personal similarity does only play a minor part in scholarship 
selection decisions.  
All in all, decision processes in stipend awarding decisions seem to be much more 
rational and especially based on applicant ability signals than personnel selection 
decisions. 
 
Relation to Theory 
From a sociological perspective, it was hypothesized that (merit-based) scholarship 
granting organizations do aim at selecting future elite members. This objective has 
explicitly been stated by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF 2009). Consequently, several elite theories were consulted for theoretically 
explaining stipend awarding decisions. In line with functional elite theory, an applicant’s 
field of study did not affect stipend awarding success in the investigated selection 
process. As a result, access to stipends is equally gained to students from all fields. 
Assuming that the investigated stipend facilitates access to elite positions, the notion of 
several parallel functional elites is indeed supported by the empirical results. 
Additionally, the existence of performance elites is supported by the previously discussed 
results as performance is the main driver of stipend awarding decisions.  
From an economic perspective on the other hand, the selection process is interpreted as 
an investment decision under uncertainty. Based on agency theory, the principal (here: 
the evaluator) is not able to observe the true quality of the agent (here: the applicant) as 
information asymmetries occur. As a result, agents need to signal their ability and 
principals need to screen their applications. Economically rational decisions are then 
entirely based on ability signals and inefficiencies such as discrimination based on 
applicant (or rater) individual difference factors do not occur. The present study has 
revealed that stipend awarding decisions are based on ability signals to a great extent. 
Only very few indices (e.g. country of birth) do have an impact on awarding decisions. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
The present thesis was the first to systematically address the scholarship selection 
process by empirically testing which signals and indices influence evaluator decisions 
and consequently, selection outcomes.  
Due to the rather small number of observations (429 usable application sets in pre-
selection and 226 in final selection) and the specificity of the investigated program 
however, the results need to be reinforced by other investigations of a similar kind. In 
order to obtain more general results, future studies also need to examine selection 
processes in countries other than Germany. Moreover, future research should focus more 
on certain variables that revealed to be of importance in the current study (e.g. grades, 
place of birth, extracurricular activities). Field experiments (or even correspondence 
studies) could actively manipulate certain signals and indices and measure their 
respective effect more precisely.  
Furthermore, the present study’s results may be influenced by the specific requirements 
of a stay abroad (language skills for instance). Subsequent research should additionally 
address other scholarship purposes in order to find more general success factors in 
scholarship applications. Likewise, different selection methods and their respective 
influence should be investigated in future research projects. Particularly interesting 
could be whether or not the application success factors differ when other evaluators than 
professors decide upon selection or rejection.  
Nonetheless, the present study is able to provide (education) economists and policy 
advisors with a better understanding of scholarship selection processes and the nature 
and composition of student elites arising from such academic distinctions. The empirical 
method developed for and applied in the present thesis can be understood as some kind 
of controlling mechanism for stipend awarding decisions in general. As a consequence, it 
can be easily transferred to stipend awarding processes other than the ones observed at 
the DAAD and can serve as a powerful to control for the degree of stipend goal 
attainment. 
With reference to the initially presented objective of counteracting the imminent long-
term shortage of skilled labor in Germany by offering more merit-based scholarships, 
other research questions emerge which could not be answered with the available 
research design.  
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One of these important questions is to find out whether the ambitious goal stated by the 
BMBF (and in the DAAD’s mission statement) is accomplished: Do merit-based 
scholarships really attract the most promising students? In other words, do stipend 
awardees really turn out to be future elite members? This however can only be studied in 
a longitudinal follow-up research design illustrating later life performance of stipend 
awardees. Only by tracking the long-term career-path of stipend awardees, one might be 
able to find out whether or not evaluators chose the ‘right’ applicants. Although the 
present thesis is not able to answer all the questions connected with stipend awarding 
decisions, it has laid the foundation of an innovative, promising and socially relevant 
strand of research that requires constant attention in future. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS — ‘NO SHOWS’ VS. ‘INTERVIEWED APPLICANTS’ 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Sample 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Pre‐Selection Score  254  84.83  5.37  73  100  Invited & Interviewed 
  18  86.53  4.78  78  94  Invited, but did not show up 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Academic Achievement             
High School Grade Average  254  1.56  .466  1  3.3  Invited & Interviewed 
  18  1.52  .392  1.1  2.3  Invited, but did not show up 
(Preliminary) University Grade 
Average 
248  1.69  .445  1  3.5  Invited & Interviewed 
18  1.78  .451  1.07  2.64  Invited, but did not show up 
Field of Studies             
Engineering  254  .142  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Mathematics, Informatics and 
Natural Sciences 
254  .185  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Law, Economics and Social 
Sciences 
254  .350  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .333  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  254  .295  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .278  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Other  254  .028  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .056  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Type of Home Institution             
University of Applied Sciences  253  .079  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .056  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Technical University  253  .154  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .278  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
University  253  .767  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .667  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Duration of Study             
Semester  254  4.41  1.48  2  14  Invited & Interviewed 
18  4.22  1.77  2  14  Invited, but did not show up 
Work Experience Part‐Time             
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Job only at University  
254  .181  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .222  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Jobs both at & outside 
University 
254  .252  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .222  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Job only outside University  
254  .358  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .389  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
No Part‐Time Job   254  .209  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Other Scholarships             
‘BAföG’  254  .181  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .111  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Previous Merit‐Based Stipend  254  .232  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .333  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’  254  .102  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Also Applied for Other 
Scholarships 
254  .492  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .556  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
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Number of Extracurricular Activities (ECAs) 
One Type of ECAs  254  .260  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .389  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
More than one Type of ECAs  254  .587  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .611  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
No Extracurricular Activity  254  .154  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .000  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Letter of Reference             
Recommendation  246  9.46  .493  8  10  Invited & Interviewed 
17  9.40  .545  7.75  10  Invited, but did not show up 
Recommending 
Person=Professor 
254  .744  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .611  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Good Relation to 
Recommending Person 
241  .905  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .889  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Language Proficiency             
Language Skills  253  90.58  7.35  59.2  100  Invited & Interviewed 
17  90.07  8.43  70  100  Invited, but did not show up 
TOEFL  254  .756  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .389  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Project‐Specific Statements             
Tuition Fees (in Th. $US)  248  15.626  14.28  0  80  Invited & Interviewed 
18  20.471  18.52  0  51.81  Invited, but did not show up 
Private Guest Institution  254  .283  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .222  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Top10 Guest Institution  254  .181  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .278  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Guest Institution in Canada  254  .213  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Guest Institution in US‐Midwest  254  .118  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Guest Institution in US‐
Northeast 
254  .252  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .111  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Guest Institution in US‐South  254  .181  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .222  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Guest Institution in US‐West  254  .236  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .333  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Applicant Characteristics             
Gender  254  .492  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .556  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Glasses  253  .213  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .222  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Born in Germany  254  .945  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .945  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Age  254  21.67  1.18  19  27  Invited & Interviewed 
18  21.22  1.44  19  24  Invited, but did not show up 
Parents=Academics  254  .201  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .167  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Pre‐Selection Evaluator Characteristics and Pre‐Selection Situation 
Evaluator Gender  254  .205  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .278  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
Evaluator Age  253  53.74  9.76  33  68  Invited & Interviewed 
18  51.06  8.07  40  68  Invited, but did not show up 
Year             
Selection Year  254  .508  ‐  0  1  Invited & Interviewed 
18  .667  ‐  0  1  Invited, but did not show up 
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APPENDIX 2: PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS 
Probit Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  P ‐ I  P ‐ IIa  P ‐ IIb  P ‐ IIc  P ‐ III 
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.708*** ‐0.614*** ‐0. 577***  ‐0.560***  ‐0.545***
University Grade Average  ‐1. 012*** ‐0.990*** ‐0.954***  ‐0.972***  ‐0.922***
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐0.571 ‐0.516 ‐0.386  ‐0.385
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.299 ‐0.335 ‐0.316  ‐0.285
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.325  ‐/‐
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.158  ‐/‐ 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.139  ‐/‐
Other Fields of Study  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.484  ‐/‐
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills ‐/‐ 0.019* 0.019*  0.020*  0.018
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 0.487*** 0.542***  0.562***  0.513***
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job
at University  ‐/‐ 0.126 0.123 0.150  0.159
both at University & outside University ‐/‐ 0.039 0.074 0.106  0.133
outside University   ‐/‐ ‐0.066 ‐0.033 ‐0.002  0.010
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  0.055  0.054  0.082  0.039 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.147  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.662**  0.662**  0.663** 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  0.198  0.199  0.178  0.238 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.002  ‐0.003
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ 0.161 0.170 0.210  0.203
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐/‐ 0.028 ‐0.021 ‐0.036  0.006
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ 0.052 0.076 0.063  0.138
US‐Midwest ‐/‐ 0.285 0.266 0.242  0.310
US‐North‐East ‐/‐ ‐0.169 ‐0.186 ‐0.212  ‐0.163
US‐South  ‐/‐ 0.082 0.094 0.062  0.010
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.593** 0.569**  0.547**  0.569**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.585** 0.555**  0.562**  0.566**
Letter of Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ 0.119 0.123 0.129  0.122
Recommending Person=Professor  ‐/‐ 0.566*** 0.553***  0.560***  0.587***
Good Relation to Recommending Person ‐/‐ 0.414* 0.410*  0.400  0.406
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.042
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.173
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.501
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.159**
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.104
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐0.634*** ‐2.442*** ‐2.461***  ‐2.613***  ‐3.047***
Observations    429  429  429  429  429 
Pseudo R²    0.191 0.289 0.296 0.300  0.310
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
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Probit Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number
Dependent Variable: Invitation (Yes=1 No=0)  P ‐ IV P ‐ Va P ‐ Vb P ‐ VI  P ‐ VIIa P ‐ VIIb
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.838*** ‐0.640*** ‐0.671*** ‐0.673***  ‐0.767*** ‐0.880***
University Grade Average  ‐0.974*** ‐0.831*** ‐0.792*** ‐0.828***  ‐0.805*** ‐1.863***
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐0.814** ‐0.796** ‐0.641  ‐0.377  ‐0.140
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.365 ‐0.414 ‐0.306  ‐0.171  ‐0.173
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.540
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐0.158 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.494*
Other Fields of Study ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.295
Language 
Proficiency 
Language Skills  ‐/‐ 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026**  0.024** 0.023**
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 0.808*** 0.687*** 0.821***  0.806*** 0.839***
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job 
at University   ‐/‐ ‐0.062 ‐0.056 0.004  ‐0.043  ‐0.055
both at University & outside 
University  ‐/‐  0.414  0.455*  0.549*  0.619**  0.626** 
outside University   ‐/‐ ‐0.189 ‐0.153 ‐0.149  ‐0.230  ‐0.205
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  ‐0.231  ‐0.220  ‐0.268  ‐0.353  ‐0.335 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.533**  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  1.301**  1.227**  1.115*  1.200** 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  ‐0.097  ‐0.096  ‐0.050  ‐0.028  ‐0.016 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ 0.009 0.010 0.009  0.007  0.010
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ ‐0.428* ‐0.413* ‐0.423  ‐0.520*  ‐0.502*
Guest Institution=Top10 University   ‐/‐ ‐0.401* ‐0.423* ‐0.379  ‐0.390  ‐0.335
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ 0.003 0.041 0.020  0.081  0.159
US‐Midwest  ‐/‐ ‐0.046 ‐0.062 0.029  0.077  0.037
US‐Northeast  ‐/‐ 0.409 0.443 0.506*  0.611** 0.619**
US‐South  ‐/‐ 0.183 0.214 0.235  0.247  0.218
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.519** 0.549** 0.516*  0.605** 0.616**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.603** 0.607*** 0.616**  0.711*** 0.710***
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ 0.339** 0.348** 0.342**  0.387** 0.395***
Recommending Person=Professor  ‐/‐ 0.570*** 0.561*** 0.659***  0.726*** 0.814***
Good Relation to Recommender  ‐/‐ 0.828*** 0.872*** 0.926***  0.941*** 0.854***
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.124  0.069  0.044
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.231  0.267  0.275
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.976***  1.010*** 0.977***
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.213**  ‐0.236** ‐0.241***
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.400**  ‐0.459** ‐0.492**
Rater  
Characteristics 
Evaluator Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.785*** 0.851***
Evaluator Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.021*  0.039*
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Part. in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     0.214*** ‐1.872*** ‐1.957*** ‐2.971***  ‐3.328*** ‐3.520***
Observations    423  423  423  423  423  423 
Pseudo R²    0.226 0.418 0.422 0.457  0.473  0.488
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
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Probit Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  P ‐ VIII P ‐ IXa P ‐ IXb  P ‐ Xa  P ‐ Xb
Academic 
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.451** ‐0.353 ‐0.290 ‐0.216  ‐0.183
University Grade Average  ‐0.656*** ‐0.929*** ‐0.900***  ‐0.890***  ‐0.973***
Home Institution 
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐0.520 ‐0.413 ‐0.287  ‐0.231
Technical University  ‐/‐ ‐0.020 ‐0.015 0.116  0.138
Field of Study 
Reference Category: Law, Economics and Social Sciences
Engineering ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  0.234
Mathematics, Informatics &  
Natural Sciences  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.255 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  ‐0.149
Other Fields of Study  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐  1.561*
Language  
Proficiency 
Language Skills  ‐/‐ 0.013 0.012 0.012  0.017
TOEFL  ‐/‐ 0.007 0.113 0.079  0.056
Work Experience 
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job
at University  ‐/‐ 0.326 0.340 0.343  0.493
both at University & outside University ‐/‐ ‐0.050 0.002 0.049  0.116
Outside University   ‐/‐ 0.081 0.150 0.138  0.209
Recipient of other 
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  ‐/‐  0.087  0.080  0.028  0.095 
Any other Merit‐Based Stipend  ‐/‐  0.004  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  ‐/‐ 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.733  0.826*  0.845* 
Applied for other Scholarships  ‐/‐  0.430*  0.415*  0.511**  0.538** 
Project‐Specific 
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐/‐ ‐0.010 ‐0.010 ‐0.010  ‐0.012
Private Guest Institution  ‐/‐ 0.406 0.437 0.529  0.525
Guest Institution=Top10 University  ‐/‐ 0.353 0.272 0.330  0.301
Guest Institution 
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West
Canada  ‐/‐ ‐0.066 ‐0.036 0.067  0.011
US‐Midwest ‐/‐ 0.557 0.507 0.598  0.621
US‐Northeast ‐/‐ ‐0.532 ‐0.604 ‐0.560  ‐0.613
US‐South  ‐/‐ ‐0.114 ‐0.128 ‐0.122  ‐0.192
Number of 
Extracurricular 
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity
One Type of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.670** 0.636*  0.717**  0.744**
More Types of ECAs  ‐/‐ 0.569* 0.515*  0.574*  0.665**
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐/‐ ‐0.176 ‐0.178 ‐0.210  ‐0.223
Recommending Person=Professor ‐/‐ 0.300 0.287 0.325  0.264
Good Relation to Recommending Person ‐/‐ ‐0.319 ‐0.315 ‐0.301  ‐0.315
Applicant 
Characteristics 
Gender  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.226  0.250
Glasses  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.251  0.165
Born in Germany  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.160  0.215
Age  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐0.178*  ‐0.168
Parents=Academics  ‐/‐ ‐/‐ ‐/‐ 0.078  0.157
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad 
Program 
Selection Year 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
‐/‐ 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     0.250*** ‐0.585 ‐0.677 ‐1.269  ‐1.375*
Observations    226 226  226  226  226 
Pseudo R²    0.069 0.169 0.179 0.196  0.217
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01
 
 XLVIII 
 
 
Probit Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0) P ‐ XI P ‐ XII  P ‐ XIII 
Academic  
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.319  ‐0.297  ‐0.083 
University Grade Average  ‐0.920***  ‐1.065***  ‐1.046*** 
Language  
Proficiency  Language Skills  0.010  0.013  0.012 
Recipient of other  
Sponsorships 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   0.740*  1.024**  1.011** 
Applied for other Scholarships  0.419**  0.522**  0.481** 
Project‐Specific  
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐0.011  ‐0.012  ‐0.012 
Private Guest Institution  0.079  0.124  0.129 
Guest Institution=Top10 University   0.257  0.257  0.193 
Number of  
Extracurricular  
Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity 
One Type of ECAs  0.588*  0.572*  0.626* 
More Types of ECAs  0.483  0.519  0.534 
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  ‐0.183  ‐0.252  ‐0.348 
Recommending Person=Professor  0.302  0.193  0.138 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  ‐0.225  ‐0.234  ‐0.253 
Applicant  
Characteristics 
Gender  0.180  0.156  0.154 
Born in Germany  0.204  0.479  0.471 
Age  ‐0.172*  ‐0.166  ‐0.182* 
Parents=Academics  0.112  0.197  0.187 
Evaluation Committee  
Characteristics 
Size  ‐0.030  ‐0.134  ‐0.139 
Fraction of Female Evaluators  0.953  0.775  0.659 
Mainly Male Evaluators  0.218  0.316  0.209 
Average Evaluator Age  ‐0.025  ‐0.026  ‐0.032 
Dispersion Evaluator Age  ‐0.007  0.004  0.011 
Interview  
Framework 
Reference Category: Interview Time 10‐10:59 a.m. 
Interview Time: 09‐09:59 a.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.013  ‐0.029 
Interview Time: 11‐11:59 a.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.959**  ‐0.931** 
Interview Time: 12‐01:30 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.157  ‐0.195 
Interview Time: 02‐02:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  0.251  0.264 
Interview Time: 03‐03:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.657  ‐0.687 
Interview Time: 04‐04:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  0.152  0.186 
Interview Time: 05‐06:59 p.m.  ‐/‐  ‐0.227  ‐0.215 
Pre‐selection  
Outcome  Pre‐Selection Score  ‐/‐  ‐/‐  0.074*** 
Year  Selection Year  ‐0.389*  ‐0.479**  ‐0.503** 
Control Variables  Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐1.006  ‐1.065  ‐0.852 
Observations    226  226  226 
Pseudo R²    0.176  0.226  0.261 
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
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Probit Regression Coefficients  Estimation Number 
Dependent Variable: Scholarship Awarded (Yes=1 No=0)  P ‐ III  P ‐ XIV 
Academic  
Achievement 
High School Grade Average  ‐0.545***  ‐0.282 
University Grade Average  ‐0.922***  ‐0.629** 
Home Institution  
Characteristics 
Reference Category: University 
University of Applied Sciences  ‐0.385  ‐0.184 
Technical University  ‐0.285  ‐0.169 
Language  
Proficiency 
Language Skills  0.018  0.008 
TOEFL  0.513***  0.187 
Work Experience  
Part‐Time 
Reference Category: No Part‐Time Job 
at University   0.159  0.208 
both at University & outside University  0.133  ‐0.020 
Outside University   0.010  0.030 
Recipient of other  
Sponsorships 
‘BAföG’  0.039  0.108 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’   0.663**  0.352 
Applied for other Scholarships  0.238  0.311* 
Project‐Specific  
Statements 
Tuition Fees (in Thousand US)  ‐0.003  ‐0.008 
Private Guest Institution  0.203  0.363 
Guest Institution=Top10 University   0.006  0.149 
Guest Institution  
Region 
Reference Category: Guest Institution Region=US‐West 
Canada  0.138  0.099 
US‐Midwest  0.310  0.308 
US‐Northeast  ‐0.163  ‐0.308 
US‐South  0.010  0.014 
Number of  
Extracurricular Activities 
Reference Category: No Extracurricular Activity 
One Type of ECAs  0.569**  0.383 
More Types of ECAs  0.566**  0.339 
Letter of  
Reference 
Recommendation  0.122  ‐0.022 
Recommending Person=Professor  0.587***  0.406* 
Good Relation to Recommending Person  0.406  0.078 
Applicant  
Characteristics 
Gender  0.042  0.074 
Glasses  0.173  0.115 
Born in Germany  0.501  0.336 
Age  ‐0.159**  ‐0.098 
Parents=Academics  ‐0.104  0.065 
Pre‐selection Success  Individual Invitation Probability  ‐/‐  1.477** 
Control Variables 
Semester 
Existing Contacts to Guest Institution 
Participant in Organized Study‐Abroad Program 
Selection Year 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
incl. 
Constant     ‐3.047***  ‐3.000*** 
Observations    429  423 
Pseudo R²    0.310  0.322 
significant at * p <0.10 ** p <0.05 *** p <0.01 
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APPENDIX 3: STANDARD APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS — OVERALL SELECTION 
A standard applicant in Estimations I-III (standard applicant 1) has applied for the 
investigated scholarship program in 2008. He has achieved a high school grade average 
of 1.76 and university grades averaging 1.89. He is enrolled at a university and studies 
Law, Economics or Social Sciences in his 4th semester. His certified language skills are 
reported to be 88.85 (on a scale from 0 to 100) and he has handed in a TOEFL. In terms 
of part-time employment, he has already worked for at least one external employer, i.e. 
not at the university. The standard applicant (1) does neither receive BAföG, nor any 
other merit based stipend (and consequently he has not been awarded the stipend of the 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’). Additionally, he did not or at least did not 
indicate to have applied for other scholarship programs promising to support the study-
abroad experience.  
The standard applicant (1) wants to spend his stay abroad in the academic year 2009/10 
at a public higher education institution located in the US-West which does not belong to 
the THE Top 10 Universities in this specific field. He expects to pay tuition fees totaling 
US$ 14,643 for the entire stay abroad. He has not been in contact with the respective 
guest institution and does not take part in an organized study abroad program 
In terms of extracurricular activities, the standard applicant (1) is active in more than 
one type of ECA. He has handed in a recommendation from a professor who indicates to 
know him very well. The recommendation score the standard applicant (1) has achieved 
is 9.26.  
The standard applicant (1) is male, does not wear glasses, was born in Germany, is 21.84 
years old and did not mention his parents in the CV. Consequently, evaluators don’t 
know whether or not the standard applicant’s parents are academics.  
In pre-selection, the standard applicant (1) is evaluated by a male evaluator who is aged 
53.61 years and has managed to achieve a pre-selection score of 76.64.  
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APPENDIX 4: STANDARD APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS — PRE-SELECTION 
A standard applicant in Estimations IV-VIIb (standard applicant 2) has applied for the 
investigated scholarship program in 2008. He has achieved a high school grade average 
of 1.76 and university grades averaging 1.89. He is enrolled at a university and studies 
Law, Economics or Social Sciences in his 4th semester. His certified language skills are 
reported to be 88.76 (on a scale from 0 to 100) and he has handed in a TOEFL. In terms 
of part-time employment, he has already worked for at least one external employer, i.e. 
not at the university. The standard applicant (2) does neither receive BAföG, nor any 
other merit based stipend (and consequently he has not been awarded the stipend of the 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’). Additionally, he did not or at least did not 
indicate to have applied for other scholarship programs promising to support the study-
abroad experience.  
The standard applicant (2) wants to spend his stay abroad in the academic year 2009/10 
at a public higher education institution located in the US-West which does not belong to 
the THE Top 10 Universities in this specific field. He expects to pay tuition fees totaling 
US$ 14,652 for the entire stay abroad. He has not been in contact with the respective 
guest institution and does not take part in an organized study abroad program 
In terms of extracurricular activities, the standard applicant (2) is active in more than 
one type of ECA. He has handed in a recommendation from a professor who indicates to 
know him very well. The recommendation score the standard applicant (2) has achieved 
is 9.27.  
The standard applicant (2) is male, does not wear glasses, was born in Germany, is 21.85 
years old and did not mention his parents in the CV. Consequently, evaluators don’t 
know whether or not the standard applicant’s parents are academics.  
In pre-selection, the standard applicant (2) is evaluated by a male evaluator who is aged 
53.61 years and has managed to achieve a pre-selection score of 76.71.  
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APPENDIX 5: STANDARD APPLICANT CHARACTERISTICS — FINAL SELECTION 
A standard applicant in Estimations VIII-XIII (standard applicant 3) has applied for the 
investigated scholarship program in 2008. He has achieved a high school grade average 
of 1.55 and university grades averaging 1.68. He is enrolled at a university and studies 
Law, Economics or Social Sciences in his 4th semester. His certified language skills are 
reported to be 90.82 (on a scale from 0 to 100) and he has handed in a TOEFL. In terms 
of part-time employment, he has already worked for at least one external employer, i.e. 
not at the university. The standard applicant (3) does neither receive BAföG, nor any 
other merit based stipend (and consequently he has not been awarded the stipend of the 
‘Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes’). However, he has also applied for other 
scholarship programs promising to support the study-abroad experience.  
The standard applicant (3) wants to spend his stay abroad in the academic year 2009/10 
at a public higher education institution located in the US-Northeast which does not 
belong to the THE Top 10 Universities in this specific field. He expects to pay tuition 
fees totaling US$ 16,081 for the entire stay abroad. He has already been in contact with 
the respective guest institution, but does not take part in an organized study abroad 
program. 
In terms of extracurricular activities, the standard applicant (3) is active in more than 
one type of ECA. He has handed in a recommendation from a professor who indicates to 
know him very well. The recommendation score the standard applicant (3) has achieved 
is 9.47.  
The standard applicant (3) is male, does not wear glasses, was born in Germany, is 21.7 
years old and did not mention his parents in the CV. Consequently, evaluators don’t 
know whether or not the standard applicant’s parents are academics.  
In pre-selection, the standard applicant (3) is evaluated by a male evaluator who is aged 
53.61 years and has managed to achieve a pre-selection score of 84.98. In final selection, 
the standard applicant (3) has been interviewed from 10 to 11 am by an interview panel 
consisting of 4.36 evaluators. On average, these panel members are 52.41 years old 
(standard deviation 15.96 years). The panel mainly consists of male members: The 
fraction of female evaluators in the committee is 0.26.   
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APPENDIX 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS — REDUCED SAMPLES 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Sample 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Pre‐Selection Score 
504  75.42  14.08  19.5  100  Full 
429  76.64  13.19  19.5  100  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  76.71  13.23  19.5  100  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  84.98  5.42  73  100  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Invitation to Interview 
504  .540  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .566  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .572  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  1  ‐  1  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Scholarship Awarded 
504  .290  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .312  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .314  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .593  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Academic Achievement             
High School Grade Average 
504  1.80  .577  1  3.7  Full 
429  1.76  .553  1  3.7  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  1.76  .555  1  3.7  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  1.55  .452  1  2.7  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
(Preliminary) University Grade 
Average 
489  1.94  .551  1  3.67  Full 
429  1.89  .513  1  3.66  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  1.89  .511  1  3.66  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  1.68  .424  1  3.05  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Field of Studies             
Engineering 
504  .141  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .140  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .142  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .142  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Mathematics, Informatics and 
Natural Sciences 
504 .169  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .166  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .168  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .186  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Law, Economics and Social 
Sciences 
504 .373  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .380  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .383  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .363  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Linguistic and Cultural Sciences 
504 .284  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .289  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .284  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .288  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Other 
504 .034  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .026  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .024  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .022  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
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Type of Home Institution             
University of Applied Sciences 
500  .082  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .089  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .090  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .088  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Technical University 
500  .154  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .154  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .156  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .164  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
University 
500  .764  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .758  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .754  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .748  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Duration of Study             
Semester 
504  4.39  1.69  2  14  Full 
429  4.39  1.60  2  14  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  4.40  1.61  2  14  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  4.46  1.46  2  10  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Work Experience Part‐Time             
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Job only at University  
503  .157  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .163  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .163  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .186  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Jobs both at & outside 
University 
503  .193  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .184  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .184  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .248  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
(Previous or Current) Part‐Time 
Job only outside University  
503  .416  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .424  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .421  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .350  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
No Part‐Time Job  
503  .235  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .228  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .232  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .217  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Other Scholarships             
‘BAföG’ 
504  .226  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .221  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .222  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .190  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Previous Merit‐Based Stipend 
504  .147  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .161  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .163  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .243  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
‘Studienstiftung des Dt. Volkes’ 
504  .060  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .063  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .064  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .102  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Also Applied for Other 
Scholarships 
504  .421  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .434  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .433  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .504  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
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Number of Extracurricular Activities (ECAs) 
One Type of ECAs 
504  .290  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .284  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .286  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .270  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
More than one Type of ECAs 
504  .516  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .538  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .537  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .593  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
No Extracurricular Activity 
504  .194  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .177  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .177  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .137  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Letter of Reference             
Recommendation 
477  9.25  .708  5  10  Full 
429  9.26  .698  5  10  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  9.27  .687  5  10  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  9.47  .465  8  10  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Recommending 
Person=Professor 
504  .681  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .697  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .704  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .752  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Good Relation to 
Recommending Person 
475  .834  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .851  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .851  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .916  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Language Proficiency             
Language Skills 
491  88.61  9.35  40  100  Full 
429  88.85  9.21  40  100  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  88.76  9.23  40  100  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  90.82  7.00  60  100  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
TOEFL 
504  .562  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .580  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .582  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .770  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Project‐Specific Statements             
Tuition Fees (in Th. $US) 
494  14.221  13.98  0  80  Full 
429  14.643  14.18  0  80  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  14.652  14.18  0  80  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  16.081  14.39  0  80  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Private Guest Institution 
504  .276  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .289  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .286  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .296  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Top10 Guest Institution 
504  .181  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .184  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .187  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .181  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
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Guest Institution in Canada 
504  .206  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .198  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .196  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .190  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Guest Institution in US‐Midwest 
504  .131  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .131  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .130  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .119  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Guest Institution in US‐
Northeast 
504  .236  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .235  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .235  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .265  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Guest Institution in US‐South 
504  .177  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .179  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .180  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .186  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Guest Institution in US‐West 
504  .250  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .256  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .260  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .239  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Applicant Characteristics             
Gender 
504  .486  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .471  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .466  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .469  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Glasses 
499  .178  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .186  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .187  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .221  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Born in Germany 
504  .918  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .923  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .924  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .947  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Age 
504  21.87  1.45  19  32  Full 
429  21.84  1.36  19  27  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  21.85  1.36  19  27  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  21.69  1.19  19  27  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Parents=Academics 
504  .236  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .235  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .227  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .199  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Pre‐Selection Evaluator Characteristics and Pre‐Selection Situation 
Evaluator Gender 
504  .188  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .184  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .187  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .195  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Evaluator Age 
498  53.56  9.33  33  68  Full 
429  53.61  9.26  33  68  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  53.61  9.26  33  68  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  53.85  9.57  33  68  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
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Evaluation Committee Characteristics 
Size of Evaluation Committee  254  4.35  0.941  3  7  Full 
226  4.36  0.939  3  7  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Fraction of Female Evaluators  254  0.260  0.210  0  1  Full 
226  0.257  0.208  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Mainly Male Evaluators  254  .815  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .819  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Average Evaluator Age  254  52.41  5.42  43.5  62  Full 
226  52.41  5.41  43.5  62  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Dispersion Evaluator Age  254  16.02  6.25  4.24  27.48  Full 
226  15.96  6.25  4.24  27.48  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Framework             
Interview Time: 09‐09:59 am  254  .134  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .133  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 10‐10:59 am  254  .150  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .159  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 11‐11:59 am  254  .157  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .155  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 12‐01:30 pm  254  .154  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .159  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 02‐02:59 pm  254  .146  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .142  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 03‐03:59 pm  254  .087  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .080  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 04‐04:59 pm  254  .083  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .088  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Interview Time: 05‐06:59 pm  254  .091  ‐  0  1  Full 
226  .084  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
Year             
Selection Year 
504  .518  ‐  0  1  Full 
429  .510  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations I ‐ III 
423  .518  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations IV ‐ VIIb & XIV 
226  .509  ‐  0  1  Subjects included in Estimations VIII ‐ XIII 
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